A Dynamic General Equilibrium Approach to Asset Pricing
Experiments

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Abstract

We report results from a laboratory experiment that implements a consumption-based dynamic general equilibrium model of asset pricing. This work-horse model of the macrofinance literature posits that agents buy and sell assets for the purpose of intertemporally smoothing consumption, and that asset prices are determined by individual risk and time preferences as well as the distribution of income and dividends. The experimental findings are largely supportive of the model’s theoretical predictions. Notably we observe that asset price bubbles, defined as sustained departures of prices from those implied by fundamentals, are infrequent and short-lived. This finding is a stark departure from many recent multi-period asset pricing experiments that lack a consumption-smoothing objective. Indeed, we find that when subjects are induced to adjust shareholdings to smooth consumption, assets typically trade at a discount relative to their expected value and market participation is broad; when the consumption-smoothing motivation to trade assets is removed in an otherwise identical economy, assets frequently trade at a premium relative to fundamentals and shareholdings become highly concentrated.

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1 Introduction

The consumption-based general equilibrium approach to asset pricing, as pioneered in the work of Stiglitz (1970), Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979), remains a workhorse model in the literature on financial asset pricing in macroeconomics, or macrofinance. This approach relates asset prices to individual risk and time preferences, dividends, aggregate disturbances and other fundamental determinants of an asset’s value.¹ While this class of theoretical models has been extensively tested using archival field data, the evidence to date has not been too supportive of the models’ predictions. For instance, estimated or calibrated versions of the standard model generally under-predict the actual premium in the return to equities relative to bonds, the so-called “equity premium puzzle” (Hansen and Singleton (1983), Mehra and Prescott (1985), Kocherlakota (1996)), and the actual volatility of asset prices is typically much greater than the model’s predicted volatility based on changes in fundamentals alone – the “excess volatility puzzle” (Shiller (1981), LeRoy and Porter (1981)).²

A difficulty with testing this model using field data is that important parameters like individual risk and time preferences, the dividend and income processes, and other determinants of asset prices are unknown and have to be calibrated, approximated or estimated in some fashion. An additional difficulty is that the available field data, for example data on aggregate consumption, are measured with error (Wheatley (1988)) or may not approximate well the consumption of asset market participants (Mankiw and Zeldes (1991)). A typical approach is to specify some dividend process and calibrate preferences using micro-level studies that may not be directly relevant to the domain or frequency of data examined by the macrofinance researcher.

In this paper we follow a different path, by designing and analyzing data from a laboratory experiment that implements a simple version of an infinite horizon, consumption–based general equilibrium model of asset pricing. In the laboratory we control the income and dividend processes, and can induce the stationarity associated with an infinite horizon and time discounting by imposing an indefinite horizon with a constant continuation probability. Further, we can precisely measure individual consumption and asset holdings and estimate each individual’s risk preferences separately from those implied by his market activity, providing us with a very clear picture of the environment in which agents are making asset pricing decisions. We can also reliably induce heterogeneity in agent types so as to create a clear motivation for subjects to engage in trade, whereas the theoretical literature frequently presumes a representative agent and derives equilibrium asset prices at which the equilibrium volume of trade is zero. The degree of control afforded by the laboratory presents an opportunity to diagnose the causes of specific deviations from the theory which are not identifiable using field data alone.

There already exists a literature testing asset price formation in the laboratory, but the design of these experiments departs in significant ways from consumption-based macrofinance models. The early experimental literature (e.g., Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1982), Plott and Sunder (1982) and Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984)) instituted markets comprised of several 2-3 period cycles. Each subject was assigned a type which determined his endowment of cash and assets at the beginning of a cycle as well as his deterministic but non-constant dividend stream. Each period began with trade in the asset and ended with the payment of type-dependent dividends. The main finding from this literature is that market prices effectively aggregate private information about dividends and tend to converge toward rational expectations values. While such results are in line with the efficient markets view of asset pricing, the primary motivation for

¹See, e.g., Cochrane (2005) and Lengwiler (2004) for surveys.
²Nevertheless, as Cochrane (2005, p. 455) observes, while the consumption-based model “works poorly in practice...it is in some sense the only model we have. The central task of financial economics is to figure out what are the real risks that drive asset prices and expected returns. Something like the consumption-based model–investor’s first-order conditions for savings and portfolio choice–has to be the starting point.”
exchange in these experimental designs is owing to explicit heterogeneity in the value of dividends rather than intertemporal consumption-smoothing as in the framework we study.

In later, highly influential work by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (SSW) (1988), a simple four-state i.i.d. dividend process was made common for all subjects. A finite number of trading periods ensured that the fundamental value of the asset declined at a constant rate over time. There was no induced motive for subjects to engage in any trade at all. Nevertheless, SSW observed substantial trade in the asset, with prices typically starting out below the fundamental value, then rapidly soaring above the fundamental value for a sustained duration of time before collapsing near the end of the experiment. The “bubble-crash” pattern of the SSW design has been replicated by many authors under a variety of different treatment conditions, and has become the primary focus of the large and growing experimental literature on asset price formation (key papers include Porter and Smith (1995), Lei et al. (2001), Dufwenberg, et al. (2005), Haruvy et al. (2007) and Hussam et al. (2008); for a review of the literature, see chapters 29 and 30 in Plott and Smith (2008)). Despite many treatment variations (e.g., incorporating short sales or futures markets, computing expected values for subjects, implementing a constant dividend, inserting “insiders” who have previously experienced bubbles, using professional traders in place of students as subjects), the only reliable means of eliminating the bubble-crash pattern in the SSW environment has been to repeat the same market trading conditions several times with the same group of subjects.³

There also exists an experimental literature testing the capital-asset pricing model (CAPM), see, e.g., Bossaerts and Plott (2002), Asparouhova, Bossaerts, and Plott (2003), Bossaerts, Plott and Zame (2007). In contrast to consumption-based asset pricing, the CAPM is a portfolio-based approach and presumes that agents have no other source of income apart from asset income. Another important distinction is that the CAPM is not an explicitly dynamic model; laboratory investigations of the CAPM involve repetition of a static, one-period economy.⁴

Our focus on the consumption-based approach to asset pricing establishes a bridge between the experimental asset pricing literatures and intertemporal consumption-smoothing. Experimental investigation of intertemporal consumption smoothing (without tradeable assets) is the focus of papers by Hey and Dardanoni (1988), Noussair and Matheny (2000), Ballinger et al. (2003) and Carbone and Hey (2004). A main finding from that literature is that subjects appear to have difficulty intertemporally smoothing consumption in the manner prescribed by the solution to a dynamic optimization problem; in particular, current consumption appears to be too closely related to current income relative to the predictions of the optimal consumption function. By contrast, in our experimental design where intertemporal consumption smoothing must be implemented by buying and selling assets at market-determined prices, we find strong evidence that subjects are able to consumption-smooth in a manner that approximates the dynamic, equilibrium solution. This finding suggests that asset-price signals may provide an important coordination mechanism enabling individuals to more readily implement near-optimal consumption and savings plans.

Our aim in implementing an experimental general equilibrium asset pricing model that is closely aligned with the theory and predictions of the macrofinance literature is to begin a dialogue between macrofinance researchers and experimentalists. Our design enables us to address a number of issues related to asset pricing and intertemporal decision-making while incorporating several important insights gained from the experimental asset pricing and consumption-smoothing literatures.

One way we depart from the existing experimental asset pricing literature is that we induce “consumption” at the end of every period. Most asset pricing experiments, following the SSW model, proceed differently.³

³Lugovskyy, Puzzello, and Tucker (2010) have recently implemented the SSW framework using a tättonnement institution in place of the double auction and report a significant reduction in the incidence of bubbles.

⁴Cochrane (2005) points out that intertemporal versions of the CAPM can be viewed as a special case of the consumption-based approach to asset pricing where the production technology is linear and there is no labor/endowment income.
In these experiments, subjects are given a large, one-time endowment of experimental currency units, sometimes called “francs”. Thereafter, an individual’s franc balance varies with dividends earned and with asset purchases or sales, all of which are denominated in francs. Individual franc balances carry over from one period to the next. Following the final period of the experiment, these franc balances are converted into money earnings using a linear exchange rate. This design differs from the sequence–of–budget–constraints faced by agents in standard, intertemporal (asset pricing) models. Consistent with the sequence–of–budget–constraints approach, in our design subjects receive a known, exogenous endowment of “francs” at the start of each new period (as in a pure exchange economy). Dividends are then paid on any assets that an individual holds (in terms of additional francs). Next, an asset market is opened where prices are denominated in francs and where any transactions that occur alter individual franc balances. Finally, after individuals have had an opportunity via the asset market to alter their asset positions/franc balances and the asset market has closed, each individual’s remaining, end-of-period franc balance –their period “consumption”– is converted into money earnings (dollars) and stored in a private payment account that cannot be used for asset purchases or consumption in any future period of the session. More precisely, in our experimental design all francs (experimental currency units) disappear from the system at the end of each period. In our framework, assets are durable “trees” and francs are perishable “fruit” in the language of Lucas (1978).

A second way we depart from the existing experimental literature is to introduce heterogeneous subject incomes which, combined with a concave franc-to-dollar exchange rate, motivates trade in the asset. Thus in our design, long-lived assets become a vehicle for intertemporally smoothing consumption, a critical feature of most macrofinance models which are built around the permanent income model of consumption but one that is absent from the experimental asset pricing literature. In a second treatment, the franc-to-dollar exchange rate is made linear (as in SSW-type designs). Since the dividend process is common to all subjects there is no induced reason for subjects to trade in the asset at all in this treatment, a design feature which connects our macrofinance economy in the first treatment with the laboratory asset bubble design of SSW.

