Abstract

We use extreme value theory (EVT) to develop insights about price theory. Our analysis reveals “detail-independent” equilibrium properties that characterize a large family of models. We derive a formula relating equilibrium prices to the level of competition. When the number of firms is large, markups are proportional to $1 / \left( n F^{-1} \left[ F^{-1} \left( 1 - 1/n \right) \right] \right)$, where $F$ is the random utility noise distribution and $n$ is the number of firms. This implies prices are pinned down by the tail properties of the noise distribution and that prices are independent of many other institutional details. The elasticity of the markup with respect to the number of firms is shown to be the EVT tail exponent of the distribution for preference shocks and in most leading cases is relatively insensitive to the number of firms. For example, for the Gaussian case asymptotic markups are proportional to $1 / \sqrt{\ln n}$, implying a zero asymptotic elasticity of the markup with respect to the number of firms. Thus competition only exerts weak pressure on prices. We also study applications of the model, including endogenizing the level of noise.
1 Introduction

Economists model consumer choices as a function of deterministic factors – like measurable product attributes – and noise (Luce 1959, McFadden 1981). Noise arises because of consumer evaluation errors as well as true variation in tastes.

Drawing from extreme value theory (EVT), we develop tools to analyze the impact of noise on equilibrium prices in three important classes of symmetric random utility models – Hart (1985), Perloff and Salop (1985), and Sattinger (1984).\(^1\) Expressions for equilibrium markups have been previously derived for these models. The existing markup formulae, however, include integrals that are generally analytically intractable. Only for a few specific distributions are closed-form solutions available. Drawing from extreme value theory, the current paper solves this tractability problem and provides a simple, useful formula for markups. Our analysis also reveals important robust features about markups and relates these markups to limit pricing, (i.e., Bertrand competition with heterogeneous firms).

Previous analysis of random-utility models has focused on a small number of special cases in which markups turn out to be either unresponsive to competition or highly responsive to competition. For instance, consider the Perloff-Salop model and assume that noise has an exponential density or a logit (i.e. Gumbel) density. In this case, markups converge to a strictly positive value as \(n\), the number of competing firms, goes to infinity. Hence, asymptotic markups have zero elasticity with respect to \(n\) (Perloff and Salop 1985, Anderson et al. 1992). By contrast, when noise is uniformly distributed, markups are proportional to \(1/n\), so markups have a unit elasticity and hence a strong negative relationship with \(n\) (Perloff and Salop 1985).

All three of these illustrative distributions — exponential, logit, and uniform — are appealing for their analytic tractability rather than their realism. In comparison to the Gaussian distribution, the exponential and logit cases have relatively fat tails while the uniform case has no tails. It is important to know how prices respond to competition when the noise follows more general distributions, particularly distributions that are considered to be empirically realistic.

We use extreme value theory to analyze general noise distributions. In each of the three
\(^1\)Empirical IO models no longer use symmetric, random utility models (e.g., see the critiques in Bajari and Benkard 2003 and Armstrong 2013). Accordingly, our findings are not directly applicable to the structural models that are most frequently used in empirical IO. However, extensions of our work (see our conclusion) may be useful for characterizing asymmetric models.
random-utility models that we study – Hart, Perloff-Salop, Sattinger – we show that markups are asymptotically proportional to \(1/(nF'[F^{-1}(1-1/n)])\), where \(F\) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for noise. Moreover, we show that this markup turns out to be almost equivalent to the markup obtained under limit pricing. The markup is asymptotically proportional (and often equal) to the expected gap between the highest draw and second highest draw in a sample of \(n\) draws.

This “detail-independence” for the value of the markup is surprising.\(^2\) The Hart, Perloff-Salop, and Sattinger models differ in a host of important ways.\(^3\) Yet, these three models lead asymptotically to the same value of the markup up to a scaling constant.

We pay particular attention to the Gaussian case because it is a leading approximation of many natural phenomena. For the Gaussian case we show that asymptotic markups are proportional to \(1/\sqrt{\ln n}\), where \(n\) is the number of competing firms. This formula implies that mark-ups fall slowly as \(n\) rises. Moreover, the elasticity of the markup with respect to \(n\) converges to 0. Hence, the Gaussian case behaves much more like the exponential and logit cases than like the uniform case. Rising competition in an environment with a Gaussian noise distribution only produces weak downward pressure on prices.

We also show that for all “heavy-tailed” distributions (including subexponential distributions like the log-normal and power-law distributions like the Pareto distribution), mark-ups increase as the number of competing firms increase.

More generally, if \(n\) is large we find that the elasticity of the markup with respect to the number of firms equals the EVT tail exponent of the distribution; a magnitude that is easy to calculate. These results demonstrate an intimate relationship between the economic logic of competition in large economies and the mathematics of EVT. We conclude that markups are surprisingly insensitive to the degree of competition in large economies, since markups have a zero asymptotic elasticity for many empirically realistic noise distributions. Only noise distributions with extremely thin tails (like the uniform distribution) and very heavy tails (like the Pareto), have markups with elasticities different from zero.

