My presentation for Chapman is based upon the published essay included below.

This essay was originally published in *Milton Now*, edited by Catharine Gray and Erin Murphy for Routledge Press in 2014.

Along with myself, contributors to this volume included Sharon Achinstein, Ann Coiro, Frances Dolan, Margaret, Jonathan Goldberg, Feisal Mohamed, Molly Murray, Mary Nyquist, Diane Purkiss, Rachel Trubowitz, Eliot Visconsi, Christopher Warley, and Reginald Wilson.

The work that comprises this essay will also play a role in my current work-in-progress, *Eve’s Economy: Free Markets and Female Desire in English Restoration Writings by Women*.

---

**Shades of Representation:**

Lucy Hutchinson’s Ghost and the Politics of the Representative

In their preface to *Re-Membering Milton*, editors Mary Nyquist and Margaret Ferguson write that “much remains to be done in the way of situating Milton’s presentation of gender relations historically, including, now, in relation to the various women writers of the period who have recently been discovered.” Nyquist’s contribution compares Milton’s treatment of gender in Genesis with interpretations offered by two of his female contemporaries, Rachel Speght and Mary Astell; she does so in order to advance the third wave feminist “attack” on “Western bourgeois” liberalism. While some liberal feminists posit that Milton’s epic presages gender equality by providing Eve with a “dominion” over the ordering and naming of plants that is symmetrical to Adam’s dominion over animals, Nyquist argues that this technique of “formal balance and harmonious pairing” merely “neutralizes” differences that are “ordered hierarchically and ideologically.” Speght, on the other hand, asserts that “all” are equally “serviceable” unto God, including Eve -- God’s “last work and therefore the best” -- while Astell
interrogates the contradiction between Milton’s radical republicanism and his conservative
gender politics: “how much soever Arbitrary Power may be dislik’d on a throne, Not Milton
himself wou’d cry up Liberty to poor Female Slaves, or plead for the Lawfulness of Resisting a
Private Tyranny.” By contrasting Milton’s liberalism with that of an even broader and diverse
range of women’s perspectives, Shannon Miller confirms Nyquist’s finding that Milton’s gender
politics are “distinctive and motivated” rather than ideologically-neutral. But even as Miller also
exposes the masculinism of Milton’s position on dominion, she argues that the assimilation of
women’s viewpoints reveals the diversity within the liberal tradition rather than its dependence
upon the idea that “bourgeois man has proved the measure” of who gets to be “equal with
whom” and “to what end.” Nyquist alludes to this possible alternative conclusion, asserting that
Speght “may very well be the most important unsung foremother of modern liberal feminist
commentators on Genesis and Paradise Lost” and that Astell’s Reflections Upon Marriage
deploys the “means of the very rationalist and individualist principles that came to prevail during
the Civil War period” to become “fully conscious” of their “liberties,” particularly when they are
considering marriage - this “state of domestic subjection.” But she ultimately rejects it,
contending that the bourgeois notion of contractual relations depends upon “the progressive
privatization and sentimentalization of the domestic sphere” which in turn entails a “novel
female subjectivity.” Adam’s narcissistic desire for Eve to function as his “other self” is
rewarded but Eve’s preference for her own image is “unambiguously constituted” as a “specular
illusion” and an “error.” Neo-Platonists read the Narcissus myth as “a reflection of the ‘fall’ of
spirit into matter” but Milton turns this “tragic tale” into a comedy by enlightening Eve to the
superiority of Adam’s “manly grace and wisdom” over her feminine beauty. These qualities are

not merely “attributes of Adam” but “the reality principle itself”xi and thus the idea that Eve ever possessed a self that enabled her to consent to – and potentially resist -- man’s dominion is itself a myth. Similarly, while Miller invites us to think in terms of ‘liberalisms,’ she joins Nyquist in rejecting the ‘bourgeois’ variant for its division of family from state and its confinement of women to domestic subjection. Like Milton, Locke’s Two Treatises subsumes women into the “biblical subjectivity” of Eve’s motherhood while extending Adam’s into a universal conception of “Man” whose acquisition of dominion through labor enables him to “begin the very development of state organization.”xii

In this essay, I continue to place the voices of early modern women writers into dialogue with the liberal tradition as it is represented in this context by Milton. I will agree with Miller that assimilating women’s voices reveals liberalism’s elastic potential for gender equality.xiii But I will argue that the elegies and memoirs that Lucy Hutchinson wrote for her husband, Colonel John Hutchinson, after he died in Charles II’s prison in 1664, spotlight the dimensions of liberal thought that understood “dominion” as something to be limited rather than gained. While modern feminists stress women’s access to public forms of power, Hutchinson joined male counterparts in arguing that the cultivation of virtue within the private sphere would structure a delimited sphere of rule and a diminished, even spectral role for rulers. Hutchinson advocates limited dominion through dramatizing the improper modes of looking associated with tyranny. As Rebecca Bushnell notes, Renaissance writers typically represented tyrants as beastial, idolatrous effeminate, theatrical, and uxorious.xiv They desired to idolatrously compel their subjects’ gaze by surrounding themselves with the patina of divinity while regarding others as possessions rather than autonomous beings in possession of their own personal sovereignty. Tyrants’
enslavement to their passions signified their loss of reason and ineligibility for power. As Laura Lungar Knoppers points out, this Renaissance conceit persisted into the seventeenth century, utilized to discredit Charles I, Cromwell, and Charles II respectively.\textsuperscript{xv} Clement Fatovic takes it even further, identifying “the transposition” of “anti-popery,” in England from “the external struggle against European Counter-Reformation” to “an internal struggle against royal and clerical tyranny” and on to the individual’s “interior” civil war with the idolatrous tyrant within as a “crucial stage” in “the development of English both liberal and socialistic variations on republican thought.”\textsuperscript{xvi} In her elegies and memoirs, Hutchinson effects this transposition by staging a civil war with her own inner tyrant, lamenting that she has become a ghost condemned to purgatory for idolizing her husband. She is a specter not because she lacks a self but because she possesses one which is equally vulnerable to “falling into matter” through her tragically dehumanizing passion for her spouse \textit{and} equally capable of acquiring wisdom through hindsight. She not only represents herself as a shade, she draws upon shadow theory by Lucretius and employs verbal forms of shading in her work as pedagogical devices for contrasting lower order of idolatrous looking with higher form of republican reflection wherein one sees more clearly by acknowledging the capacity for error that shadows the pursuit of power.\textsuperscript{xvii} Jonathan Goldberg explored Hutchinson’s Lucretian understanding of shadows as physical traces of the undifferentiated ground or maternal seedbed from which all life arises rather than the immaterial reflections of material object.\textsuperscript{xviii} As he argues, Hutchinson’s ghostly personae enables her to function as the “unseen matter that makes for visibility” – the authorial ground and maternal creator who retranslates her husband’s death into the “writing matter” of his life, thereby subverting such binaries as “republican/royalist; humanist/Christian; puritan/pagan;
male female.” Because this “principle of sameness” is central to Goldberg’s interest in Hutchinson’s work, he registers a brief objection to the moment in her epic, Order and Disorder, when she proffers a ‘Christian republican’ version of peace through “exclusions that justify such invidious distinctions as that between the saved and the enslaved.” But Goldberg’s focus on the continuity between difference and resemblance causes him to overlook Hutchinson’s emphasis upon the modes of transformation that do preserve a hierarchical duality – though not discontinuity -- between lower and higher forms of knowledge. Higher knowledge emerges through trial and error – through an engagement with the body that heightens awareness of the limitations of human knowledge – thus she also displays a ‘Christian republican’ interest in saving the enslaved by helping them to see how badly they see – by using darkness to illuminate their dark capacity for sin. So, while she subverts gender hierarchies insofar as she represents women as being equally capable of acquiring and imparting such wisdom, she privileges the guilty wisdom that Eve gains in hindsight as the “reality principle” for those who occupy positions of social and political authority and she uses her own hard-gained authority to enact and instruct her readers in the higher ways of looking needed to prevent undue claims of dominion over others. She aims to build not just an authorial self but also an enduring republic.

