headshot photo of Dr. Daniel Kovenock

Dr. Daniel Kovenock

Professor
Economic Science Institute
The George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics
Expertise: Game Theory; Industrial Organization; Political Economy
Office Location: Wilkinson Hall 106
Education:
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Bachelor of Science
University of Wisconsin - Madison, Ph.D.

Biography

Research Interests:

Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Microeconomic Theory, Political Economy, Public Economics

Recent Creative, Scholarly Work and Publications

Kovenock, D. and B. Roberson (2020), “Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto Games,” Economic Theory https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01272-2
Kovenock, D., B. Roberson, and R. Sheremeta (2019), "The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks," Public Choice, 179, pp. 175-194.
Gelder, A., D. Kovenock, and B. Roberson (2019), “All-Pay Auctions with Ties,” Economic Theory https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01195-7
Kovenock, D. and D. Rojo Arjona (2019), “A Full Characterization of Best-Response Functions in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game,” Economics Letters, 182, pp. 33-36.
Barbieri, S., D. Kovenock, D. Malueg, and I. Topolyan (2019), "Group Contests with Private Information and the 'Weakest Link,'" Games and Economic Behavior, 118, pp. 382-411.
Kovenock, D. and B. Roberson (2018), "The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets," Economic Inquiry, 56, pp. 2195-2211.
Gelder, A. and D. Kovenock (2017), “Dynamic Behavior and Player Types in Majoritarian Multi-Battle Contests,” Games and Economic Behavior, 104, pp. 444-455.