Moving away from the specifics of random demand models, the tools that we develop allow

\(^2\)The paradigm of a “detail-independence” or “universality” result is the central limit theorem: for large \(n\), when forming the mean, we obtain a distribution (the Gaussian) that is independent of the details of the system. Likewise, power laws and Zipf’s law arise in detail-independent ways, which explains their prevalence in economics (see Gabaix 1999, and the references therein).

\(^3\)For instance, in the Perloff-Salop model consumers need to buy one unit of the good. In the Sattinger model, they allocate a fixed dollar amount to the good. The Hart model does not impose either constraint.
us to calculate the asymptotic behavior of integrals for a class of functions $h(x)$, of the form

$$
\int h(x) f^k(x) F(x)^n dx, \quad (1)
$$

where $k \geq 1$, which appear in a very large class of economic situations, some of which we will review later. For instance, this integral can be used to calculate the expected value of a function of the maximum of $n$ random variables, or the gap between the maximum and the second largest value of those random variables. Using EVT we are able to derive robust approximations of this integral for a large $n$. We illustrate the practical usefulness of this integral by studying a series of examples in trade, macroeconomics, behavioral economics, and several other fields.

Extreme outcomes and EVT techniques are important in many parts of economics. For example, the Gumbel extreme value distribution is the foundation of the logit specification for discrete choice with random demand (Luce 1959, McFadden’s 1981). This specification has been used widely in the analysis of product differentiation, regional economics, geography and trade, see e.g. Anderson et al. (1992), Dagsvik (1994), Dagsvik and Karlstrom (2005), Ibragimov and Walden (2010), and Armstrong (2012). In international trade, Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Bernard et al. (2003), used the aggregation properties of the Fréchet extreme value distribution to analyze international trade at the producer level (see also Chaney 2008, 2012). Acemoglu, Chernozhukov and Yildiz (2006, 2009) identify the impact of the tail specification on learning. In macroeconomics, Gabaix (2011) shows that the tails of the firm size distribution play a role in macroeconomic fluctuations; extremes in the size distribution of firms can emerge from random growth (Gabaix 1999, Luttmer 2006) or the network structure of the buyer-supplier relations amongst firms (Acemoglu et al. 2012, Chaney 2012). Jones (2005) models the distribution of innovative ideas and analyzes the impact of this distribution on the bias of technical change. In applied finance, much use has been made of EVT in risk management and systemic risk analysis; see e.g. Jansen and De Vries (1991) for an early contribution and Ibragimov, Jaffee and Walden (2009, 2011) for recent examples. In an application to the economics of health care, Garber, Jones and Romer (2006) discuss how the distribution of benefits generated by medical innovations relates to the optimal scheme for incentivizing innovation. EVT is also used extensively in the theory of auctions (e.g., Hong and Shum 2004). We anticipate that the techniques developed in the current paper will be useful in the setups discussed above, in addition to the basic price-theoretic setup we discuss
here (e.g. Bulow and Klemperer 2002, 2012, Weyl and Fabinger 2012 for recent developments in that area). As an example, Gabaix and Landier (2008) use some of the current paper’s results to analyze the upper tail of the distribution of CEO talents.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the three illustrative market models we analyze – Hart, Perloff-Salop and Sattinger. Section 3 presents our core mathematical result: an asymptotic approximation of a key integral that is needed to characterize economic environments in which extremes matter. Section 4 illustrates the value of this approximation, by using it to study the three economic models. We show that the tail of the noise distribution – captured by the tail exponent – is the crucial determinant of prices, whereas the details of the demand-side modelling (e.g., Hart vs. Perloff-Salop vs. Sattinger) matter little, or not at all, asymptotically. As many common noise distributions have a tail index of zero, our results imply that in many market contexts additional competition has little effect on prices, once the market goes beyond a small number of firms.

Section 5 presents extensions and applications of our three key models, in numerous fields, including trade, macroeconomics, and behavioral economics. For example, when noise is endogenous, competition increases the amount of noise supplied by firms, in a way we make quantitatively precise. This section also demonstrates that our mathematical techniques and economic insights are robust. Section 6 concludes and discusses an extension of our results to a more general family of models.

We prove our main results (Theorems 1 and 2) in the Appendix, and our other results in an online Appendix. The online appendix also discusses some additional details of our three key models.

## 2 Economic Models

In the following three subsections we introduce three models of monopolistic competition under oligopoly. The three models differ in the specification of the consumer’s utility function, but all share the feature that the representative consumer’s preference for a given firm’s good is represented by a random taste shock.

Each model features a representative consumer, and an exogenously specified number $n$ of firms. The timing of each model is as follows:

1. Firms simultaneously set prices;
2. Random taste shocks are realized;

3. Consumers make purchase decisions;

4. Profits are realized.

The key economic object of interest is the price markup in a symmetric equilibrium, which we derive by solving the first-order condition for each firm’s profit maximization problem. The firm $i$’s profit function is given by

$$\pi_i = (p_i - c)D(p_1, ..., p_n; i)$$

where $D(p_1, ..., p_n; i)$ is the demand function for firm $i$ given the price vector $(p_1, ..., p_n)$ of the $n$ goods, and where $c$ is the marginal cost of production. The first order condition for profit maximization implies the following equilibrium markup in a symmetric equilibrium

$$p - c = -\frac{D(p, p; n)}{D_1(p, p; n)}.$$ (2)

Here $p$ is the symmetric equilibrium price, $D(p, p'; n)$ denotes the demand function for a firm that sets price $p$ when there are $n$ goods and all other firms set price $p'$, and $D_1(p, p'; n) \equiv \partial D(p, p'; n) / \partial p$. Denote the markup $p - c$ in a symmetric equilibrium with $n$ firms as $\mu_n$.