Some theorist of seventeenth-century republican thinker identified spectral self-hood as the proper subject position for rulers. English republicans opposed monarchy in part because of what they saw as its idolatrous use of royal iconography, including the ‘Royal Image’ of the king himself. Designed to enthrall subjects by dazzling their senses rather than freeing them by activating their reason through argumentation, seductive icons were to be smashed and replaced with a limited and demystified state. Once in power, iconoclastic republicans faced a crisis: How
could they represent a republic when representation itself was suspect? To do so, as David Norbrook argues, theorists often assimilated Renaissance humanist conceptions of virtue to new modes of political representation, including those used to represent the democratic institution of political representation. As the author of *Englands Miserie and Remedie* wrote in 1645, representatives needed to understand that they were not sun kings whose obsession with staging their own divinity led them to obscure the sovereignty of their people; rather, they were public servants or “shadows” who were obliged to magnify the people’s “substance” rather than their own. Given that, in a republic, the people were the rulers, they had to be made more conscious of the self-destructive effects of investing men with god-like powers. As George Wither wrote in *Vox Pacifica* (1645), “But, let them know [when they were elected] ‘twas for another thing./Which they but represent; and, where, ere long./Them to a strict account, will, doubtless, bring,/Of any way, they do it wilfull wrong:/For that, indeed, is really, the Face,/Whereof, they are the shadow, in the glasse.” But institutions also had to be developed that would permanently consign representatives to the shadows. In his poem, *The Dark Lantern* (1652), Wither envisioned a bi-cameral structure: A house of representatives motored by the permanent revolution of election cycles and term limits and a Supreme Senate whose 12 members inhabited a purgatorial space wherein they would guard the citizens’ rights by performing a penitential awareness of their penchant for tyrannically envying and expropriating those rights. While Wither identifies Catholicism as a source of tyranny, his solutions draw upon the Catholic tradition of *contemptus mundi*. After English republicans failed to erect such institutions, they blamed themselves for their own inability to turn away from the idols of
ambition. Instead of retreating, they shifted their efforts towards reforming the flawed modes of representation that undergirded tyranny in all its manifestations.

Norbrook points out that Milton did not provide a “clear concept of political representation.” But while Milton does not go so far as to represent politicians as ghosts, his belief in man’s fallibility undergirds his theories of limited power. His critique of idolatry was critical to this vision. As Barbara Lewalski argues, Milton, like his fellow Puritans, “understood idolatry as pertaining to the worship of a ‘representative of the true God or of some false god’”; unlike his more radical contemporaries, Milton confined his iconoclasm to the pen, using it to broaden the definition of idolatry from the practice of superstitious rites to a psychological condition of social, religious, and political enthrallment. For Milton, “the disposition to attach divinity to or special sanctity to any person – pope, king, or prelate – or to any human institution, or to any material good, was idolatrous” but the “evil” of idolatry “resides less in the external gesture than in the internal servility involved in worshiping anything that is not God.” Only by “worshiping a God who is transcendent, and rejecting all such material embodiments of the sacred, can humans attain and preserve their proper freedom and dignity.” Monarchy was a “‘civil kinde of idolatry’” in that it used such motifs as the sun to deify the king and enslave the people to their passions” but the onus was on people to recognize and resist the threat that these attempts at “psychic idolatry” posed to liberty. The idolatrous equation of men with God was especially threatening to religious liberty as Milton warns in *A Treatise of Civil Power.* Milton’s antidote was a form of government which, unlike the regime of “the pope antichrist,” would not allow ministers and magistrates to “assume” this “infallibilitie” over the conscience – or the “spirit it self of God within us”; as Paul tells the Corinthians, apostles do not have
“dominion over your faith” and so “much less have ordinary ministers.” In *The Readie and Easie Way*, “Milton envisioned a Senate with minimal control over citizens’ lives. This institution would be perpetuated through the creation of an educated citizenry. As Milton writes, “To make the people fittest to chuse and the chosen fittest to govern, will be to . . . teach the people . . . virtue, temperance, modestie, sobrietie, parsimonie, justice; not to admire wealth or honour; to hate turbulence and ambition; to place every one his private welfare and happiness in the public peace, libertie and safety.” Because it was comprised of such august individuals, this governing body would wield little institutional power. Once elected, representatives would function as “true keepers of our libertie”; beyond that that, “most of their business will be in forein affairs.” Given that possessing power in and of itself corrupts, a strictly limited government would insure that those elected do not succumb to temptation once in office. Submission rather than dominion forms the reality principle for proper rule.