Most consumption-based asset pricing models posit stationary infinite planning horizons, while most dynamic asset pricing experiments impose finite horizons with declining asset values. A third distinguishing feature of our design is that we induce a stationary environment by adopting an indefinite time horizon in which assets become worthless at the end of each period with a known constant probability. If subjects are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers, our indefinite horizon economy features the same steady state equilibrium price and shareholdings as its infinite horizon constant time discounting analogue from the macrofinance literature.

A fourth feature of our design is that we consider the consequences of departures from risk-neutral behavior. Our analysis of this issue is both theoretical and empirical. Specifically, we elicit a measure of risk tolerance from subjects in most of our experimental sessions using the Holt-Laury (2002) paired lottery choice instrument. To our knowledge no prior study has seriously investigated risk preferences in combination with a multi-period asset pricing experiment. Our evidence on risk preferences, elicited from participants who have also determined asset prices in a dynamic general equilibrium setting, should be of interest to macrofinance researchers investigating the “puzzles” in the asset pricing literature; for example, the equity premium puzzle and the related risk-free rate puzzle depend on assumptions made about risk attitudes, which, to date has been derived from survey and experimental studies that do not involve asset pricing (see, e.g., the discussion in Lengwiler (2004).

The main findings of our experiment can be summarized as follows. First, the stochastic horizon in the

\footnote{Notice that francs play a dual role as “consumption good” and “medium of exchange” within a period, but assets are the only \textit{intertemporal} store of value in our design.}

\footnote{Camerer and Weigelt (1993) used such a device to study asset price formation within the heterogeneous dividends framework referenced earlier. Their main finding is that asset prices converge slowly and unreliably to predicted levels from below.}
linear exchange rate treatment (where, as in SSW, there is no induced motivation for trading shares of the asset) does not suffice to eliminate asset price “bubbles.” Indeed, we often observe sustained deviations of prices above fundamentals in this environment. However, the frequency, magnitude, and duration of asset price bubbles are significantly reduced in the treatment where we induce a concave exchange rate; in fact, in these “concave treatment” sessions, assets tend to trade at a discount relative to their expected value (which can be interpreted as a kind of endogenous equity premium!) The higher prices in the linear induced utility economies are driven by a concentration of shareholdings among the most risk-tolerant subjects in the market as identified by the Holt-Laury measure of risk attitudes. By contrast, in the concave induced utility economies, most subjects actively traded shares in each period so as to smooth their consumption in the manner predicted by theory; consequently, shareholdings were much less concentrated. Thus market thin-ness and high prices appear to be endogenous features of the more speculative markets in our design. We conclude that the frequency, magnitude, and duration of asset price bubbles can be greatly reduced by the presence of an incentive to intertemporally smooth consumption in an otherwise identical economy.

2 A simple asset pricing framework

In this section we first describe an infinite horizon, consumption-based asset pricing framework – a heterogeneous agent version of Lucas’s (1978) one-tree model. We then present the indefinite horizon version of this economy that we implement in the laboratory, and we demonstrate that both economies share the same steady state equilibrium under the assumption that subjects are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers. In Section 5 we consider how the model is impacted by departures from the assumption of risk neutrality.

2.1 The infinite horizon economy

Time $t$ is discrete, and there are two agent types, $i = 1, 2$, who participate in an infinite sequence of markets. There is a fixed supply of an infinitely durable asset (trees), shares of which yield some dividend (fruit) in amount $d_t$ per period. Dividends are paid in units of the single non-storable consumption good at the beginning of each period. Let $s^i_t$ denote the number of asset shares agent $i$ owns at the beginning of period $t$, and let $p_t$ be the price of an asset share in period $t$. In addition to dividend payments, agent $i$ receives an exogenous endowment of the consumption good $y^i_t$ at the beginning of every period. His initial endowment of shares is denoted $s^i_1$.

Agent $i$ faces the following objective function:

$$\max_{\{c^i_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}} E_1 \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} u^i(c^i_t),$$

subject to

$$c^i_t \leq y^i_t + d_t s^i_t - p_t (s^i_{t+1} - s^i_t)$$

and a transversality condition. Here, $c^i_t$ denotes consumption of the single perishable good by agent $i$ in period $t$, $u^i(\cdot)$ is a strictly monotonic, strictly concave, twice differentiable utility function, and $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the (common) discount factor. The budget constraint is satisfied with equality by monotonicity. We will impose no borrowing and no short sale constraints on subjects in the experiment, but the economy will be parameterized in such a way that these restrictions only bind out-of-equilibrium. Substituting the budget constraint for consumption in the objective function, and using asset shares as the control, we can restate the problem as:

$$\max_{\{s^i_{t+1}\}_{t=1}^{\infty}} E_1 \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} u^i(y^i_t + d_t s^i_t - p_t (s^i_{t+1} - s^i_t)).$$
The first order condition for each time $t \geq 1$, suppressing agent superscripts for notational convenience, is:

$$u'(c_t)p_t = E_t\beta u'(c_{t+1})(p_{t+1} + d_{t+1}).$$

Rearranging we have the asset pricing equation:

$$p_t = E_t\mu_{t+1}(p_{t+1} + d_{t+1})$$

(1)

where $\mu_{t+1} = \beta \frac{u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)}$, a term that is referred to variously as the stochastic discount factor, the pricing kernel, or the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. If we assume, for example, that $u(c) = \frac{c^{\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$ (the commonly studied CRRA utility), we have $\mu_{t+1} = \beta \left( \frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} \right)^\gamma$. Notice from equation (1) that the price of the asset depends on 1) individual risk parameters such as $\gamma$; 2) the rate of time preference, $r$, which is implied by the discount factor $\beta = 1/(1 + r)$; 3) the income process; and 4) the dividend process, which is assumed to be known and common for both player types.

We assume the aggregate endowment of francs and assets is constant across periods.\(^7\) We further suppose the dividend is equal to a constant value $d_t = \bar{d}$ for all $t$, so that a constant steady state equilibrium price exists.\(^8\) The latter assumption and the application of some algebra to equation (1) yields:

$$p^* = \frac{\bar{d}}{E_t \frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} - 1}. \quad (2)$$

This equation applies to each agent, so if one agent expects consumption growth or decay they all must do so in equilibrium. Since the aggregate endowment is constant, strict monotonicity of preferences implies that there can be no growth or decay in consumption for all individuals in equilibrium. Thus it must be the case that in a steady state competitive equilibrium each agent perfectly smooths his consumption, that is, $c^* = c^*_{t+1}$, so equation (2) simplifies to the standard fundamental price equation:

$$p^* = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta \bar{d}}. \quad (3)$$

2.2 The indefinite horizon economy

Obviously we cannot observe infinite periods in a laboratory study, and the economy is too complex to consider eliciting continuation strategies from subjects in order to compute discounted payoff streams after a finite number of periods of real-time play. As we describe in greater detail in the following section, in place of implementing an infinite horizon with constant time discounting, we follow Camerer and Weigelt (1993) and study an indefinite horizon with a constant continuation probability. We also note that this technique for implementing infinite horizon environments in a laboratory setting has a rich history in game theory experiments, beginning with Roth and Murnighan (1978).

We will refer to units of the consumption good as “francs”. The utility function $u'(c_i)$ in the experiment thus serves as a map from subject $i$’s end-of-period franc balance (consumption) to U.S. dollars. While shares of the asset transfer across periods, once francs for a given period are converted into dollars they

\(^7\)The absence of income growth rules out the possibility of “rational bubbles”.

\(^8\)If the dividend is stochastic, it is straightforward to show that a steady state equilibrium price does not exist. Instead, the price will depend (at a minimum), upon the current realization of the dividend. See Mehra and Prescott (1985) for a derivation of equilibrium pricing in the representative agent version of this model with a finite-state Markovian dividend process. We adopt the simpler, constant dividend framework since our primary motivation was to induce an economic incentive for asset trade in a standard macrofinance setting. We hope to consider stochastic processes for dividends in future research. We note that Porter and Smith (1995) show that implementing constant dividends in the SSW design does not substantially reduce the incidence or magnitude of asset price bubbles.
disappear from the system, as the consumption good is not storable. Dollars accumulate across periods in a non-transferable account and are paid in cash at the end of the experiment. The indefinite horizon economy is terminated with probability $1 - \beta$ at the end of each period, in which event shares of the asset become worthless. Thus from the decision-maker’s perspective, francs today are worth more than identical francs tomorrow not because subjects are impatient as in the infinite horizon model, but because future earnings are less likely to be realized.

Let $m_t = u(c_t)$ and $M_t = \sum_{s=0}^{t} m_s$ be the sum of dollars a subject has earned through period $t$ given initial wealth $m_0$. We consider initial wealth quite generally; it may equal zero or include some combination of the promised show-up fee, cumulative earnings during the experimental session, or even an individual’s personal wealth outside of the laboratory. Superscripts indexing individual subjects are suppressed for notational convenience. Let $v(m)$ be a subject’s indigenous (homegrown) utility of $m$ dollars, and suppose this function is strictly concave, strictly monotonic, and twice differentiable. Then the subject’s expected value of participating in an indefinite horizon economy is

$$V = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} (1 - \beta) v(M_t). \quad (4)$$

The sequence $\langle s_t \rangle_{t=2}^{\infty}$ is the control used to adjust $V$. The first order conditions for $V$ with respect to $s_{t+1}$ for $t \geq 1$ can be written as:

$$u'(c_t) p_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} E_t \{v'(M_s)\} = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t+1} E_t \{v'(M_{s+1}) \} u'(c_{t+1}) (d + p_{t+1}). \quad (5)$$

Again focusing on a steady state price, the subject’s first-order condition reduces to:

$$p = \frac{d}{u'(c_t)} \left( \frac{1}{\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t+1} v'(M_{s+1})} - 1 \right). \quad (6)$$

Notice the similarity of (6) to (2). This is not a coincidence; if indigenous risk preferences are linear, the indigenous marginal utility of wealth is constant, and applying a little algebra to (6) produces (2). This justifies our earlier claim that the infinite horizon economy and its indefinite horizon economy analogue share the same steady-state equilibrium provided that subjects are risk-neutral. We consider departures from indigenous risk neutrality in Section 5.