The evaluation of this markup expression for the three models of monopolistic competition gives rise to different integral problems, which we address in Section 4 (using tools developed in Section 3.) We briefly discuss the features of each model, and list the resulting expressions for price markups in terms of integrals. The derivation of these expressions from the first-order conditions, as well as verification of the second-order conditions, is relegated to the online Appendix.

2.1 Perloff-Salop (1985): Consumers demand a fixed unit amount in the aggregate

In the Perloff-Salop model, a particular consumer can purchase exactly one unit of the differentiated good. The consumer receives net utility $X_i - p_i$ by purchasing the good of firm $i$, where $X_i$ is a random taste shock, i.i.d. across firms and consumers, and $p_i$ is the price charged by firm $i$. Thus the consumer chooses to purchase the good that maximizes $X_i - p_i$. 
In a symmetric-price equilibrium, the demand function of firm $i$ is the probability that the consumer’s surplus at firm $i$, $X_i - p_i$, exceeds the consumer’s surplus at all other firms,

$$D(p_1, ..., p_n; i) = \mathbb{P}(X_i - p_i \geq \max \{X_j - p_j\}) = \mathbb{P}(X_i \geq \max \{X_j\}).$$  

(3)

Let $M_n$ denote the $\max \{X_1, ..., X_n\}$, whose density is $nf(x)F^{n-1}(x)$.\footnote{Indeed, \[ \mathbb{P}(M_n \leq x) = \mathbb{P}(X_i \leq x \text{ for } i = 1...n) = \mathbb{P}(X_i \leq x)^n = F(x)^n. \]}

Evaluation of (2) gives the following markup expression for the symmetric equilibrium of the Perloff-Salop model:

$$\mu_{PS}^n = \frac{1}{n \mathbb{E}[f(M_{n-1})]} = \frac{1}{n(n-1) \int f^2(x)F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}.$$

(4)

Here $F$ is the distribution function and $f$ is the corresponding density of $X_i$.

2.2 Sattinger (1984): Consumers demand a fixed dollar amount in the aggregate

Sattinger (1984) analyzes the case of multiplicative random demand. There are two types of goods. One is a composite good purchased from an industry with homogenous output, and the other is obtained from a monopolistically competitive (MC) market with $n$ differentiated producers. The consumer has utility function

$$U = Z^{1-\theta} \sum_{i=1}^{n} A_i Q_i^\theta,$$

(5)

where $Z$ is the quantity of the composite good, $A_i = \exp(X_i)$ is the random taste shock, and $Q_i$ is the quantity consumed of good $i$. The $X_i$ are i.i.d. across consumers and firms and have distribution function $F$. The consumer faces the budget constraint $y = qZ + \sum_i p_i Q_i$ where $y$ is the consumer’s endowment, $q$ is the price of the composite good and $p_i$ is the price of good $i$.

One shows that the demand function of firm $i$ is

$$D(p_1, ..., p_n; i) = \frac{\theta y}{p_i} \mathbb{P}\left( \frac{e^{X_i}}{p_i} \geq \max_{j \neq i} \frac{e^{X_j}}{p_j} \right).$$

(6)
Evaluation of (2), see the online appendix, gives the following markup expression for the symmetric equilibrium of the Sattinger model:

\[ \mu_n^{Satt} = \frac{1}{n\mathbb{E}[f(M_{n-1})]} = \frac{c}{n(n-1) \int f^2(x)F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}. \]  

(7)

Note that the markup expressions for the Perloff-Salop and Sattinger models are almost identical, except for the marginal costs factor \( c \) from (2). Thus

\[ \mu_n^{Satt} = c \cdot \mu_n^{PS}. \]  

(8)

### 2.3 Hart (1985): Consumers’ demand is flexible in quantity and value

Hart (1985) analyzes a model of monopolistic competition where both the quantity and the dollar amount spent depend on the prospective utility of the good purchased. In comparison, in the Perloff-Salop model from section 2.1, the quantity demanded is fixed; while in the Sattinger model (section 2.2), dollar expenditure is also fixed. The Hart model thus allows us to study the impact of competition in a slightly richer economic context than the previous models of monopolistic competition. Interestingly, with a particular choice of noise distribution, the Hart (1985) model generates the same demand function, see our Proposition 6, as the traditional Dixit-Stiglitz (1979) model, but within a random utility framework.