Lewalski’s discussion of idolatry refrains from accounting for gender differences in Milton’s parameters for worshipping humans as God and, by implication, for the role that women were imagined to play the formation and perpetuation of the republic. As Lewalski notes, for “Milton and for his God, the only objects worthy of reverence on earth are human beings themselves, as bearers of God’s image.” This would seem to constitute men and women as equals, as would Milton’s non-gendered use of the plural “we” and “us” in *Civil Power* to refer to those whose “God within” entitles them to religious freedom. Indeed when Satan first sees Adam and Eve in Eden in *Paradise Lost*, he is impressed by what he sees as Adam and Eve’s equal standing: “Two of far nobler shape erect and tall,/ Godlike erect, with native Honor clad/ In naked Majestie seemd Lords of all,/ And worthie seemd for in thir looks Divine/ The image of
their glorious Maker shone.” However the narrator informs us that, while Adam and Eve are “in true filial freedom plac’t,” they are not equal to one another as “thir sex not equal seem’d.” Because Eve’s “wanton ringlets” resemble the “tendrils” of “the Vine,” she is consigned to “coy submission” while Adam’s “large Front and Eye sublime declar’d/ Absolute rule” as did his “Hyacinthin Locks.” As Milton aphorizes, “Hee for God only, shee for God in him.” Milton does not wonder if his physiological essentialism consigns Eve to idolatry given that Adam’s right to rule is inscribed on his body. Thus he raises but does not answer the question of how Eve is to worship Adam as God without idolizing him. When Raphael visits Eden to warn the pair of Satan’s proximity, he speaks to the difference between love and idolization but Eve is absent from this lesson. Adam seizes upon his time alone with the angel to confess that the delight his senses take in the earth’s beauty differs from the “passion” he feels when he gazes at Eve and experiences “the charm of Beauties powerful glance.” Raphael chides Adam for sliding into “subjection” to “an outside.” “True Love,” he instructs, “hath his seat/In Reason” and because it “refines the thoughts, and heart enlarges” it is the “scale” or ladder by which humans “ascend” to “heav’nly Love.” “Carnal pleasure” on the other hand reduces one to beastial effeminacy and evacuates the reason needed to govern. To ascend, Adam must respect what is “higher in Eve’s society,” that is her humanity and rationality. Feeling “half abash’t,” Adam insists that nothing so much “delights” him as “those graceful acts,/ Those thousand decencies that daily flow/From all her words and actions mixt with Love/ and sweet compliance, which declare unfeign’d/ Union of Mind, or in us both one Soule.”

But these gendered and hierarchized binaries raise more questions than they answer. If “Love” propels one up the scala natura, then why doesn’t Eve’s “Love” for Adam enable her to
ascend? How does her rationality differ from his reason? If she is capable of “graceful acts” and her “words and actions” give rise to a “thousand decencies” that “declare “Union of Mind” and “Soule” with Adam – and if these markers of interior worth matter more than externalities – then what warrants her “sweet compliance?” Milton’s use of the term “ornament” echoes the republican critique of the monarchical trappings that were said to enthrall unwary subjects. But if, as Lewalski argues, the “evil of idolatry” in Milton’s thought “resides less in the external gesture than in the internal servility involved in worshiping anything that is not God,” then Adam’s rapture is a comment upon his own flaws not Eve’s. Apparently the very quality (beauty) which renders Eve in need of government automatically renders Adam incapable of governing her. Hierarchy fails, as does Raphael’s lecture given that, after the fall, the Son rejects Adam’s explanation for the transgression – “She gave me of the Tree, and I did eate” – and instead blames his idolatrous love for his wife: “Was shee thy God, that her thou didst obey/ Before his voice, or was shee made thy guide, Superior, or but equal, that to her/ Thou did’st resigne thy Manhood, and the Place/Wherein God set thee above her made of thee.” But if Eve is innocent and her beauty rather than her substance attract Adam even after Raphael’s lesson, then why is Adam still superior? Now that nature and Adam have failed one another, a rhetorical *deux ex machina* must intervene with new information: Adam reigns because his “perfections” surpass Eve’s in “all real dignitie.” But what is “real dignity?” We are not told. Adam rules, it would seem, because God says so. Nyquist is right that Milton tries to deny Eve the makings of selfhood but wrong that he succeeds; if anything the anti-idolatrous terms upon which free humans are differentiated from enslaved beasts endows Eve with a self that undermines Milton’s labored attempts at enforcing inequality.
James Grantham Turner acknowledges “the unresolvable clash of two ideologies of gender – the ecstatic-egalitarian and the patriarchal-masculinist” by way of Milton’s treatment of idolatry, arguing that, while the younger Milton fashioned a “Miltonic solution” to the woman question by equating the image of God in man with male supremacy” the older and thrice-married author of *Paradise Lost* achieved a “sensuous maturity” which conveyed “how deeply grave in human nature this desire for the equal is.” xlvi I would take it a step further by asserting that the implied selfhood I have just delineated raises the possibility that Eve’s “biblical subjectivity” forms an unacknowledged “universal” in Milton’s work which in turn forms the basis for an entire social order predicated upon limited dominion for men as well as women. As Raphael tells Adam, the world will be ruled by “grievous Wolves” and their Satanic “assaults” will turn “all the sacred mysteries of Heav’n/ To thir own vile advantages . . . of lucre and ambition.”l However, the resulting “conflagrant mass” won’t be eradicated through competing forms of warfare or political power; instead it will be “purg’ed and refin’d” by the “return/Of him so lately promiss’d to thy aid/The Womans seed.”lii By filling the “faithful” with the “spirit” of “love” and providing them with “Spiritual Armour, able to resist,” the Son who, at that stage, will have sacrificed himself to become Christ will enable humans to ascend the scale and found “New Heav’ns, new Earth.”lii Adam draws the proper conclusions: The accomplishment of “great things” will be done “by things deemd weak; the “worldly strong, and worldly wise” will be subverted by the “simply meek”; and “to obey is best,/and love with fear the onely God.”lili The ‘masculine’ is reduced to resisting epic calls to arms and spurning the trappings of political power while the feminine is elevated to the agent of refinement. Drawing attention to the reversal without explicitly acknowledging it, Michael tells Adam that, when Eve awakens, he should “Chiefly” pass on the
message of the *Protoevangelium*, that is the promise alluded to above that, in the final days, Eve’s seed would rise up to bruise the head of the serpent. Upon waking, however, Eve reports that she already knows her destiny: “By mee, the Promis’d Seed shall all restore.” Adam, the designated mediator, is bypassed by direct communication between Eve and the divine. This is reinforced by the reason cited for why Eve was put to sleep in the first place, that is so that “all her spirits” could be “compos’d/To meek submission.” In other words, she is to be composed directly by God whereas Adam must paradoxically learn from the angel that he must compose himself into meek submission to God by remembering that he must resist “effeminate slackness” when it comes to worshipping women. What is more, when one considers that Eve’s articulation of the *Protoevangelium* comprises both her final words and the last words of the epic to be uttered by anyone other than the narrator, one can infer that Milton’s placement of this creed as the “last” and thus possible “best” message of the epic elevates Eve – the meek, mild, and obedient – to the status of not just a mother but a representative subject whose humiliating fall into sin and subsequent acceptance of submission comprises the foundation for future triumph. Men and women share an unacknowledged equality not because they both seek or possess dominion but because they are equally destined to obey God’s injunction to reject the pretensions of those who claim to have it.