3 Experimental design

We conducted sixteen laboratory sessions of an indefinite horizon version of the economy introduced above. In each session there were twelve subjects, six of each induced type, for a total of 192 subjects. The endowments of the two subject types and their utility functions are given in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No. Subjects</th>
<th>$s_i$</th>
<th>${y_i^t} =$</th>
<th>$u^i(c) =$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110 if $t$ is odd, 44 if $t$ is even</td>
<td>$\delta^1 + \alpha^1 c^{\phi^1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24 if $t$ is odd, 90 if $t$ is even</td>
<td>$\delta^2 + \alpha^2 c^{\phi^2}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Treatment Parameters
In every session the franc endowment, \( y^i_t \), for each type \( i = 1, 2 \) followed the same deterministic two-cycle. Subjects were informed that the aggregate endowment of income and shares would remain constant throughout the session, but otherwise were only privy to information regarding their own income process, shareholdings, and induced utility functions. Utility parameters in all treatments were chosen so that if subjects were playing according to equilibrium, each subject would earn $1 per period. The utility function was presented to each subject as a table converting his end-of-period franc balance into dollars (this schedule was also represented and shown to subjects graphically). By inducing subjects to hold certain utility functions, we were able to exert some degree of control over individual preferences and provide a rationale for trade in the asset.

We used a \( 2 \times 2 \) experimental design where the treatment variables are the induced utility functions (concave or linear) and the asset dividend, \( d = 2 \) or \( d = 3 \).\(^9\) In our baseline, concave treatments we set \( \phi^i < 1 \) and \( \alpha^i \phi^i > 0 \).\(^{10}\) Given our two-cycle income process, it is straightforward to show from (3) and the budget constraint that steady state shareholdings must also follow a two-cycle between the initial share endowment, \( s^i_{odd} = s^i_1 \), and

\[
s^i_{even} = s^i_{odd} + \frac{y^i_{odd} - y^i_{even}}{d + 2p^*} . \tag{7}
\]

Notice that in equilibrium subjects smooth consumption by buying asset shares during high income periods and selling asset shares during low income periods. In the treatment where \( d = 2 \), the equilibrium price is \( p^* = 10 \). Thus in equilibrium, according to (7), a type 1 subject holds 1 share in odd periods and 4 shares in even periods, and a type 2 subject holds 4 shares in odd periods and 1 share in even periods. In the treatment where \( d = 3 \), the equilibrium price is \( p^* = 15 \). In equilibrium, type 1 subjects cycle between 1 and 3 shares, while type 2 subjects cycle between 4 and 2 shares. In autarky (no asset trade), each subject earns $1 every two periods which is only one-half of equilibrium earnings, so the incentive to smooth consumption was reasonably strong.

Our primary variation on the baseline concave treatments was to set \( \phi^i = 1 \) for both agent types so that there was no longer an incentive to smooth consumption.\(^{11}\) Our aim in these linear treatments was to examine an environment that was closer to the SSW framework. In SSW’s design, dividends were common to all subjects and dollar payoffs were linear in francs, so risk-neutral subjects had no induced motivation to engage in any asset trade. We hypothesized that in our linear utility treatment we might observe asset trade at prices greater than the fundamental price, in line with SSW’s bubble findings.

To derive the equilibrium price in the linear utility treatment (since the first-order conditions no longer apply), suppose there exists a steady state equilibrium price \( \hat{p} \). Substituting in each period’s budget constraint we can re-write \( U = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} u(c_t) \) as

\[
U = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} y_t + (d + \hat{p})s + \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \beta^{t-2} [\beta d - (1 - \beta)\hat{p}] s_1 . \tag{8}
\]

Notice that the first two right-hand side terms in (8) are constant, because they consist entirely of exogenous, deterministic variables. If \( \hat{p} = p^* \), the third right-hand term in (8) is equal to zero regardless of the sequence of future shareholdings, so clearly this is an equilibrium price where the corresponding individual equilibrium shareholdings are restricted to sum to the aggregate endowment of shares in each period. If \( \hat{p} > p^* \), the third right-hand term is negative, so each agent would like to hold zero shares, but this cannot be an equilibrium since excess demand would be negative. If \( \hat{p} < p^* \), this same term is positive, so each agent would like to buy

\(^9\)While the difference in the dividend values is small, the difference in the implied equilibrium prices and shares traded is much larger, as shown below.

\(^{10}\)Specifically, \( \phi^1 = -1.195 \), \( \alpha^1 = -311.34 \), \( \delta^1 = 2.6074 \), \( \phi^2 = -1.3888 \), \( \alpha^2 = -327.81 \), and \( \delta^2 = 2.0627 \).

\(^{11}\)In these linear treatments, \( \alpha^1 = 0.0122 \), \( \alpha^2 = 0.0161 \), and \( \delta^1 = \delta^2 = 0 \).
as many shares as his no borrowing constraint would allow in each period, thus resulting in positive excess demand. Thus $p^*$ is the unique steady state equilibrium price in the case of linear utility.

In all sessions of our experiment we imposed the following trading constraints on subjects:

$$y_i^t + d_t s_i^t - p_t(s_{i+1}^t - s_i^t) \geq 0,$$

$$s_i^t \geq 0,$$

where the first constraint is a no borrowing constraint and the second is a no short sales constraint. These constraints do not impact the fundamental price in either treatment nor on steady-state equilibrium shareholdings in the concave treatment. They do restrict the set of equilibrium shareholdings in the linear treatment, which without these constraints must merely sum to the aggregate share endowment. No borrowing or short sales are standard restrictions on out-of-equilibrium exchange in market experiments.

### 3.1 Inducing time discounting (or bankruptcy risk)

An important methodological issue is how to induce time discounting and the stationarity associated with an infinite horizon and constant time discounting. We follow Camerer and Weigelt (1993) and address this issue by converting the infinite horizon economy to one with a stochastic number of trading periods. Subjects participate in a number of “sequences,” with each sequence consisting of a number of trading periods. Each trading period lasts for three minutes during which time units of the asset can be bought and sold by all subjects in a centralized marketplace (more on this below). At the end of each three minute trading period subjects take turns rolling a six-sided die in public view of all other participants. If the die roll results in a number between 1 and 5 inclusive, the current sequence continues with another three minute trading period. Each individual’s asset position at the end of period $t$ is carried over to the start of period $t + 1$, and the common, fixed dividend amount $d$ is paid on each unit carried over. If the die roll comes up 6, the sequence of trading periods is declared over and all subjects’ assets are declared worthless. Thus, the probability that assets continue to have value in future trading periods is $5/6 (.833)$, which is our means of implementing time discounting, i.e., a discount factor $\beta = 5/6$.

The fact that the asset may become worthless at the conclusion of any period has a natural interpretation as bankruptcy risk, where the (exogenous) dividend-issuing firm becomes completely worthless with constant probability. This type of risk is not present in any existing experimental asset pricing models aside from Camerer and Weigelt’s (1993) study. For instance, in SSW the main risk that agents face is price risk – uncertainty about the future prices that assets will command – as it is known that assets are perfectly durable and will continue to pay a stochastic dividend (with known support) for $T$ periods, after which time all assets will cease to have value. However, participants in naturally occurring financial markets face both price and bankruptcy risk, (as the recent financial crisis has made rather clear). It is therefore of interest to examine asset pricing in environments (such as ours) where both types of risk are present; for instance, it is possible that bankruptcy risk alone might interact with indigenous subject risk aversion to inhibit the formation of asset price bubbles, even in our linear treatments.

To give subjects experience with the possibility that their assets might become worthless, our experimental sessions were set up so that there would likely be several sequences of trading periods. We recruited subjects for a three hour block of time. We informed them they would participate in one or more “sequences,” each consisting of an indefinite number of “trading periods” for at least one hour after the instructions had been read and all questions answered. Following one hour of play (during which time one or more sequences were typically completed), subjects were instructed that the sequence they were currently playing would be the

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12There is also some dividend risk but it is relatively small given the number of draws relative to states.
last one played, i.e., the next time a 6 was rolled the session would come to a close. This design ensured that
we would get a reasonable number of trading periods, while at the same time limited the possibility that
the session would not finish within the 3-hour time-frame for which subjects had been recruited. Indeed, we
never failed to complete the final sequence within three hours. The expected mean (median) number of
trading periods per sequence in our design is 6 (4), respectively. The realized mean (median) were 5.3 (4) in
our sessions. On average there were 3.3 sequences per session.

3.2 The trading mechanism

An important methodological issue is how to implement asset trading. General equilibrium models of asset
pricing simply combine first-order conditions for portfolio choices with market clearing conditions to obtain
equilibrium prices, but do not specify the actual mechanism by which prices are determined and assets are
exchanged. Here we adopt the double auction as the market mechanism as it is well known to reliably
converge to competitive equilibrium outcomes in a wide range of experimental markets. We use the double
auction module found in Fischbacher’s (2007) z-Tree software. Specifically, prior to the start of each three
minute trading period $t$, each subject $i$ was informed of his beginning of period asset position, $s_i^t$, and the
number of francs he would have available for trade in the current period, equal to $y_i^t + s_i^t d$. The dividend, $d$,
paid per unit of the asset held at the start of each period was made common knowledge to subjects (via the
experimental instructions), as was the discount factor $\beta$. After all subjects clicked a button indicating they
understood their beginning-of-period asset and franc positions, the first three minute trading period was
begun. Subjects could post buy or sell orders for one unit of the asset at a time, though they were instructed
that they could sell as many assets as they had available, or buy as many assets as they wished so long as they
had sufficient francs available. During a trading period, standard double auction improvement rules were in
effect: buy offers had to improve on (exceed) existing buy offers and sell offers had to improve on (undercut)
existing sell offers before they were allowed to appear in the order book visible to all subjects. Subjects could
do also agree to buy or sell at a currently posted price at any time by clicking on the bid/ask. In that case, a
transaction was declared and the transaction price was revealed to all market participants. The agreed upon
transaction price in francs was paid from the buyer to the seller and one unit of the asset was transferred
from the seller to the buyer. The order book was cleared, but subjects could (and did) immediately begin
reposting buy and sell orders. A history of all transaction prices in the trading period was always present on
all subjects’ screens, which also provided information on asset trade volume. In addition to this information,
each subject’s franc and asset balances were adjusted in real time in response to any transactions.