In Hart’s model, the consumer’s payoff function is:

\[ U = \frac{\psi + 1}{\psi} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} A_i Q_i \right)^{\psi/(\psi+1)} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i Q_i. \]  

(9)

where \( i \) is the index of the consumed good, \( A_i = e^{X_i} \) is the associated random taste shock, \( Q_i \) is the consumed quantity and \( p_i \) is the unit price of good \( i \). The \( X_i \) are i.i.d. across consumers and firms and have distribution function \( F \); note that this specification allows for negative realizations of \( X_i \). Hart shows that the demand function for firm \( i \) is

\[ D(p_1, \ldots; p_n; i) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{e^{\psi X_i}}{p_i^{1+\psi}} \{e^{X_i/p_i} \max_{j \neq i} e^{X_j/p_j}\} \right]. \]  

(10)

Evaluation of (2), see the online appendix, gives the following markup expression for the
symmetric equilibrium of the Hart model:

\[ \mu_n^{\text{Hart}} / c = \left( \psi + (n - 1) \frac{\int e^{\psi x} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}{\int e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx} \right)^{-1} \]  
(11)

\[ = \left( \psi + (n - 1) \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[ e^{\psi M_{n-1}} f(M_{n-1}) \right]}{\mathbb{E} \left[ e^{\psi M_{n-1}} \right]} \right)^{-1} \]  
(12)

Note that, by comparing (6) with (10) and (7) with (11):

\[ D_{\text{Hart}}(p_1, \ldots, p_n; i) \bigg|_{\psi=0} = D_{\text{Satt}}(p_1, \ldots, p_n; i) / (\theta y), \]
\[ \mu_n^{\text{Hart}} \bigg|_{\psi=0} = \mu_n^{\text{Satt}}, \]

where \( D_{\text{Hart}} \) is the demand function in the Hart model and \( D_{\text{Satt}} \) is the demand function in the Sattinger model. In the special case \( \psi = 0 \), the Hart model generates the same demand functions and markups as the Sattinger model.

3 Extreme Value Theory and Related Results

Solving for the symmetric equilibrium outcome in the models discussed above, for distribution function \( F \), requires the evaluation of integrals of the form

\[ \int x^j e^{\psi x} f^k(x) F(x)^{n-l} \, dx \]  
(13)

where \( k, l \geq 1 \) and \( j, \psi \geq 0 \). For large \( n \), such integrals mainly depend on the tail of the distribution \( F \), which suggests that techniques from Extreme Value Theory (EVT) may be applied. (See de Haan (1970), Resnick (1987), and Embrechts et al. (1997) for an introduction to EVT.)

This section develops the mathematical tools that we will use to asymptotically evaluate (13). Section 3.1 states a number of technical assumptions and introduces notation. Section 3.2 presents the main mathematical results. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
3.1 Preliminaries

First, we introduce a few useful objects. Recall from Section 2 that we define:

\[ M_n \equiv \max_{i=1,\ldots,n} X_i, \]

to be the maximum of \( n \) independent random variables \( X_i \) with distribution \( F \). Also, define the counter-cumulative distribution function \( \overline{F}(x) \equiv 1 - F(x) \).\(^5\) We are particularly interested in the connection between \( M_n \) and \( \overline{F}^{-1}(1/n) \); informally in analogy with the empirical distribution function, one may think of \( \overline{F}^{-1}(1/n) \) as the “typical” value of \( M_n \). In fact, the key to our analysis is to formalize this relationship between \( \overline{F}^{-1}(1/n) \) and \( M_n \) for large \( n \).

Our analysis is restricted to what we call well-behaved distributions:

**Definition 1** Let \( F \) be a distribution function with support on \((w_l, w_u)\). Let \( f = F' \) be the corresponding density function. We say \( F \) is well-behaved iff \( f \) is differentiable in a neighborhood of \( w_u \), \( \lim_{x \to w_u} F/f = a \) exists with \( a \in [0, \infty] \), and

\[ \gamma = \lim_{x \to w_u} d \left( \frac{F(x)}{f(x)} \right) / dx \]

exists and is finite. The \( \gamma \) is called the tail index of \( F \).

Being well-behaved imposes a restriction on the right tail of \( F \). The case \( \gamma < 0 \) consists of thin-tailed distributions with right-bounded support such as the uniform distribution. The case \( \gamma = 0 \) consists of distributions with tails of intermediate thickness. A wide range of economically interesting distributions fall within this domain, ranging from the relatively thin-tailed Gaussian distribution to the relatively thick-tailed lognormal distribution, as well as other distributions in between, such as the exponential distribution. The case \( \gamma > 0 \) consists of fat-tailed distributions such as Pareto’s power-law and the Fréchet distributions.

Being well-behaved in the sense of Definition 1 is not a particularly strong restriction. It is satisfied by most distributions of interest, and is easy to verify. Condition (14) is well-known in the EVT literature as a second-order von Mises condition; for example, (14) is a slightly stronger version of the assumption found in Pickands (1986). Table 1 lists several well-behaved

\(^5\)Strictly speaking, we abuse notation in cases where \( F \) is not strictly increasing by using \( \overline{F}^{-1}(t) \) to denote \( \overline{F}^{-} (t) = \overline{F} (1 - t) \), where \( \overline{F}^{-} (t) = \inf \{ x \in (w_l, w_u) : F (x) \geq t \} \) is the generalized inverse of \( F \) (Embrechts et al. 1997, p.130). This is for expositional convenience; our results hold with the generalized inverse as well.
densities $f$, the tail index $\gamma$ of the associated distribution $F$, and corresponding values for $F^{-1}(1/n)$ and $nf(F^{-1}(1/n))$ (which will be useful for our analysis). Note that tail fatness is increasing in $\gamma$.