And yet, as noted, Milton doesn’t explicitly address much less resolve the contradiction between his critique of idolaters and gender hierarchy, neither throughout his work in general nor by the end of *Paradise Lost*. In his rehearsal of the future, Raphael shows Adam the society of the Canaanites, drawing particular attention to those male offspring of Cain who have “yield[ed] up all their virtue, all their fame/Ignobly, to the trains and to the smiles/ Of these fair atheists.”
Interestingly, Adam is “inlined to admit delight” (his favorite mode) at the vision of this apparently harmonious society. Raphael reacts swiftly, conceding that the Canaanites do “now swim in joy” but warns that “Erelong” God will send the flood that will drive them to “swim at large” as the “world erelong a world of tears must weep.”lvii Adam has once again been taken in by appearances and so Raphael must reiterate: Idolizing women is the origin of trouble for man who should “better hold his place/ By wisdom, and superior gifts received.”lviii But it is still problematic that, after she awakes, Eve still rests in a tense state of conceptual ‘sleep’ when it comes to her relationship to this ultimate moral of the story. Ostensibly submissive by nature and worthy of direct composition by God, Eve must still look to Adam as the exemplar of submission to God – a worrisome proposition given that, even as he is being escorted out of Eden for his uxoriousness, he spares a smile for the chimera of the pretty dancing Canaanites.lxi

As stated, other of Milton’s works prove similarly recalcitrant when it comes to reconciling the logic of mediation with that of the inner spirit. In *The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, Milton argues “that nothing more hinders and disturbs the whole life of a Christian, than a matrimony found to be uncurably unfit, and doth the same in effect that an Idolatrous match.”lx If one does not divorce an “Idolatresse,” she will “pervert” her husband to “superstition” and “disinable him in the whole service of God.”lx1 But Milton does not address the dilemma a wife faces when she is prevented from living “the whole life of a Christian” by being forced to adhere to the perverse superstition that her husband is God. As a male, a husband is no less fallible than the kings, bishops, popes, and even Old Testament heroes who, Milton asseverates, are given to lust, ambition, and superstition. Indeed, as we saw with Adam, acquiring power over others immediately raises the specter of idolatry-driven overreach. Given that, for Milton, human
claims to divinity are commensurate with tyranny, one can conclude that husbandly intercession is, as Astell claimed, as tyrannical as its political correlatives and yet Milton avoids the problem, leaving us instead with an unresolved conundrum.

Lucy Hutchinson resolves this conundrum by demonstrating that, as a woman, she has the same capacity for degenerating into idolatry and ascending into love as men. She can learn to compose herself after performing a grievous error and instruct others to do the same. More broadly, she can ascertain the human capacity for idolatry in general and to limit its negative effects by constructing a social order in which any given fallible person’s ability to wield dominion over another is circumscribed. She transmits this knowledge in the context of seeking reformed modes of composing her love for her husband after he died in Charles II’s prison in 1664. When Charles II returned to the throne in 1660, his “Act of Free and General Pardon, Indemnity, and Oblivion” granted clemency to the Parliamentarians who had defeated the Crown after a decade of Civil War and implemented a republic in its stead. The Act also consigned the Civil War and Commonwealth eras to “oblivion” by purging them from the historical record. The exception to this rule proved the signatories to the order for Charles I’s beheading. These “Murderers of my Father” as Charles II described them would be condemned to that most literal form of oblivion – death. In the end, only a small number of the Commissioners were executed. But royalists still “Infamed” their opponents in “Hystory” as Christ-killing “Traytors” and Satantic “rebels” who had to be prevented from further “simulating” themselves as heroic “saints” and leading their “deluded followers” into further prosecution of their “oh so Glorious Cause.” Lucy Hutchinson’s husband, John, was labeled just such a “Traytor,” The Governor of Nottingham, a Colonel in the Parliamentarian forces, and a Member of Parliament, John
Hutchinson served on the court that tried and ultimately executed the king in 1649 but later withdrew from service in protest of Oliver Cromwell’s increasing ambition.\textsuperscript{lxv} After Cromwell died in 1658, John Hutchinson joined the Convention Parliament to try and salvage the commonwealth but was thwarted by the restoration. As a regicide, he was denied clemency. Supporters worked to obtain his pardon but he prepared for death. When his wife forged an apology in his name, he was pardoned but barred from office and in 1663 accused of conspiracy. No formal charges were filed but he died in prison the following year. Riven with sorrow, his widow composed a Biblical epic, \textit{Order and Disorder}, a cycle of elegies dedicated to her spouse, and \textit{The Memoirs of the Life of Colonel John Hutchinson}.\textsuperscript{lxvi} In the elegies and \textit{Memoirs}, Lucy Hutchinson recovers her husband from oblivion by supplanting his image as a “simulated saint” condemned to hell and replacing it with that of the virtuous republican man whose dedication to the cause earned him a saint’s rest in heaven. To do so, she provides what Milton avoids – the spectacle of a woman who failed to subdue her idolatrous passions and is left a specter by the loss of her idol. As she laments in \textit{Elegy 1}, her husband’s death means that she is now her “owne pale Empty Shade.”\textsuperscript{lxvii} And as she writes in the \textit{Memoirs}, while her spouse has “gone hence,” she remains “an airy phantasm walking about his sepulcher.”\textsuperscript{lxviii} But by representing herself as a specter, Hutchinson does not betray a lack of selfhood but dramatizes, condemns, and exploits the potential for refinement in the plight of the female idolater, thereby constituting the equality of selfhood as the foundation for a delimited political sphere.