3.3 Subjects, payments and timing

Subjects were primarily undergraduates from the University of Pittsburgh. No subject participated in more
than one session of this experiment. At the beginning of each session, the 12 subjects were randomly assigned
a role as either a type 1 or type 2 agent, so that there were 6 subjects of each type. Subjects remained in the
same role for the duration of the session. They were seated at visually isolated computer workstations and
were given written instructions that were also read aloud prior to the start of play in an effort to make the

\[13\] In the event that we did not complete the final sequence by the three hour limit, we instructed subjects at the beginning
of the experiment that we would bring all of them back to the laboratory as quickly as possible to complete the final sequence.
Subjects would be paid for all sequences that had ended in the current session, but would be paid for the continuation sequence
only when it had been completed. Their financial stake in that final sequence would be derived from at least 25 periods of play,
which makes such an event very unlikely (about %1) but quite a compelling motivator to get subjects back to the lab. As it
turned out, we did not have to bring back any group of subjects in any of the sessions we report on here, as they all finished
within the 3-hour time-frame for which subjects had been recruited.
instructions public knowledge. As part of the instructions, each subject was required to complete two quizzes to test comprehension of his induced utility function, the asset market trading rules and other features of the environment; the session did not proceed until all subjects had answered these quiz questions correctly. Copies of the instructions (including the quizzes) as well as the payoff tables, charts and endowment sheets used in all treatments of this experiment are available at http://www.pitt.edu/~jduffy/assetpricing. Subjects were recruited for a three hour session, but a typical session ended after around two hours. Subjects earned their payoffs from every period of every sequence played in the session. Mean (median) payoffs were $22.45 ($21.84) per subject in the linear sessions and $18.26 ($18.68) in the concave sessions, including a $5 show-up payment but excluding the payment for the Holt-Laury individual choice experiment. Payments were higher in the linear sessions because it was a zero-sum market (whereas social welfare was uniquely optimized in the steady-state equilibrium in the concave sessions).

At the end of each period $t$, subject $i$’s end-of-period franc balance was declared his consumption level, $c_i^t$, for that period; the dollar amount of this consumption holding, $u'(c_i^t)$, accrued to his cumulative cash earnings (from all prior trading periods), which were paid at the completion of the session. The timing of events in our experimental design is summarized below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>dividends paid:</th>
<th>3-minute trading period</th>
<th>consumption takes place</th>
<th>die role:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>francs=$s_i^t d + y_i^t$</td>
<td>using a double auction to trade assets and francs</td>
<td>$c_i^t = s_i^t d + y_i^t + \sum_{k=1}^{K_i^t} p_{t,k} \left(s_{t,k}^i - s_{t-k}^i\right)$</td>
<td>$t+1$ continue to $t+1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>assets=$s_i^t$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$ar{t}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this timeline, $K_i^t$ is the number of transactions completed by $i$ in period $t$, $p_{t,k}$ is the price governing the $k$th transaction for $i$ in $t$, and $s_i^{t,k}$ is the number of shares held by $i$ after his $k$th transaction in period $t$. Thus $s_{t,0} = s_i^t$ and $s_i^{t,K_i^t} = s_{t+1}^i$. Of course, this summation does not exist if $i$ did not transact in period $t$; in this “autarkic” case, $c_i^t = s_i^t d + y_i^t$. In equilibrium, sale and purchase prices are predicted to be identical over time and across subjects, but under the double auction mechanism they can differ within and across periods and subjects.

Following completion of the last sequence of trading periods, beginning with Session 7 we asked subjects to participate in a further brief experiment involving a single play of the Holt-Laury (2002) paired lottery choice instrument. The Holt-Laury paired-lottery choice task is a commonly-used individual decision-making experiment for measuring individual risk attitudes. This second experimental task was not announced in advance; subjects were instructed that, if they were willing, they could participate in a second experiment that would last an additional 10-15 minutes for which they could earn an additional monetary payment from the set \{\$0.30, \$4.80, \$6.00, \$11.55\}. All subjects agreed to participate in this second experiment. We had subjects use the same ID number in the Holt-Laury individual-decision making experiment as they used in the 12-player asset-pricing/consumption smoothing experiment enabling us to associate behavior in the latter with a measure of each individual’s risk attitudes. The instructions for the Holt-Laury paired-lottery choice experiment as well as the Java program used to carry it out may be found at http://www.pitt.edu/~jduffy/assetpricing.

14Subjects earned an average of $7.40 for the second, Holt-Laury experiment and this amount was added to subjects’ total from the asset pricing experiment.

15These payoff amounts are 3 times those offered by Holt and Laury (2002) in their “low-payoff” treatment. We chose to scale up the possible payoffs in this way so as to make the amounts comparable to what subjects could earn over the course of one sequence of trading periods.
4 Experimental findings

We conducted sixteen experimental sessions. Each session involved twelve subjects with no prior experience in our experimental design (192 subjects total). The treatments used in these sessions are summarized in Table 2. We will henceforth refer to our four treatments as: C2, C3, L2, and L3, where C=Concave, L=Linear, and 2 or 3 refers to the dividend ($\bar{d}$) value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>$d$</th>
<th>$u(c)$</th>
<th>Holt-Laury test</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>$d$</th>
<th>$u(c)$</th>
<th>Holt-Laury test</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>concave</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>concave</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>linear</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>concave</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>linear</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>linear</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>linear</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>linear</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>concave</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>linear</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>concave</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>concave</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>linear</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Assignment of Sessions to Treatment

We began administering the Holt-Laury paired-lottery individual decision-making experiment following completion of the asset pricing experiment in sessions 7 through 16 after it had become apparent to us that indigenous risk preferences might be playing an important role in our experimental findings. Thus in 10 of our 16 sessions, we have Holt-Laury measures of individual subject’s tolerance for risk (120 of our 196 subjects, or 62.5%).

We summarize our main results as a number of different findings.

Finding 1 In the concave utility treatment ($\phi^i < 1$), observed transaction prices at the end of the session were generally less than or equal to $p^* = \frac{\beta}{(1-\beta)}\bar{d}$.

Figure 1 displays median transaction prices by period for all sessions. The graphs on the top (bottom) row show median transaction prices in the concave (linear) utility sessions, $\bar{d} = 2$ on the left and $\bar{d} = 3$ on the right. Solid dots represent the first period of a new indefinite trading sequence. To facilitate comparisons across sessions, prices have been transformed into percentage deviations from the predicted equilibrium price (e.g., a price of -40% in panel (a), where $\bar{d} = 2$, reflects a price of 6 in the experiment, whereas a price of -40% in panel (b), where $\bar{d} = 3$, reflects a price of 9 in the experiment).

Of the eight concave utility sessions depicted in panels (a) and (b), half end relatively close to the asset’s fundamental price (7%, 0%, 0%, -13%) while the other half finish well below it (-30%, -40%, -47%, -60%). In two sessions (8 and 9) there were sustained departures above the fundamental price, but in both cases the “bubbles” were self-correcting and prices finished close to fundamental value. We emphasize that these corrections were wholly endogenous rather than forced by a known finite horizon as in SSW. We further emphasize that while prices in the concave treatment lie at or below the prediction of $p^* = \frac{\beta}{(1-\beta)}\bar{d}$, subjects were never informed of this fundamental trading price (as is done in some of the SSW-type asset markets). Indeed in our design, $p^*$ must be inferred from fundamentals alone, namely $\beta$ and $\bar{d}$ and a presumption that agents are forward-looking, risk-neutral expected utility maximizers.

We note that the underpricing of the asset that occurred most frequently in our concave utility treatment can be viewed as a kind of endogenous equity premium. Subjects in these sessions were only willing to buy
the risky asset if the price was discounted relative to the fundamental, risk neutral equilibrium price.

Finding 2 In the linear induced utility sessions ($\phi^i = 1$) trade in the asset did occur, at volumes similar to those observed in the concave sessions. Transaction prices in the linear utility sessions are significantly higher than transaction prices in the corresponding concave utility sessions (same value for $\bar{d}$).

On average, about 24 shares were traded in each period of both the linear and concave sessions. However, prices (in terms of deviations from equilibrium predictions) were much higher in the linear sessions, particularly by the end of those sessions.