### Table 1: Properties of Common Densities

Distributions are listed in order of increasing tail fatness whenever possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Density</th>
<th>$f$</th>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>$nf(F^{-1}(1/n))$</th>
<th>$F^{-1}(1/n)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uniform</td>
<td>$1, x \in [-1,0]$</td>
<td>$-1$</td>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>$-\frac{1}{n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounded Power Law</td>
<td>$\alpha(-x)^{\alpha-1}, \alpha \geq 1, x \in [-1,0]$</td>
<td>$-1/\alpha$</td>
<td>$\alpha n^{1/\alpha}$</td>
<td>$-n^{-1/\alpha}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weibull</td>
<td>$\alpha(-x)^{\alpha-1}e^{(-x)^\alpha}, \alpha \geq 1, x &lt; 0$</td>
<td>$-1/\alpha$</td>
<td>$\alpha n^{1/\alpha}$</td>
<td>$-n^{-1/\alpha}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaussian</td>
<td>$(2\pi)^{-1/2}e^{-x^2/2}$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$\sim \sqrt{2 \ln n}$</td>
<td>$\sim \sqrt{2 \ln n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rootzen Class</td>
<td>$\kappa \lambda \phi x^{\alpha+1-\phi}e^{-x^\phi}, x &gt; 0, \phi &gt; 1$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$\sim \phi \lambda^{1/\phi} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi}$</td>
<td>$\sim (\ln n)^{1/\phi}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumbel</td>
<td>$\exp(-e^{-x} - x)$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$\sim 1$</td>
<td>$\sim \ln n$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exponential</td>
<td>$e^{-x}, x &gt; 0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$1$</td>
<td>$\ln n$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-normal</td>
<td>$(2\pi)^{-1/2} x^{\alpha-\alpha-1} e^{-(\log^2 x)/(2x^2)}, x &gt; 0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$\sim \frac{\sqrt{2 \ln n}}{F^{-1}(1/n)}$</td>
<td>$\sim e^{\sqrt{2 \ln n}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power law</td>
<td>$\alpha x^{\alpha-1}, \alpha &gt; 0, x \geq 1$</td>
<td>$1/\alpha$</td>
<td>$\alpha n^{1/\alpha}$</td>
<td>$n^{1/\alpha}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fréchet</td>
<td>$\alpha x^{\alpha-1} e^{-x^{-\alpha}}, \alpha &gt; 0, x \geq 0$</td>
<td>$1/\alpha$</td>
<td>$\alpha n^{1/\alpha}$</td>
<td>$\sim n^{1/\alpha}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Definition 1 ensures that the right tail of $F$ behaves appropriately. To ensure that the integral (13) does not diverge, we also impose some restriction on the rest of $F$. The following notation will simplify the exposition of our results.

**Definition 2** Let $j : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ have support on $(w_l, w_u)$. The function $j(x)$ is $[w_l, w_u]$-integrable iff

$$\int_{w_l}^{w_u} |j(x)| \, dx < \infty$$

for all $w \in (w_l, w_u)$.

For example, in Theorem 2 we require that $f^2$ be $[w_l, w_u]$-integrable. Verification of this condition is typically straightforward; it is useful to note, for example, that $f^2(x)$ is $[w_l, w_u]$-integrable if $f = F'$ is uniformly bounded.

Finally, the following definition of regular variation will be useful.

**Definition 3** A function $h : \mathbb{R}^+ \to \mathbb{R}$ is regularly varying at $\infty$ with index $\rho$ if $h$ is strictly
positive in a neighborhood of $\infty$, and
\[ \forall \lambda > 0, \lim_{x \to \infty} \frac{h(\lambda x)}{h(x)} = \lambda^\rho. \] (15)

We indicate this by writing $h \in RV_\rho^\infty$.

Analogously, we say that $h : \mathbb{R}^+ \to \mathbb{R}$ is regularly varying at zero with index $\rho$ if, $\forall \lambda > 0, \lim_{x \to 0} h(\lambda x)/h(x) = \lambda^\rho$, and denote this by $h \in RV_\rho^0$. Intuitively, a regularly varying function $h(x)$ with index $\rho$ behaves like $x^\rho$ as $x$ goes to the appropriate limit, perhaps up to logarithmic corrections. For instance, $x^\rho$ and $x^\rho |\ln x|$ are regularly varying (with index $\rho$) at both 0 and $\infty$. Much of our analysis will require the concept of regular variation; specifically, we will require that certain transformations of the noise distribution $F$ be regularly varying.

In the case $\rho = 0$, we say that $h$ is slowly varying (for example $\ln x$ varies slowly at infinity and zero).

Finally, following the notation of Definition 1, define
\[ w_l = \inf \{ x : F(x) > 0 \} \quad \text{and} \quad w_u = \sup \{ x : F(x) < 1 \} \] (16)
to be the lower and upper bounds of the support of $F$, respectively.

### 3.2 Core Mathematical Result

Our core mathematical result documents an asymptotic relationship between $M_n$ and $F^{-1}(1/n)$.