In her elegies, Hutchinson uses Eve to link reformation to the capacity to recognize error. Her husband’s death should result in submission to God’s will but instead her grief causes her to look back rather than up. As she writes in \textit{These verses transcribed out of my other Book J: H},
“If I cast back my sorrow drowned eyes/ I see our nere, to be reentered paradise/ the Flaming sword which doth us thence, exclude/by sad remorce & ugly guilt persu’ed./if on my sinn defiled self I gaze,/ my nakednesse & spots do me amaze.” Exiled from the paradise of her marriage and the republic, she is now “her own pale Shade” because, as she states in Elegy 1, “The effect of [her] human Passion” for her husband was inevitably “woe & death.” Her husband achieved “Love devine” by bringing his “wild passions Under Servitude” and dedicating himself to God. As a result, he is now “Deaths Spotlesse victim.” She, however, is covered with “spotts” because she remains among those whose “lusts enslaved in sadder [Thralldome] lay.” And while his “steadfast looke” is “fixt” on “God alone,” her gaze continues to roam, even lingering in The Night 8:th, to catalogue the features of her husband’s face. Norbrook argues that Hutchinson’s blazon “stays just this side of idolatry,” but I suggest she lambastes herself for having committed that very sin. While she recognizes her error, the knowledge is gained in hindsight as her transgression lands her in a purgatory of regret and reflection. Although tormented, this space enables her to validate the idea that she did have a true self—composed of womanly grace and wisdom— that was condemned to death-in-life not because she failed to worship her husband as God but because she succeeded.

Purgatory is for Hutchinson the sort of psychic space which, Fatovic argued, represents the individual’s internal war with idolatry and tyranny. But it also enables her to display her new ability to see into the sublime workings of sight. Hutchinson notes that readers might experience “mirth” at the fact that she, a Puritan, has invoked the Catholic “fable” of purgatory. But by imagining herself as hovering within this fabled place, she draws upon the Protestant transposition of the geography of purgatory onto the mental landscape of the fallen human
condition. In the post-lapsarian middle space between heaven and hell, one attains higher understanding by recognizing that, while earth can be made to simulate God’s kingdom, it is not heaven itself. The few who never confuse the two possess “perfect” and “clean” hearts; those who idolatrously mistake one for the other harbor “‘hearts that burn like ovens,’ hearts fueled by lust, envy, and ambition, Judas hearts.”\textsuperscript{lxxvii} The hearts in the middle are the melting, broken, and contrite hearts owned by those awakened to their proclivity for burning. That awakening enables them to detect the “charnal house” that lurks beneath heavenly simulacra and to enlighten others to the dark truth that, as John Donne wrote, we are ALL our “own ghosts.”\textsuperscript{lxxviii} As a “middle heart,” Hutchinson sees and reflects upon the consequences of her profane love for her “adored idol” and enunciates herself as a subject by acknowledging her limitations.

The insight provided by this self-mediating state allows her to expose the fate that awaits idolatrous royalists. Charles II’s propagandists quickly reconstituted the solar iconography of the monarch, arguing that “The Beauty of a King is the brightest thing that a nations eye can be fixed upon.”\textsuperscript{lxxix} While John Hutchinson had “fixt” his eyes upon God, Lucy, like the royalists, was still “charmed” by that “mighty witch” who disguises the “loathsome dunghill” of the world as “Groves” and “Pallaces.”\textsuperscript{xxx} But from her vantage point, she can transmit the knowledge that her husband now occupies one of the “blessed seates” in heaven while those who still fail to make “Carnall reason freely to lay downe/ At the Lords feete her Scepture & her Crowne” are condemned to stupefaction.\textsuperscript{xxx} Hutchinson enlightens readers to their condition by having them see through the eyes of her own guilt. By denoting and reforming their idolatry, she constitutes her spectral condition as a “reality principle” that keeps the republic in sight as a social order designed to dispossess others of the ability to wield power by establishing themselves as idols.
In *These verses*, Hutchinson demonstrates that a significant part of preserving the republic means exercising the forms of looking that do not reduce others to subjection. Her passion rendered her a tyrannical usurper of her husband’s own selfhood. As she tells him, “if I on thee a private glance reflect/ confusion does my shamefull eyes deject/ Seeing the man I Love by me betrayd,/ by me who for his mutual help was made./ Who to preserve thy life ought to have dyed,/ & I have kill’d thee by my foolish pride,/ defiled thy Glory and pul’d down thy Throne.”

This confession recalls the letter she forged in his name to save him from execution. By desiring him “privately,” Hutchinson tempted her husband into forestalling his fate as a martyr and living the “whole life of a Christian.” But by implicating herself as his Judas, she legitimates his republican martyrdom and dethrones those idolaters who continue to claim the title of God’s anointed. She had attempted to live the “whole life of a Christian” but fell short, succumbing instead to the lusts of the inner tyrant. Now, she is able to distinguish between a passionate “glance” and the “shamefull eyes” which recognize how her “foolish pride” compromised her “love.” Hutchinson plays God to her own Eve, chastising herself for not honoring what was higher in her husband’s society.