Table 3 displays the mean of median prices over various period frequencies at both the treatment and individual session levels. Notice that for a given dividend value $\bar{d}$, mean prices at nearly all period frequencies are higher in the linear treatment than the corresponding concave treatment. Further, the price difference between linear and concave treatments involving the same $\bar{d}$ value was getting wider over time: in moving from the mean of all periods, to the mean of the second half of all periods, to the mean of the final five periods, to the mean of the final period, mean prices are monotonically decreasing in the concave treatments and monotonically increasing in the linear treatments. To see evidence of these trends at the session level, we fit a simple quadratic regression of price on periods for each session. In the final 3 columns of Table 3 we
Table 3: Summary of Session Prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>First Pd</th>
<th>Final Half</th>
<th>Final 5 Pds</th>
<th>Final Pd</th>
<th>Forecast</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>-1.48</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S15</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S8</td>
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<td>9.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S11</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
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<td>S14</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5</td>
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<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>S10</td>
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<td>21.4</td>
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<td>S16</td>
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<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S12</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14.8</td>
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<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

use that regression to report the forecast of the next period price, the change in this forecast over the final realized price, and the estimated probability that the next realized price would be less than the fitted value in the final period. Five of eight concave sessions are trending downward, while five of eight linear sessions are trending upward. But only three concave sessions have a substantial trend (9, 8, and 11), all decreasing. Only one linear session has a substantial trend (13), also negative.

The latter evidence suggests that price differences between the concave and linear sessions would likely have been even greater if our experimental sessions had involved more periods of play. For this reason, we choose to look for treatment differences in prices using the final period, median price of each session. Another justification for this focus on final period prices is that in a relatively complicated market experiment such as this one there is the potential for significant learning over time; prices in the final period of each session reflect the actions of subjects who are the most experienced with the trading institution, realizations of the continuation probability, and the behavior of other subjects. Final period prices thus best reflect learning and long-term trends in these markets.

We again consider prices as percentage deviations from the fundamental price to facilitate comparisons across treatments. Pooling the final period prices across dividends by induced utility type, on average the eight linear sessions were 27% above the fundamental price, while the eight concave sessions were 23% below the fundamental price. Applying a (two-tailed) Mann-Whitney rank sum test of the null hypothesis that the two sets of prices come from the same distribution, this difference is significant at the 0.0350 level. If we had instead considered the mean of the median transaction price per period during the second half of each session, the mean price across linear sessions would be 21% above the fundamental price, and 18% below in
the concave sessions. Thus the difference is still quite large, but no longer significant at the 5% level (p-value is 0.1412). Breaking down these equilibrium-normalized prices by the four treatments, the mean final period price is 65% in L2 vs. -18% in C2, and -12% in L3 vs. -28% in C3. The difference between C2 and L2 is significant (p-value = 0.0209), the difference between C3 and L3 is not (p-value = 0.5637).

The difference between prices in L2 and L3 is significant (p-value = 0.0433) and, surprisingly, the asset which pays the smaller dividend tends to be priced higher (the larger dividend is priced higher than the smaller one in the concave sessions, but the price difference is not significant, with a p-value of 0.5637). It is important to note that the mean within-session price change was actually 1.5 times greater in L3 than in L2 (4.5 vs. 3 francs), so the difference in final equilibrium-normalized prices between L2 and L3 stems from a very large difference in initial prices. The mean of median first period prices in L2 was 13.5 francs vs. 8.75 francs in L3; by way of comparison, the mean of median first period prices in the concave treatments were similar (10.38 in C2 and 9.25 in C3). We offer a hypothesis and supporting evidence for the difference in initial prices between the linear treatments – For idiosyncratic reasons subjects in L3 were more risk-averse than subjects in L2.

In the description of Finding 5 we detail our implementation of an individual decision-making experiment following the group asset market experiment designed to identify differences in risk preferences between subjects (these Holt-Laury paired lottery choice experiments were run beginning with session 7). For now we note that in this second experiment, each subject had the option to choose a high-variance or low-variance lottery at each of ten decision nodes. We define a subject’s Holt-Laury score as the number of high-variance lotteries chosen; the higher the Holt-Laury score, the greater a subject’s risk tolerance. In Finding 5, we report that a subject’s Holt-Laury score had a significant and substantial positive influence on the number of shares he acquired in the linear (but not in the concave) treatments.

Figure 2 displays the mean Holt-Laury score in a session against the median initial (first trading period) transaction price for the ten sessions in which we conducted the paired lottery choice. The figure indicates that there is a strong positive relationship between the two; sessions with greater average risk tolerance among the twelve subjects tend to start with a much higher mean transaction price. Indeed, a simple linear regression (using pooled data) of the median initial trading price on the Holt-Laury score yields the compelling fitted line in Figure 2.

We also observe that asymmetric distributions of risk tolerance between types account for most of the
deviations from the fitted line; including the squared difference between a session’s mean HL score and the mean HL score of its type 2 subjects brings the $R^2$ in the above regression up from 0.73 to 0.97 (the full regression result is reported in Table A-1 of the Appendix). Thus it appears to be the case that the difference in prices between L2 and L3 is due largely to the difference in the distribution of risk preferences in these sessions.\footnote{We believe this result supports our decision to pool equilibrium-normalized prices within the linear and concave treatments and report a significant difference in median final prices between the linear and concave sessions.}

Finding 3 \textit{In the concave utility treatment, there is strong evidence that subjects used the asset to intertemporally smooth their consumption.}

Figure 3 shows the per capita shareholdings of type 1 subjects by period (the per capita shareholdings of type 2 subjects is 5 minus this number). Dashed vertical lines denote the first period of a sequence,\footnote{Since each subject begins period $t$ with $s^t_i$ and finishes the period with $s^t_{i+1}$, all vertical lines but the first also correspond to shares that were bought in the final period of the previous sequence but which expired without paying a dividend.} dashed horizontal lines mark equilibrium shareholdings (the bottom line in odd periods of a sequence, the top line in even periods). Recall that equilibrium shareholdings follow a perfect two-cycle, increasing in high income periods and decreasing in low income periods. As Figure 3 indicates, a two-cycle pattern (at least in sign) is precisely what occurred in each and every period on a per capita basis.\footnote{In these figures, the period numbers shown are aggregated over all sequences played. The actual period number of each individual sequence starts with period 1, which is indicated by the dashed vertical lines.} The two sessions with the most pronounced deviations from predicted per capita trades, sessions 8 and 9, were the sessions that produced sustained deviations above the fundamental price.

Across all concave sessions, type 1 subjects buy an average of 1.63 shares in odd periods (when they have high endowments of francs) and sell an average of 1.71 shares in even periods (when they have low endowments of francs). By contrast, in the linear sessions, type 1 subjects buy an average of just 0.28 shares in odd periods and sell and average of just 0.23 shares in even periods. Thus, while there is a small degree of consumption-smoothing taking place in the linear sessions (on a per capita basis, subjects sell shares in low income periods and buy shares in high income periods in 6 of 8 sessions), the larger magnitude of average trades in the concave sessions indicates that it is the concavity of induced utility that matters most for the consumption-smoothing observed in Figure 3, and not the cyclic income process alone.

We can also confirm a strong degree of consumption-smoothing at the individual level. Consider the proportion of periods a subject smooths consumption; that is, the proportion of periods that a type 1 (2) subject buys (sells) shares if the period is odd, and sells (buys) shares if the period is even. Figure 4 displays the cumulative distribution across subjects of this proportion, pooled by whether the session had linear or concave induced utility functions. Half of the subjects in the concave sessions smoothed consumption in at least 80% of all trading periods while just 2% of subjects in the linear sessions smoothed consumption so frequently. Nearly 90% of the subjects in the concave sessions smoothed consumption in at least half of the periods, whereas only 30% of the subjects in the linear sessions smoothed consumption that frequently. We note that the comparative absence of consumption smoothing in the linear sessions is not indicative of anti-consumption smoothing behavior. Rather, it results from the fact that many subjects in the linear treatment did not actively trade shares in many periods. It is clear from the figure that subjects in the concave sessions were actively trading in most periods, and had a strong tendency to smooth their consumption.

As noted in the introduction, the experimental evidence on whether subjects can learn to consumption-smooth in an optimal manner (without tradeable assets) has not been encouraging; by contrast, in our design where subjects must engage in trade in the asset in order to implement the optimal consumption plan, and
Figure 3: Shares in Concave Utility Sessions
observe various transaction prices paid for that asset, consumption-smoothing seems to come rather naturally to most subjects.

**Finding 4** In the linear utility treatment, the asset was hoarded by just a few subjects.

In the linear treatment subjects have no induced motivation to smooth consumption, and thus no induced
reason to trade at $p^*$ under the assumption of risk neutrality. However, we observe substantial trade in these sessions, with roughly half of the subjects selling nearly all of their shares, and a small number of subjects accumulating most of the shares. Figure 5 displays the cumulative distribution of mean individual shareholdings during the final two periods of the final sequence of each session, aggregated according to whether the treatment induced a linear or concave utility function.\(^\text{19}\) We average across the final two periods due to the consumption-smoothing identified in Finding 3; use of final period data would bias upward the shareholdings of subjects in the concave sessions. We consider the final two periods rather than averaging shares over the final sequence or over the entire session because it can take several periods within a sequence for a subject to achieve a targeted position due to the budget constraint. Forty-three percent of subjects in the linear sessions held an average of 0.5 shares or less during the final two periods. By contrast, just 9% of subjects in the concave session held so few shares during the final two periods. At the other extreme, 16% of subjects in the linear sessions held an average of at least 6 shares during the final two periods, while only 4% of subjects in the concave sessions held so many shares. Thus subjects in the linear sessions were five times more likely to hold ‘few’ (< 1) shares and four times more likely to hold ‘many’ (≥ 6) shares as were subjects in the concave sessions, while subjects in the concave sessions were more than twice as likely to hold an intermediate quantity (∈ (1, 6)) of shares (87% vs. 41%).