**Theorem 1** Let $F$ be a differentiable CDF with support on $(w_l, w_u)$, $\overline{F} = 1 - F$, $f = F'$, and assume that $F$ is strictly increasing in a left neighborhood of $w_u$. Let $G : (w_l, w_u) \to \mathbb{R}$ be a strictly positive function in a left neighborhood of $w_u$. Suppose that $\widehat{G}(t) \equiv G\left(\frac{\overline{F}^{-1}(t)}{n}\right) \in RV_\rho^0$ with $\rho > -1$, and that $|\widehat{G}(t)|$ is integrable on $t \in (\overline{t}, 1)$ for all $\overline{t} \in (0, 1)$ (or, equivalently, $G(x) f(x)$ is $[w_l, w_u]$-integrable in the sense of definition 2). Then, for $n \to \infty$

\[ \mathbb{E}[G(M_n)] = \int_{w_l}^{w_u} \int_{w_l}^{w_u} nG(x) f(x) F(x)^{n-1} dx \sim G\left(\frac{1}{n}\right) \Gamma(\rho + 1) \] (17)

where $M_n$ is the largest realization of $n$ i.i.d. random variables with CDF $F$.

The intuition for equation (17) is as follows. By definition of $M_n$, if $X$ is distributed as $F$ and if $M_n$ and $X$ are independent, then $\mathbb{P}[X > M_n] = 1/(n + 1)$; that is, $\mathbb{E}[\overline{F}(M_n)] = \dots$
$1/(n+1) \approx 1/n$. Consequently, we might conjecture (via heroic commutation of the expectations operator) that

$$\mathbb{E}[M_n] \approx F^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$$

and that $\mathbb{E}[G(M_n)] \approx G(\mathbb{E}[M_n]) \approx G\left(F^{-1}(1/n)\right)$.

It turns out that this heuristic argument gives us the correct approximation, up to a correction factor $(\rho + 1)$.

We next present an intermediate result that is technically undemanding but will allow us to apply Theorem 1 to expressions of the form (13).

**Lemma 1** Let $F$ be well-behaved with tail index $\gamma$. Then

1. $f\left(F^{-1}(t)\right) \in RV_{\gamma+1}^0$.
2. If $w_u = \infty$, then $F^{-1}(t) \in RV_{-\gamma}^0$. If $w_u < \infty$, then $w_u - F^{-1}(t) \in RV_{-\gamma}^0$.
3. If $a$ is finite, then $e^{F^{-1}(t)} \in RV_{a}^0$.

Lemma 1 ensures that when $F$ is well-behaved, (13) satisfies the conditions imposed in Theorem 1 for a wide range of parameter values. The following proposition is then an immediate implication of Theorem 1 and Lemma 1.

**Proposition 1** Let $F$ be well behaved with tail index $\gamma$. Let $j, \psi \geq 0$, $k \geq 1$ and let $x^j e^{\psi x} f^k(x)$ be $[w_l, w_u]$-integrable. If $j > 0$, assume that $w_u > 0$. If $\psi = 0$, we can treat $\psi a = 0$ in the

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6To understand the correction factor, start with the linear case $G(x) = x$, in which case the theorem gives $E[M_n] \sim F^{-1}(1/n) \Gamma(-\gamma + 1)$. Then the correction factor arises because the distribution of the maximum is $F^n(x)$, not $F(x)$. For distributions with an exponential type tail, $\gamma = 0$ and no correction is required. For distributions with a power type tail and finite mean, $\gamma \in (0, 1)$, an upward correction is needed. To provide some intuition for this, consider the log $(-\log P\{M_n \leq t\})$, and where the distribution $F$ is either Gumbel or Fréchet, see Table 1. In case of the Gumbel one finds $\log n - t$, while the Fréchet gives $\log n - \alpha \log t$. Take $n$ and $t$ large. In the Gumbel case $n$ plays a minor role, while in the case of the distribution $n$ and $t$ are of similar order of magnitude, so that $n$ affects the distribution and its moments. More generally, if $G(x)$ is not linear, the tail behavior of $G(x)$ interacts with the tail behavior of $F(x)$. Both functions then determine $\rho$ in the correction factor as indicated in the theorem. For example, take $G(x) = x^m$ and $F(x) = 1 - x^{-\alpha}$, $m < \alpha$, then $\mathbb{E}[(M_n)^m] \approx n^m/\alpha \Gamma(1-m/\alpha)$. 

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following expressions. If \((k - j - 1) \gamma - \psi \alpha + k > 0\), then as \(n \to \infty\),

\[
\int_{w_u}^{w_u} x^j e^{\psi x} f^k(x) F(x)^{n-1} dx \\
\approx \begin{cases} 
 n^{-1} \left( \frac{F^{-1}(1/n)}{F^{-1}(1/n)} \right)^j e^{\psi F^{-1}(1/n)} f^{k-1} \left( F^{-1}(1/n) \right) \Gamma ((k - j - 1) \gamma - \psi \alpha + k) : w_u = \infty \\
 n^{-1} w_u^j e^{\psi w_u} f^{k-1} \left( F^{-1}(1/n) \right) \Gamma ((k - 1) \gamma + k) : w_u < \infty
\end{cases}
\]

Proposition 1 allows us to approximate (13) for well-behaved distributions\(^7\). The parameter restriction \((k - j - 1) \gamma - \psi \alpha + k > 0\) is necessary to ensure that (13) does not diverge. For our purposes, this restriction is rather mild, as we will see when we apply Proposition 1 in the subsequent sections. One notable exception is that when \(\psi > 0\), we cannot analyze heavy-tailed distributions (which have fatter-than-exponential tails) such as the lognormal distribution; for these distributions, \(a = \infty\).