In the introduction to *The Memoirs of the Life of Colonel John Hutchinson*, Hutchinson identifies her children as the intended beneficiaries of her hard-earned lessons and delineates how those lessons apply to both the personal and the political spheres. She preserves the distinction between family and state in order to argue that the private sphere functions as the arbiter of the virtue needed to sustain a republic. But this virtue consists of limiting the capacity for anyone to use institutional power to expand their dominion over others. As a mother, her pedagogical labor constructs the republic through the cultivation of this virtue rather than
military adventurism or political contestation. She is still in mourning so her task is difficult but she makes that difficulty the basis for her instruction. As she writes, those who “dote on mortal excellencies” are “endangered” of “let[ting] loose the winds of passion” when their “adored idols are taken from them.” As one who doted on her husband’s mortal excellence, she is “under a command not to grieve at the common rate of desolate women,” thus she is “studying” how to “moderate” her “woe” while also “augmenting” her love. On the one hand, it is common for mourners to alleviate their grief by having the objects that compel it removed from view but this tactic succeeds at a cost. As “oblivion’s curtain is drawn over the dead face,” things “less lovely are liked” because “they are not viewed together with that which was most excellent.”

Deprived by oblivion of the opportunity to compare and contrast, one loses sight of the standard-bearers for true worth. On the other hand, if she “augments” her love by “gilding” it with the “flattering commendations” used by court panegyrists, the decoration of her own devotion will eclipse her husband’s “substantial glory.” To find her “medium,” she composes “a naked, undressed narrative, speaking the simple truth of him”; to do so, she uses verbal forms of shading or chiaroscuro to bring the depth of her husband’s substance into relief through contrasting the light of “that which was most excellent” with the darkness of “things less lovely.”

Hutchinson begins by reminding both her own children and all children of this “errring age” that hers is the “less lovely” but necessary perspective through which her husband will literally be viewed. As she writes, her husband’s life generated a “resplendent body of light” designed to “discover the deformities of this wicked age and to instruct the erring children of this generation” but this light can only be captured through her own “apprehension and expression,” thus it must “shine as under a very thick cloud, which will obscure much of [its] lustre.”
is advantageous for there is “need of this medium to this world’s weak eyes” which “hath but few people so virtuous in it as can believe (because they find themselves so short) that any other could make so large a progress in the race of piety, honour, and virtue.” By shading her husband’s virtue through her own weak eyes, she can enable readers to see him more clearly. The assertion that bright things are best viewed through a “very thick cloud” draws not only on the Biblical tradition of seeing God through a cloud but also, as mentioned, from the theory of optics developed in *On the Nature of Things*, the scientific poem composed by Lucretius in the 1st century and translated into English by Hutchinson in the 1650s. Here, eyes shun “splendid objects” because they “are made blind with gazing on the sun.” The sun burns the eyes with “seeds of fire,” causing them to see all through a yellowish “sickly hiew.” In the dark, eyes can see splendid objects because “open sight” first takes in “the neere shadows of the mist.” Gradually, the eyes are filled with this “obscure air” then the “bright shining ayre” of the object arrives, slowly “purging” those “dark shadows” and opening a “passage” for the “splendor” of the now visible image. While ultimately marginalized, the “black shaddows” form a necessary frame for the act of envisioning. Enacting this theory while explicating it, Hutchinson’s introduction shades the splendor of her text by providing readers with insight into the workings of their fallen human eyes. And as the guilty author of her husband’s life, she actively shades and moderates the faulty modes of looking practiced by those who, like her, “delight more in the mirror that reflected the Creator’s excellence” than in the Creator’s “own fountain.” To represent her husband’s life, she must look at him rather than God. But to remind us that this representation is just that, she filters it through the mist of her *gnosis*. 
Hutchinson both declares that her husband reflects a “greater light” and frames him with the supposition of shame so that we do not mistake him as the source for his own splendor. While splendid, he is still “but man, a son of Adam, an inheritor of his corrupted nature, subject to all the sins and miseries that attend it, which is necessary to be considered that we may the more magnify the riches of God’s grace and admirable power.”\textsuperscript{xcvii} The memoir is the medium through which this “Adam” is to be magnified into a “blessed image” of God’s “own glory,” thus the specter of Eve’s original sin is still “necessary to be considered.” Hutchinson then enacts the blinding effects of idolization and subsequent need for shading by telling her children that they must stop seeing their father through “tears” and allow her to “open” the “shut” eyes of their “knowledge” to “that splendor” which “should make us remember to give all his and all our glory to God alone.”\textsuperscript{xcviii} Because she is still in passion’s thrall, she focuses her children’s awakened eyes upon their father’s body, blazoning his “slender and well-proportioned shape,” his “hair of light brown . . . curling into loose great rings,” and “his lips very ruddy and graceful.”\textsuperscript{xcix} She stops herself, confessing, “All this and more is true, but I so much dislike the manner of relating it that I will make another essay.”\textsuperscript{x} In her second essay, Hutchinson provides the corrective shading that reveals her husband’s true splendor by commemorating him through his actions rather than his appearance. To throw his virtuous acts into greater relief, she parallels them with the perfidy of his foes. Her method recalls that of Plutarch’s \textit{Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans}, a connection that is strengthened by the title of this section, \textit{The Life of John Hutchinson of Owthrope, in the County of Nottingham, Esquire} and by her actual citation in the narrative of Plutarch as a major influence. Plutarch drew historical parallels between important personages from Greece and Rome and moral parallels between heroes such as the “noble
Brutus” and villains such as the “ambitious” Julius Caesar. For her part, Hutchinson brings her husband’s Brutus-like acts of self-sacrificing service into greater relief by paralleling them with the Caesarian worship of wealth and power displayed by both royalists and traitorous republicans. Just as Milton’s Adam is instructed to “love” Eve’s acts rather than enact his passion for her body, so too does Hutchinson turn her gaze away from her husband’s body so that she may commemorate his deeds.