A useful summary statistic for the distribution of shares is the Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality that is equal to zero when each subject holds an identical quantity of shares and is equal to one when one subject owns all shares. Under autarky, where subjects hold their initial endowments (type 1 subjects hold 1 share, type 2 subjects hold 4 shares), the Gini coefficient is 0.3. In the consumption-smoothing equilibrium of the concave utility treatment, the Gini coefficient when $d = 2$ (treatment C2) is the same as under autarky: 0.3. When $d = 3$ (treatment C3), the Gini coefficient (over two periods) is slightly lower at 0.25. We find that the mean Gini coefficient for mean shareholdings in the final two periods of all concave sessions is 0.37. By contrast, the mean Gini coefficient for mean shareholdings in the final two periods of all linear sessions is significantly larger, at 0.63; (Mann-Whitney test, p-value 0.0008). This difference largely reflects the hoarding of a large number of shares by just a few subjects in the linear treatment, behavior that was absent in the concave treatment sessions.

Indeed, an interesting regularity is that exactly two of twelve (16.67%) subjects in each of the 8 linear sessions held an average of at least 6 shares of the asset during the final two trading periods (recall there are only 30 shares of the asset in total in each session of our design). Thus the subjects identified in the right tail of the distribution in Figure 5 were divided up evenly across the 8 linear sessions. The actual proportion of shares held by the largest two shareholders during the final two periods averaged 61% across all linear sessions, compared with just 38% across all concave sessions. Applying the Mann-Whitney rank sum test, the distribution of shares held by the largest two shareholders in the linear sessions is significantly larger than the same distribution found in the concave sessions (p-value = 0.0135). To benchmark these statistics, under autarky the two largest shareholders would hold 27% (8/30) of the shares in all sessions. If subjects in the C2 (C3) treatment coordinated on the risk-neutral steady state equilibrium, 17% (20%) of the shares would be held by the two largest shareholders on average during the final two periods.

**Finding 5** In the linear sessions there is a strong and significant positive relationship between a subject’s number of high-variance choices in the Holt-Laury paired lottery choice task (a measure of their risk tolerance) and the subjects’ end-of-session shareholdings. There is no such relationship in the concave sessions. In the concave sessions, the further that a subject’s indigenous risk preference departs from risk neutrality (in either direction), the worse is the expected value of his net transactions. There is no such relationship in the linear

\(^{19}\)We use the final sequence with a duration of at least two periods.
sessions. Thus, risk-neutral subjects tend to make the most sound trading decisions in the concave sessions. However, all subjects, even those who can be classified as “risk neutral” can get “caught up” in the pricing bubbles of the linear sessions.

After running the first six sessions of this experiment it became apparent to us that the “indigenous” (home-grown) risk preferences of subjects may be a substantial influence on asset prices and the distribution of shareholdings, particularly in the linear sessions. Intuitively, over the course of a linear session sequence the price of the asset should be bid up by those subjects with the highest risk tolerance, causing shareholdings to become concentrated among these subjects. Thus, beginning with session 7 we had subjects participate in a second experiment, involving the Holt-Laury paired lottery choice instrument. As mentioned in the discussion of Finding 2, this second experiment occurred after the asset market experiment had concluded, and was not announced in advance so that we could continue to make comparisons with asset price data across sessions. In this second experiment, subjects faced a series of ten choices between two lotteries, each paying either a low or high payoff; one lottery, choice A, had a low variance between the two payoffs while the other lottery, choice B, had a higher variance between the two payoffs. For choice \( n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, 10\} \), the probability of getting the high payoff in the chosen lottery was \((0.1)^n\). One of the choices was selected at random after all lottery choice decisions had been made, that lottery was played (with computer-generated probabilities), and the subject was paid according to the outcome. As detailed in Holt and Laury (2002), a risk-neutral expected utility maximizer should choose the high-variance lottery B six times. We refer to a subject’s HL score as the number of times he selected the high-variance lottery B. The mean HL score in the final nine sessions was 3.9. Roughly 16% of the subjects had an HL score of at least 6, and 30% had a score of at least 5, a distribution reasonably consistent with the experimental literature for lotteries of this scale.

For pooled linear and concave treatments, we ran a random effects regression of HL scores on average shareholdings during the final two periods of each session. This specification was necessary since the distribution of HL scores in each session was endogenous (e.g., a subject with an HL score of 6 might be the least risk-averse subject in one session but only the third least risk-averse in another). In the linear case, the estimated coefficient on the HL score was 0.46 and its associated p-value was 0.033 (the full regression results are presented in Table A-2 of the Appendix). Thus the model predicts that for every two additional high-variance choices in the Holt-Laury lottery choice experiment, a subject will hold nearly one additional share of the asset by the end of the period. This is a large impact, as there are only 2.5 shares per capita in these economies. On the other hand, in the concave case the estimated coefficient on the HL score is -0.10 with an associated p-value of 0.407 (full results are reported in Table A-3 of the Appendix). The estimated coefficients and p-values in these regressions are nearly identical to those in the analogous fixed effects regressions. Thus we find that the HL score is a useful predictor of final shareholdings only in the linear sessions: The more risk-tolerant a subject was relative to his session cohort, the more shares he tended to own by the end of a linear-treatment session.

To corroborate this result, we consider the Holt-Laury rank of the two largest shareholders during the final two periods of the five linear sessions for which we have Holt-Laury data. The rank (1=lowest, 12=highest) of the subject with the highest HL score is 12, the rank of the subject with the second-highest HL score is 11, and so on. Ties are assigned the average position within the tie; e.g., if the second-highest score is 6 and it is shared by two subjects, each of them is assigned a rank of 10.5. The mean Holt-Laury rank for the two largest shareholders in each session (as described in Finding 4) is 8.3. Consider five random draws (with replacement) of twelve subjects from the distribution of Holt-Laury scores observed in our experiment, and from each of these sets of twelve, draw two subjects at random. The probability that the average HL rank
of these two subjects relative to their group is at least 8.3 is bounded from above by 0.047, which further confirms the strong relationship between shareholdings and the relative size of the HL score within-session.

Finally, we characterize the relationship between a subject’s HL score and the expected value of a subject’s net transactions. For subject $i$ in period $t$, let $h_i^t$ be his net shares acquired and $f_i^t$ be his net francs acquired. Recalling that $p^*$ is the fundamental price, let $v_i^t = f_i^t + h_i^t p^*$. Thus $v$ is the net change in expected value of the subject’s asset and cash position during the trading period. First consider behavior in the linear sessions. Abstracting from complicated price expectations, a subject who is risk-neutral with regard to expected monetary payoffs should always take a positive expected value position; that is, if actual transaction prices are below the fundamental price a risk-neutral subject should choose to be a buyer, and if the price is above the fundamental price, that same subject should choose to be a seller. What about non-risk-neutral subjects? We will consider such types more formally in the following section, but intuitively, for prices below the fundamental price, we expect that both risk-neutral and risk-seeking subjects will take positive expected value positions while risk-averse subjects may potentially take negative expected value positions depending on the price and their degree of risk-aversion. Similarly, for prices above the fundamental price, we expect risk-neutral and risk-averse subjects to take positive expected value positions while risk-seeking subjects may potentially take negative expected value positions. Thus during a session with exposure to a wide range of prices, we should expect a risk-neutral subject to take a higher expected value position relative to other subjects in his session. The further a subject’s preferences are from the risk-neutral benchmark, the lower should be his expected value position.

For the concave sessions, because most subjects are consumption-smoothers we have to adjust for the fact that there are generally more odd periods than even periods due to the existence of multiple sequences. We do this by calculating $v$ separately for odd and even periods, taking the period average of each, adding them together and dividing by two. This gives us the mean net addition to expected value for a subject in each period. We run a quadratic random effects regression of the HL score on the mean net expected value function for the concave sessions (regression results are reported are in Table A-4 in the Appendix). The coefficient on the HL score is 2.08 (p-value 0.012) and the coefficient on the squared HL term is -0.195 (p-value 0.029). Thus the fitted curve is concave in the HL score as we would expect, and has a peak at an HL score of 5.3, which is nearly risk-neutral. Running this model for the linear sessions we get much smaller and highly insignificant coefficients (see Table A-5).

Thus it appears to be the case that risk-neutral subjects take net positions of greater expected value than other subjects in the concave sessions. They also tend to earn more than other subjects, as is apparent in Figure 6 (the maximum of the fitted curve is for an HL score of 5.7; regression results are reported in Table A-6), so the net increases in expected value are not coming at the expense of consumption-smoothing. The farther a subject’s risk tolerance departs from the risk-neutral benchmark, the lower the expected value of his net positions. However, this result does not carry over to the linear sessions. In fact, earnings are decreasing in HL scores in these sessions, although the difference is small. Risk-neutral subjects are among the most risk-tolerant subjects in these sessions, so naturally they tend to accumulate shares over the course of these sessions. But they often get caught up in a “bubble” as they compete with other risk-tolerant subjects for shares of the asset.

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20This computation assumes there are no ties in Holt-Laury rank, which of course is not possible with twelve subjects and only 10 possible HL scores. If one of the large shareholders is tied with another subject in HL score it pulls his rank downward.
5 Indigenous (homegrown) risk preferences

Defining optimal out-of-equilibrium behavior for risk-averse expected utility maximizers in our experiment is a difficult task. Aside from the difficulty of structuring subjects’ expectations about future prices, it is not clear how best to deal with the wealth effects introduced as $m_0$ in Section 2.2. As Rabin (2000) points out, the degree of risk-aversion exhibited by subjects over small stakes in laboratory settings cannot be rationalized by lifetime expected utility optimization because it would imply an implausibly high degree of risk-aversion in high stakes lotteries; it follows that most rational subjects should behave as risk neutral expected utility maximizers in the lab. If the subjects we have identified (via the HL test) as risk-averse do not maximize expected utility over all decisions (both inside and outside the lab), should we nevertheless expect them to maximize expected utility over a sequence of decisions within the lab?\footnote{Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2006) report that small stakes risk-aversion is negatively correlated with cognitive ability, further casting doubt on the likelihood that risk-averse subjects are dynamic expected utility optimizers.}

To address this issue, we will maintain the assumption that prices are expected with certainty to remain constant, which greatly simplifies the analysis and allows us to focus on how the introduction of indigenous risk aversion affects optimal behavior. Thus we can use equation (6), a subject’s Euler equation under the assumption of constant prices, as our starting point. We will show below that if subjects do not ignore wealth effects within the experiment, then rational risk aversion cannot fit the data for most subjects. This finding is intuitive since subjects identified by the Holt-Laury procedure as risk-averse are clearly ignoring wealth effects from outside the experiment.