Here we define a distribution to be heavy-tailed if \(e^{\lambda x} F(x) \to \infty\) as \(x \to \infty\) for all \(\lambda > 0\).

To see why \(a = \infty\) in this case, note that \(\lim_{x \to \infty} F(x)/f(x) = \infty\) implies \(-\frac{d}{dx} \log F(x) = o(1)\) as \(x \to \infty\), so \(-\log F(x) = o(x)\) and \(e^{-\lambda x} = o(F(x))\) for all \(\lambda\).

4 Asymptotic Markups

This section applies our newly-developed mathematical tools to the integral problems raised in Section 2. Section 4.1 derives asymptotic expressions for the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger, and Hart markups and price elasticities. Section 4.2 discusses the implications of these findings: specifically, how the choice of noise distribution determines the relationship between competition and prices. Section 4.3 briefly discusses some implications for consumer surplus under random demand frameworks.

4.1 Asymptotic Expressions for Markups

Taking Proposition 1 and substituting into (4), (7) and (11), we immediately obtain asymptotic approximations for equilibrium markups for each of the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger and Hart models.

\(^7\)For antecedents to this result, see Resnick (1971) or Maller and Resnick (1984).
Theorem 2 Assume that $F$ is well-behaved, and that $f^2(x)$ is $[w_l, w_u]$-integrable. For the Perloff-Salop and Sattinger models, assume that $-1.45 \leq \gamma \leq 0.64$. For the Hart model with parameter $\psi$, assume that $-1 < \gamma \leq 0$; if $\gamma = 0$, we further require that $1 - \psi < 0$. Then the symmetric equilibrium markups in the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger and Hart models are asymptotically

$$
\mu^{PS}_n = \mu^{Satt}_n / c \sim \mu^{Hart}_n / c \sim \frac{1}{nf \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right) \Gamma(\gamma + 2)}.
$$

(19)

with $F(x) \equiv 1 - F(x)$.

Theorem 2 treats the Hart model for the case where taste shocks have weakly thinner tails than the exponential distribution. There is no such restriction for the Perloff-Salop and Sattinger models; we are able to obtain markup expressions for fat-tailed taste shocks as well. The proof of Theorem 2 is in the Appendix.

Theorem 2 delivers the perhaps unexpected result that the three models generate asymptotically equal (up to a multiplicative constant) markups. Hence, they exhibit a sort of “detail-independence”: equilibrium markups do not depend on the details of the model of competition. This logic underlying this phenomenon will be developed in section 4.4. The markup under a limit pricing model of competition is also asymptotic to our markups in Theorem 2. Hence, the key ingredient in the modeling is the specification of the noise distribution, rather than the details of the particular oligopoly model.

The key mathematical objects in Theorem 2, $\gamma$ and $f \left( F^{-1} \left( 1/n \right) \right)$, are easy to calculate for most distributions of interest. Table 1 lists $nf \left( F^{-1} \left( 1/n \right) \right)$ and $\gamma$ for commonly used distributions, from which the asymptotic markup may immediately be calculated.

The following proposition shows that $\gamma$ has a concrete economic implication. The tail parameter $\gamma$ in (14) is the asymptotic elasticity of the markup with respect to the number of firms. In other words, the markup behaves locally as $\mu \sim kn^\gamma$. We interpret $n$ as a continuous variable in the expression of the markup.

Proposition 2 Assume that the conditions in Theorem 2 hold. Further, assume that $\log F(x)f^2(x)$ is $[w_l, w_u]$-integrable. Then the asymptotic elasticity of the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger and Hart

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8This is the range over which the second order condition holds (see the online appendix for details); the first order condition holds whenever $\gamma > -2$.  

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The markups with respect to the number of firms $n$ is:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{n}{\mu_n} \frac{d\mu_n}{dn} = \gamma.$$ 

For taste shocks with distributions fatter than the uniform ($\gamma > -1$), Proposition 2 shows that the mark-up falls more slowly than $1/n$. The proof is relegated to the online Appendix.

Finally, the following fact, which is easily verified using Lemma 3 part 6, may often be useful to simplify calculations further. As $n \to \infty$,

$$\frac{1}{nf\left(F^{-1}(1/n)\right)} \sim \begin{cases} \gamma F^{-1}(1/n), & \gamma > 0 \\ -\gamma (w_u - F^{-1}(1/n)), & \gamma < 0 \end{cases}.$$

### 4.2 Applications to Markup and Industry Equilibrium

We discuss the economic implications of the industry equilibrium. We will use $\mu_n$ to denote the Perloff-Salop markup (with $n$ firms) while keeping in mind that, by virtue of Theorems 2, the Hart, Perloff-Salop, Sattinger markups are asymptotically equal up to a constant multiplicative factor. This allows us to unify the discussion for all three models.