The acts that Hutchinson valorizes are those that actively refrain from seeking dominion over others. She begins with a critique of the tyrannical overreach that began under the “dark midnight of Papacy” and resulted in the English Civil Wars. The Reformation provoked the “wrath of princes and priests” by confronting them with their subjects’ religious autonomy. In “their own delusion,” they “set up themselves in Christ’s throne” and ruled by “their own arbitrary lust.” To control ‘extremists,’ Protestants likewise invested the “princes of the world, whether Popish or Protestant” with “God’s prerogatives,” thereby changing “the idol” but leaving “the idolatry still in practice.” Charles I began as a “temperate and chaste” alternative to the “intemperate lusts” of his father but proved a “worse encroacher upon the civil and spiritual liberties of his people” after he “married a Papist, a French lady” of “great wit and beauty, to whom he became a most uxorious husband.” The Queen lured her husband into tyranny and the “great tragedy” of the wars began. In contrast, John Hutchinson had a “great passion” for his wife but “was not uxorious”: He “loved her in the Lord as his fellow-creature, not his idol” and “governed” his household “by persuasion” rather than force. Nor was he jealous to possess fame or power. When offered a commission in exchange for swearing an oath to the Parliamentarians at the beginning of the war, his “modesty and prudence” prevented him
from “hastily rush[ing] into” office but when the king threatened to confiscate Nottingham’s power supply, Hutchinson’s “honest neighbours” applied to him for leadership because “his good affections to godliness and the interest of his country” were “a glory that could not be concealed.” As his wife editorializes, Englishmen obeyed kings who upheld the balance of powers and observed the liberties of their people but they were “invincible” in “defense of their freedoms against all those usurping lords that scorned to allow them liberty.”

While Lucy Hutchinson continues to contrast the vices of monarchy with the virtues of republicanism, the majority of her parallels involve republicans whose own abuses of power render John Hutchinson’s “fidelity more illustrious” and “kept him more strict in the watch over all his actions.” Armed with the idea that political malfeasance should inspire greater humility, John Hutchinson confronts Oliver Cromwell. A decorated General, the early Cromwell was as “equally zealous” as John Hutchinson “for the public service.” But after becoming the new commonwealth’s first head of state, his heart became “ulcerated” by the “poison of ambition.” Now a Member of Parliament, Hutchinson warned his friend that he “would darken all his glories if he should become a slave to his own ambition.” Cromwell seemed to listen but the Colonels’ inability to convince either the leader or his “idolaters” that the headship needed a stronger and more permanent institutional “curb” upon its power meant that Cromwell’s lust subverted the “Prospering and preserving” of the republic. In contrast, John Hutchinson resigned from government on the grounds that, because “God by nature” obliged leaders to defend the people from “invading tyrants, as far as [they] may by a lawful call and means,” Cromwell’s invasion of his own people lifted “the yoke” that bound Hutchinson to service.
In the sections dealing with the restoration, Lucy Hutchinson’s uxorious love takes center stage as the narrative foil for her husband’s devotion to a higher calling. But as she approaches her finale, she subverts her own binary. As Hutchinson aphorizes, “all virtues are mediums and have their extremes.”

She moderates her own use of sharp contrast by cross-hatching the parallel lines drawn between her guilt and her husband’s virtue in the context of her husband’s extreme readiness to die for his cause. Under examination for his role in the regicide, John Hutchinson testified that, “if he had erred, it was the inexperience of his age and the defect of his judgment, and not the malice of his heart, which had ever prompted him to pursue the general advantage of his country more than his own; and if the sacrifice of him might conduce to the public peace and settlement, he should freely submit his life and fortune to their dispose.”

Hearing this, his wife begins to suspect that he has become “ambitious of being a public sacrifice.” To stop him, she forges his signature to her letter of apology. Appeased, the House grants his pardon. In her elegies, Hutchinson cites this letter as evidence of her idolatrous preference for his person over principle. But in the Memoirs, her use of the highly loaded term “ambitious” also provokes us to wonder if her husband’s passion for martyrdom hasn’t begun to mask an ironic form of self-aggrandizement. She on the other hand, begins to appear more pious. When the trick earns his pardon, she attributes its success to the “over-ruling power of him that orders all men’s hearts, who was then pleased to reserve his servant.”

In impersonating her husband, she was impersonating divine will rather than her own. The Colonel himself becomes convinced that his wife’s letter served God’s plan to preserve him even as he insists that he is still destined to perform “some eminent service or suffering in this cause.” His arrest and incarceration appear to confirm this interpretation. Still his wife implies that his zeal for
martyrdom has waxed into pride. As she writes, while he “went as cheerfully into captivity as another would have come out of it,” she “was exceedingly sad” but her husband chided her for her sadness, telling her “it would blemish his innocence for her to appear afflicted.” This sudden concern for appearances belies his reputation as a man who acted out of conscience. What is more, when he declares that his martyrdom would “advance the cause more” by “hasting the vengeance of God” upon his “unjust enemies,” he abandons his earlier disdain for revenge and casts himself as a demigod capable of spurring God himself on to greater virtue.

By inviting us to wonder if the ideal representative hasn’t become enamored with his own royal image as a persecuted martyr, Hutchinson reminds us that her husband is a man, a fallen son of Adam, not a god. Both husband and wife – Adam and Eve -- are implicated in the fallen forms of representation that led to the republic’s demise even as Hutchinson’s reformed modes of seeing offer up the promise of republican restoration. Hutchinson augments this impression through the “shadow-language” of typology. In his youth, John was removed by God “from the passions which commonly distract young people and sequestered him into a private life.” This sequestration was reminiscent of “the preparation of Moses in the wilderness”: Like Moses, Mr. Hutchinson was “sequestered from a wicked court” and “exercised himself in contemplation of the first works and discoveries of God.” He too “had a call to go back to deliver his country groaning under spiritual and civil bondage” and his progress was likewise impeded by the idolatry of his own people. Through this parallel, Hutchinson implies that the English republic is not dead but languishes in purgatory wherein republicans must confront the charnal house that lies beneath the groves and palaces of their ambition. If they can learn to see through the shadows of penitential hindsight and self-reflection, they will approach the Promised Land.
The dialectical emphasis upon advancement through error and dominion over self rather than others serves as the reality principle for the generation that will actually form the enduring republic. When John Hutchinson is imprisoned, his life continues to “take up the parallel of the great Hebrew Prince.” Sequestered again, he is shown “a pattern of his glorious tabernacle” that is the lessons he imparts to his children in the hope that they will all “live to see the Parliament power up again.” If given a second chance, he predicts, the “pride and self-conceit” of the revolutionaries “would again bring us to confusion.” To risk mistaking the appearance of revolutionary zeal for true republican virtue, his son in particular must avoid “fall[ing] in with the first” group of revolutionaries “how fair soever their pretences” and wait instead to “see how their practices suite them.” A “hot-spirited people would first get up and put all into confusion, and then a sober party must settle things.” His son will be among those recruited by the “sober party” if “he behave himself piously and prudently, and keep free of all faction, making the public interest only his.” All interaction with royalists must also be shunned for the Colonel was “convinced there was a serpentine seed in them.” The phrase “serpentine seed” references the *Protoevangelium*. In Hutchinson’s typological use of that text, her children are among those offspring who will prevail if they apply the precepts learned by their parents in the “wilderness” time of restoration. Thus even though they are currently “enslaved,” they have the ability to ascend the ladder and become the “saved.” And while Hutchinson’s Eve is, like Milton’s, associated with motherhood, she is also associated with the interior struggle with her passions that enables her to acquire reason and instruct others to limit their desire for dominion over others. Likewise, John Hutchinson’s Adam is associated with fatherhood rather than a universal manhood whose power lies in “dominion.” Together, he and
his wife steward a generation that defines legitimate rulers as those who are suspicious of power and capable of sustaining institutions with highly circumscribed responsibilities. Through their collective cultivation of citizens dedicated to respecting the substance and selfhood of others, both men and women “develop” and “organize” the state.