5.1 Induced Linear Preferences

We begin with the case where induced utility is linear (that is, treatments L2 and L3), so $u(c) = \alpha c$. Then by (6) prices can be constant only if $v'(M_{t+1}) = kv'(M_t)$ for all $t$, where $k \in (0, 1)$ is a constant rate of decay of marginal utility. Thus (6) reduces to

$$p = \frac{k\beta}{1 - k\beta} \bar{d}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)
Suppose subjects have indigenous CRRA utility, i.e., \( v(m) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} m^{1-\gamma} \), where \( \gamma \in (0, 1) \). Then \( k = \left( \frac{M_t}{M_t+1} \right)^\gamma \). Substituting this expression into (9) and applying some algebra, we obtain the condition \( M_{t+1} = gM_t \), where \( g = \left[ \frac{(d+p)^\beta}{p} \right]^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} \) is the optimal growth rate of wealth in period 2 forward. If \( p = p^* \) then \( g = 1 \), so consumption is zero after the first period at the interior solution. Since we assume subjects cannot borrow against future income, a risk-averse subject facing constant price \( p^* \) thus adopts the corner solution in which he sells all of his assets in the first period and simply consumes his income in subsequent periods (this is also true for \( p > p^* \), in which case \( g < 1 \)).

For \( p < p^* \) we have \( g > 1 \), so the subject prefers that his wealth grows over time at a constant rate. This growth rate is decreasing in the risk-aversion of the subject and price. Thus a more risk-averse subject facing higher prices prefers more of his earnings in the sequence up-front and accumulates wealth at a slower rate. For all \( \gamma > 0 \) wealth eventually explodes as the curvature of the subject’s utility function becomes approximately linear at “high” levels of consumption; that is, the subject behaves almost risk-neutrally once he’s accumulated sufficient wealth, and would prefer to go long on assets at the current price if he were allowed to borrow. Note that it is not possible for all subjects to behave as expected utility maximizers at a constant price, because aggregate income in the experiment is constant in each period. Eventually demand will outpace supply, causing prices to rise towards \( p^* \).

How quickly should we expect excess demand to rise? Consider the behavior of a subject with \( \gamma = 0.5 \) in an L3 session who faces constant price \( p = 10 \) (note \( \gamma = 0.5 \) is the mean estimated degree of risk-aversion in our experiment, and \( p = 10 \) was a commonly observed and fairly stable price in two of our four L3 sessions). Suppose the subject considers initial wealth \( m_0 \) to be his show-up fee, $5. In the upper-left panel of Figure 7 is displayed the optimal shareholdings for this subject. Regardless of type this subject will spend all francs on shares in the first three periods. Thus shareholdings at the end of the first period should be more than 12 if the subject is a type 1 or more than 7 if he is a type 2; excess demand for a pair of subjects with a
mean degree of risk-aversion will be four times their shareholdings at the end of the first period alone!

The upper-right panel of Figure 7 reveals that optimal behavior is clearly sensitive to the choice of initial wealth, but even if the initial wealth reference level is $0, by the end of the fifth period a pair of subjects with an average degree of risk-aversion will have excess demand nearly four times their initial shareholdings. A highly risk-averse subject with no initial wealth, represented in the lower-left panel of the figure, will take longer to ramp up share growth. While the non-constant prices available in the experiment greatly complicate the analysis of optimal behavior, it seems unlikely that most subjects in the linear sessions attempted to dynamically optimize expected utility when prices were below $p^*$.22

However, what if risk-averse subjects ignore wealth effects entirely, even within a sequence? It is clear that most subjects ignore or under-weight wealth outside of the lab when making decisions in an experiment, so postulating that subjects ignore wealth earned within a session or even a sequence is certainly plausible. In that case, we can consider holding an asset at any point in time as a compound lottery. For a subject with $\gamma = 0.5$, the certainty equivalent of this compound lottery when $\hat{d} = 3$ is about 10.4 francs (recall the expected value of this compound lottery is 15 francs). Thus a subject with a mean degree of small-stakes risk aversion who ignores wealth effects should be nearly indifferent to buying or selling shares at the lowest prices observed after the first period of the L3 sessions, while he should sell the asset at higher prices. Therefore myopic risk-aversion can rationalize the fact that most subjects sell off their shares even when prices are well below the fundamental price in sessions 4, 7, and 12, while dynamic optimization of expected utility implies that some of these subjects should have re-entered the market as buyers later in the session, pushing prices higher.

5.2 Induced Concave Preferences

In the lower-right panel of Figure 7 we observe optimal shareholdings for a subject who is indigenously risk-neutral and faces a constant price of 10 in a C3 session. Desired shareholdings increase over time since $p < p^*$, but the rate of increase is much slower than for a rationally risk-averse subject at the same price in an L3 session. Thus while the risk-neutral steady state equilibrium price of comparable linear and concave economies is the same, optimal behavior out of equilibrium is distinctly different in the two cases. For linear induced preferences subjects are typically at a corner outcome due to budget or total resource constraints, preferring to buy or sell as many shares as they can. Further, for risk-averse subjects the transition from being a corner seller to a corner buyer happens very quickly. This knife-edge feature of induced linear preferences is robust to the intuitive behavioral strategy where wealth effects are ignored introduced above. On the other hand, for concave induced preferences consumption-smoothing remains a strong feature of optimal behavior out of equilibrium. This is apparent for the risk-neutral agent represented in the lower-right panel of Figure 7, but it is intuitively true for risk-averse agents, as well. While equation (8) has proven difficult to solve numerically, intuitively a risk-averse agent facing a constant price should hold fewer shares initially and increase shareholdings at a slower rate than a risk-neutral agent facing the same price.

As in the case of induced linear preferences, there is an intuitive behavioral strategy for concave induced preferences in which subjects ignore wealth effects. Suppose subjects myopically equate the expected marginal cost of a trade with its expected marginal benefit. Thus a type 1 subject in the first period of a sequence would equate the marginal cost of buying $\Delta$ shares at price $p$ in the current period with the expected marginal benefit of those shares in the subsequent period (these shares return a dividend plus the

---

22We are presently conducting a new stochastic horizon study where subjects can trade in a “perfectly competitive” market as much as they like at a constant price, which will provide a rigorous test of this hypothesis.
option value of re-sale). Assuming CRRA utility, the subject would choose $\Delta$ such that:

\[
\frac{\delta + \alpha (y_2 + s_1 d + \Delta(d + p))^{\gamma}}{\delta + \alpha (y_1 + s_1 d - \Delta p)^{\gamma}} = -\frac{\beta(d + p)}{p} \left[ \frac{y_2 + s_1 d + \Delta(d + p)}{y_1 + s_1 d - \Delta p} \right]^{\phi-1}
\]

The equation for a type 2 agent is similar, except this subject would set the marginal benefit of selling shares in the current period equal to the expected marginal cost in the subsequent period.

Suppose $d = 3$. At the steady-state equilibrium price of 15, all subjects following this strategy prefer to buy two shares in high income periods and sell two shares in low income periods regardless of their degree of risk-aversion; that is, these subjects would be observationally equivalent to risk-neutral optimizers. If $p = 10$, a risk-neutral type 1 subject following this behavioral strategy will prefer to purchase 3 shares in the first period and sell 2.78 shares in the second period. Thus he still has a preferences to increase his shareholdings over time, but at a much slower rate than a risk-neutral optimizer. In fact, because shares are discrete, the subject would simply prefer to cycle between buying and selling three shares. Interestingly, myopic behavior is nearly identical regardless of degree of risk-aversion in a continuous economy, and identical in a discrete economy. For example, a type 1 subject with $\gamma = 1$ (a very risk-averse subject) would prefer to buy 2.94 shares in the first period and sell 2.81 shares in the second period. Behavior for type 2 subjects is very similar, except they would sell shares in odd periods and buy shares in even periods. Therefore, if subjects follow this behavioral strategy all prices we observe in the concave sessions are sustainable as equilibria. It is only if prices get too low (around 60% below $p^*$) that we should expect to see the least risk-averse subjects accumulate shares over time, and prices in the experiment generally remain above this threshold.

Because prices are endogenous and typically vary within-session in our experiment, our design is ill-suited to identify individual strategies used by subjects in the experiment. Our goal in this section is to make it clear that optimal behavior out of equilibrium, under the simplifying assumption of constant prices, is very different between the linear and concave treatments, and this difference is robust to intuitive behavioral deviations from dynamic optimization of expected utility within the lab. Optimal behavior for linear induced preferences has a knife-edge quality: Nearly every subject at nearly any price should either buy or sell as many shares as are available. Findings 4 and 5 are consistent with this prediction; most subjects sell most of their shares while a small fraction buy nearly all of the shares available. Those who buy tend to be the least risk-averse subjects in the session as identified by the Holt-Laury paired choice lottery. Optimal behavior for concave induced preferences is characterized by thick markets where everyone buys or sells shares in every period, a characterization consistent with Finding 3. Further, while individual behavior should quickly push prices to at least $p^*$ very quickly in the case of linear induced preferences, substantially lower prices are consistent with “reasonable” behavior in the case of concave induced preferences.

6 Conclusion

Our research design provides an important bridge between the literature on experimental methods and experimental asset pricing models, and the equilibrium asset pricing models used by macroeconomic/business cycle and finance researchers. To date there has been little communication between these two fields. Our work integrating methods and models from both fields will enable both literatures to speak to a broader audience.