By placing Hutchinson’s self-representation as a guilty shade in dialogue with Milton’s underdeveloped treatment of the relationship between women and idolatry, we see both liberalism’s elastic potential for gender equality as well as the emphasis that both male and female writers placed upon limiting rather than accessing political power over others.

---


ii Mary Nyquist, “The genesis of gendered subjectivity in the divorce tracts and in Paradise Lost,” in Ferguson and Nyquist, 3-24, 19.

iii Ibid., 100, 99.

iv Ibid., 107, 123.


vii Ibid., 108, 123.

viii Ibid., 122.

ix Ibid., 120.

x Ibid., 120.

xi Ibid., 121.


xiii The essay collection, *Milton and Gender*, Catherine Gimelli Martin, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) has also proven pivotal for placing Milton’s gender politics into dialogue with his contemporaries, including women, and for pointing out the sometimes productive instabilities in Milton’s own logic on gender.


One of the first critics to take the measure of Lucy Hutchinson’s ghost was N.H. Keeble [“But the Colonel’s Shadow’: Lucy Hutchinson, Women’s Writing, and the Civil War’, in Thomas Healy and Jonathan Sawday (eds), Literature and the English Civil War (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 227-47]. Keeble ascribes her ghostly sense of self to her self-subordination as a Puritan goodwife: As the “Colonel’s Shadow,” it is only natural that, after her husband died, she would experience herself as a wraith. In “Lucy Hutchinson’s ‘Elegies’ and the Situation of the Republican Woman Writer,” [English Literary Renaissance, 27 (1997), 468-521], David Norbrook counters that Hutchinson’s “haunting” act of “self-suppression reaches beyond “personal loss” and “partakes of the political trauma experienced by republicans [when their] God seemed to have deserted them” (474). Susan Wiseman [Conspiracy and Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)] concurs but adds that Hutchinson’s sense of defeat was so monumental that she could not create “an operative political poetic vocabulary” (218) capable of reviving the republic rather than merely commemorating it. It is for this reason that Hutchinson leaves herself an “unredeemed ghost” (219). In this essay, I suggest that, in both her elegies and the Memoirs, Hutchinson is able to deploy an “operative political poetic vocabulary” precisely because she imagines herself as an “unredeemed ghost.”


Ibid., 280.

Ibid., 292, 293.


George Wither, Vox Pacifica (London: 1645), 199.


Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, 141.


Ibid., 214, 218.

Ibid., 215.

Ibid., 220.


Ibid., 1121, 1123.


Ibid., 1143.
xxxiv Ibid.

xxxv Ibid., 215.


xxxvii Ibid., 4.294, 296.

xxxviii Ibid., 4.308, 310, 300-301, 301.

xxxix Ibid., 4.299.

xl Ibid., 8.531, 5.34.

xli Ibid., 8.570, 568.

xlii Ibid., 8.590, 591-92, 590-591, 592, 593.

xliii Ibid., 8.594.

xliv Ibid., 8.587.

xlv Ibid., 8596, 600-604.

xlvi Lewalski, “Milton and Idolatry,” 218.


xlviii Ibid., 10.150, 151.


i Ibid., 12.509, 492. 510-512.

ii Ibid., 12.548, 600.

iii Ibid., 12. 481, 488, 489, 492, 549.

iii Ibid., 12. 568, 569-570, 561-562.

iv Ibid., 12.599.

lv Ibid., 12.623.

lvi Ibid., 11.623-625.

lvii Ibid., 625-626.

lviii Ibid., 11.635-636.

lix Ibid., 11.596.

lix Ibid.


lxii Ibid., 72.

lxiii William Winstanley, The loyall martyrology (London: 1665), A3; W.S., Rebels no saints, or, A collection of the speeches, private passages, letters, and prayers of those persons lately executed, (London: 1661), A3-A4, 64.


lxvii Hutchinson, Memoirs, 337.

lxviii Norbrook., “Lucy Hutchinson’s Elegies,” These Verses, lines 27-32.

lxix Ibid., lines 11, 12.

lxx Ibid., lines 12, 120.

lxxi Ibid., Elegy 17, line 8

lxxii Ibid., These verses, line 32, Elegy 1, line 56.

lxxiii Ibid., Elegy 1, line 39.


lxxvi Ibid., 42.

lxxvii Ibid.

lxxviii Ibid.

lxxix Keeble, Restoration, 68.


lxxxi Ibid., lines 16, 21-23.

lxxxii Ibid., These verses, lines 33-39.

lxxxi Hutchinson, Memoirs, lines 33-39.

lxxxii Ibid.

xcii Ibid., 4.337, 4.338.

xcii Ibid., 4.343, 4.351.

xciii Ibid., 4.354, 4.355.

xciv Ibid., 4.356, 4.357, 4.358, 4.361.

xcv Ibid., 4.358.


xcvii Ibid.

xcviii Ibid., 18.

xcix Ibid., 18-19.

c Ibid., 30.

cl Ibid., 57.

cli Ibid., 59.

cli Ibid.

civ Ibid., 67.

cv Ibid., 26.

cvi Ibid., 76.

cvii Ibid., 60.

cviii Ibid., 152.

cix Ibid., 108.

cx Ibid., 239.