What we learn from our experimental design integrating these segmented literatures is that an induced incentive to consumption-smooth can serve as a powerful brake on asset prices. If we very loosely define a bubble as a sustained deviation above an asset’s fundamental price, half of our laboratory economies with no induced incentive to trade (linear utility treatment) experienced bubbles, and in three-quarters of
those sessions the bubble exhibited no signs of collapse. Indeed, in half of the sessions exhibiting bubbles, the median price of the asset towards the end of the experiment was more than double the fundamental price and was continuing to rise. In contrast, when consumption-smoothing was induced (concave utility treatment) in an otherwise identical economy, bubbly prices were observed in only one-quarter of sessions, and in these sessions the median price of the asset had collapsed to the fundamental price by the (random) end of the experimental session. Thus price bubbles were less frequent, of lesser magnitude, and of shorter duration when we induced consumption-smoothing in an otherwise identical economy.

These results may offer some preliminary guidance as to which naturally occurring markets are most prone to experience large asset price bubbles. We might reasonably expect that markets with a high concentration of speculators are the most likely to bubble, while markets with a large number of participants who trade at least in part on the basis of intrinsic preferences are less likely to bubble (in our study market depth itself appears to be a function of what motivates agents to trade). Of course, in our current design we do not observe economies with mixtures of intrinsic and non-intrinsic participants, so at this point we merely offer the possibility that laboratory experiments may provide the basis for such a characterization in the future.

We anticipate that our basic experimental design can be extended in at least three distinct directions. First, the design can be moved a step closer to the environments used in the macrofinance literature; specifically, by adding a Markov process for dividends, and/or a known, constant growth rate in endowment income. The purpose of such treatments would be to explore the robustness of our present findings in the deterministic setting to stochastic or growing environments. A further step would be to induce consumption-smoothing through overlapping generations rather than via cyclic income and a concave exchange rate; how would a finite horizon at the individual subject level (while maintaining an indefinite horizon at the market level) impact asset prices?

In another direction, it would be useful to clarify the impact of features of our experimental design relative to the much-studied experimental design of Smith, Suchaneck, and Williams (1988). For example, one could study a finite horizon, linear (induced) utility design as in SSW, but where there exists a constant probability of firm bankruptcy as in our present design. Would the interaction of a finite horizon and firm bankruptcy inhibit bubbles relative to the SSW design, or is an induced economic incentive to trade necessary to prevent a small group of speculators from effectively setting asset prices across a broad range of economies?

Finally, it would be interesting to design an experiment to rigorously test for within-session risk preferences and wealth effects. In our present design we observe little evidence that risk-averse subjects (classified by the Holt-Laury paired lottery choice instrument) attempt to increase their shareholdings over time in the linear induced utility treatment in sessions where prices are relatively low, a contradiction of time-consistent rational risk aversion. This result is perhaps not surprising; if subjects exhibit a different degree of risk aversion in small stakes laboratory gambles than they apply to ‘large’ economic decisions (i.e., the Rabin (2000) critique), then perhaps it should be expected that they exhibit myopic risk aversion over a sequence of small stake gambles rather than maximize expected utility globally over the sequence. To our knowledge this hypothesis has not been directly tested. In fact, most laboratory studies of risk preferences explicitly eliminate the possibility of laboratory wealth effects on subject behavior.

Modifying our present design, subjects could face a sequence of decisions to directly buy assets from or sell assets to the experimenter at a constant price with a constant risk of bankruptcy, i.e., we can study individual risk preferences in a stationary, competitive market. Will risk-averse subjects (as identified by the HL test instrument) tend to increase their shareholdings as their earnings in the experiment accumulate, as dictated by CRRA preferences, or will their decisions be more myopic? This is an important question, because empirical macroeconomic studies are often calibrated to a distribution of CRRA preferences commonly estimated in laboratory studies. Our present paper suggests the possibility that the wealth effects implied
by CRRA utility are not observed for many subjects. While CRRA seems to fit laboratory data on static decisions reasonably well (for a given magnitude of the stakes involved), it is possible that an alternative model of risk-aversion is needed for dynamic decisions. The relationship of dynamic financial decision-making to a subject’s elicited (static) degree of risk aversion has the potential to lead to many new and exciting findings.
References


Appendix - Regression Results

Table A-1: Linear Regression of Mean HL Scores on Median First Period Prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Number of obs = 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>86.002833</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43.0014165</td>
<td>F(2,7) = 119.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>2.52216695</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.360309565</td>
<td>Prob&gt;F = 0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88.525</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.83611111</td>
<td>R-squared = 0.9715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adjusted R-squared = 0.9634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Root MSE = 0.60026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| pinit | Coef.   | Std. Err. | t     | P > |t| | [95% Confidence Interval] |
|-------|---------|-----------|-------|-----|---|--------------------------|
| hl    | 3.60597 | 0.3221715 | 11.19 | 0.000 | | [2.844155, 4.367784] |
| hlevendifsq | 11.18167 | 1.446256 | 7.73 | 0.000 | | [7.761817, 14.60152] |
| _cons | -4.786654 | 1.244665 | -3.85 | 0.006 | | [-7.72982, -1.843489] |

Table A-2: R.E. Regression of HL Scores on Final Shareholdings, Linear Sessions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random-effects GLS regression</th>
<th>Number of obs = 60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group variable (i): session</td>
<td>Number of groups = 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq: within = 0.0000</td>
<td>Obs per group: min = 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between = 0.0000</td>
<td>avg = 12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overall = 0.0723</td>
<td>max = 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random effect u_i~Guassian</td>
<td>Wald chi2(1) = 4.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corr(u_i,X) = 0 (assumed)</td>
<td>Prob &gt; chi2 = 0.0335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| avgsharefin2 | Coef. | Std. Err. | z     | P > |z| | [95% Confidence Interval] |
|--------------|-------|-----------|-------|-----|---|--------------------------|
| hl           | 0.4579467 | 0.2153831 | 2.13  | 0.033 | | [0.0358035, 0.8800899] |
| _cons        | 0.5613589 | 1.001782  | 0.56  | 0.575 | | [-1.402099, 2.524816] |

| sigma_u  | 0 |
| sigma_e  | 3.3157167 |
| rho      | 0 (fraction of variance due to u_i) |
Table A-3: R.E. Regression of HL Scores on Final Shareholdings, Concave Sessions

\[
\text{xtreg avgsharefin2 hl if lin==0, i (session)}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random-effects GLS regression</th>
<th>Number of obs = 60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group variable (i): session</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq: within = 0.0000</td>
<td>Obs per group: min = 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between = 0.0000</td>
<td>avg = 12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overall = 0.0117</td>
<td>max = 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random effect u_i~Guassian</td>
<td>Wald chi2(1) = 0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corr(u_i,X) = 0 (assumed)</td>
<td>Prob &gt; chi2 = 0.4074</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| avgsharefin2 | Coef.   | Std. Err. | z   | P > |z|    | [95% Confidence Interval] |
|--------------|---------|-----------|-----|-----|-----|--------------------------|
| hl           | -0.0969082 | 0.1169705 | -0.83 | 0.407 | [0.3261662, 0.1323499] |
| cons         | 2.847254   | 0.4656838 | 6.11 | 0.000 | [1.934531, 3.759978]    |

| sigma a_u    | 0       |
| sigma a_e    | 1.6286249 |
| rho          | 0 (fraction of variance due to u_i) |

Table A-4: R.E. Quadratic Regression of HL Scores on Net E.V. Positions, Concave Sessions

\[
\text{xtreg val hl hlsq if lin==0, i (session)}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random-effects GLS regression</th>
<th>Number of obs = 60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group variable (i): session</td>
<td>Number of groups = 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq: within = 0.1093</td>
<td>Obs per group: min = 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between = 0.1738</td>
<td>avg = 12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overall = 0.1049</td>
<td>max = 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random effect u_i~Guassian</td>
<td>Wald chi2(1) = 6.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corr(u_i,X) = 0 (assumed)</td>
<td>Prob &gt; chi2 = 0.0355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| avgsharefin2 | Coef.   | Std. Err. | z   | P > |z|    | [95% Confidence Interval] |
|--------------|---------|-----------|-----|-----|-----|--------------------------|
| hl           | 2.08459  | 0.8316107 | 2.51 | 0.012 | [0.4546632, 3.714517] |
| hlsq         | -0.1953346 | 0.0891952 | -2.19 | 0.029 | [-0.370154, -0.0205152] |
| cons         | -4.373728 | 1.750486 | -2.50 | 0.012 | [-7.804617, -0.9428389] |

| sigma a_u    | 0       |
| sigma a_e    | 3.5726936 |
| rho          | 0 (fraction of variance due to u_i) |
### Table A-5: R.E. Quadratic Regression of HL Scores on Net E.V. Positions, Linear Sessions

xtreg val hl hlsq if lin==1, i (session)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>P &gt;</th>
<th>[95% Confidence Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>avgsharefin2</td>
<td>0.0301019</td>
<td>0.7127489</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hlsq</td>
<td>0.0032495</td>
<td>0.0669103</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cons</td>
<td>-0.1977312</td>
<td>1.730851</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.909</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A-6: F.E. Quadratic Regression of HL Scores on Period Earnings, Concave Sessions

xtreg var2 var1 hlsq, i(var5) fe)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>P &gt;</th>
<th>[95% Confidence Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>var2</td>
<td>0.1523488</td>
<td>0.0817133</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hlsq</td>
<td>-0.013366</td>
<td>0.0088251</td>
<td>-1.51</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cons</td>
<td>0.3857246</td>
<td>0.1708212</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F-test that all u_i=0:

| F(4,53) = 1.25 | Prob > F =0.3009 |

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