To analyze the impact of competition on markups, we examine the equilibrium markup for various noise distributions. Table 2 shows how markups change as competition intensifies.

The distributions in Table 2 are generally presented in increasing order of fatness of the tails. For the uniform distribution, which has the thinnest tails, the markup is proportional to $1/n$. This is the same equilibrium markup generated by the Cournot model. However the uniform cum Cournot case is unrepresentative of the general picture. Table 2 implies that markups scale with $\gamma$. For the distributions reported in Table 2, $\gamma$ is bounded below by $-1$, so the uniform distribution is an extreme case.

In the Perloff-Salop and Sattinger cases, for the distributions with the fattest tails, the markups paradoxically rise as the number of competitors increases.\footnote{No symmetric price equilibrium can be calculated in the Hart model for these distributions, because each firm would face infinite demand.} Intuitively, for fat-tailed noise, as $n$ increases, the difference between the best draw and the second-best draw, which is proportional to $nf\left(F^{-1}(1/n)\right)$, increases with $n$ (see section 4.4 below). However, even though markups rise with $n$, profits per firm go to zero (keeping market size constant) since firm prices scale with $n^\gamma$ but sales volume per firm is proportional to $1/n$ in the Perloff-Salop model.
Table 2: Asymptotic Expressions for Markups

This table lists asymptotic markups (under symmetric equilibrium) for various noise distributions as a function of the number of firms $n$. $f$ defines the density function and describes any parameter restrictions on $f$. $(B(a, b))$ is the Euler beta function. Distributions are listed in order of increasing tail fatness. $\mu_{\text{BLP}}, \mu_{\text{PS}}, \mu_{\text{Satt}}, \mu_{\text{Hart}}$ are respectively markups under the BLP, Perlo¤-Salop, Sattinger, Hart models. Asymptotic approximations are calculated using Theorem 2 except where the markup can be exactly evaluated.

Note that $\mu$ is asymptotically equal for all four models for large $n$. Note that the Hart markup is not defined for distributions fatter than the exponential. Neither do we calculate the BLP markup for distributions fatter than the exponential or with a bounded support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>$f$</th>
<th>$\mu_n^{\text{PS}} = \mu_n^{\text{Satt}} / c$</th>
<th>$\mu_n^{\text{Hart}} / c$</th>
<th>$\lim_{n \to \infty} \mu_n$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uniform</td>
<td>$1, \ x \in [-1, 0]$</td>
<td>$1/n$</td>
<td>$\sim 1/n$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounded Power Law</td>
<td>$\alpha (-x)^{\alpha-1}$, $\alpha &gt; 0, \ x \in [-1, 0]$</td>
<td>$\Gamma(1-1/\alpha+n) / \alpha \Gamma(2-1/\alpha) \Gamma(1+n) \sim \frac{n^{1-1/\alpha}}{\alpha \Gamma(2-1/\alpha)}$</td>
<td>$\sim \frac{n^{1-1/\alpha}}{\alpha \Gamma(2-1/\alpha)}$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weibull</td>
<td>$\alpha (-x)^{\alpha-1} e^{(-x)^\alpha}$, $\alpha \geq 1, \ x &lt; 0$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{\alpha \Gamma(2-1/\alpha)} \frac{n^{1-1/\alpha}}{n^{1-1/\alpha}} \sim \frac{n^{1-1/\alpha}}{\alpha \Gamma(2-1/\alpha)}$</td>
<td>$\sim \frac{n^{1-1/\alpha}}{\alpha \Gamma(2-1/\alpha)}$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaussian</td>
<td>$(2\pi)^{-1/2} e^{-2x^2/2}$</td>
<td>$\sim (2 \ln n)^{-1/2}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rootzen class, $\phi &gt; 1$</td>
<td>$\kappa \lambda x^{\phi-1} e^{-x^\phi}$</td>
<td>$\sim \frac{1}{\phi \lambda^{1/\phi}} (\ln n)^{1/\phi-1}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumbel</td>
<td>$\exp(-e^{-x} - x)$</td>
<td>$\frac{n}{n-1}$</td>
<td>$\sim 1$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exponential</td>
<td>$e^{-x}, \ x &gt; 0$</td>
<td>$1$</td>
<td>$\sim \frac{1}{\tau} (\ln n)^{1/\tau-1}$</td>
<td>$-\infty$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rootzen Gamma $(\tau &lt; 1)$</td>
<td>$\tau x^{\tau-1} e^{-x^\tau}$, $x &gt; 0, \tau &lt; 1$</td>
<td>$\sim \frac{1}{\tau} (\ln n)^{1/\tau-1}$</td>
<td>$-\infty$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-normal</td>
<td>$\exp(-2 - \log^2 x) / x \sqrt{2\pi}$</td>
<td>$\sim \sqrt{\frac{1}{2 \ln n}} e  \sqrt{2 \ln n}$</td>
<td>$-\infty$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power law</td>
<td>$\alpha x^{-\alpha-1}$, $\alpha &gt; 1, x \geq 1$</td>
<td>$\Gamma(1+1/\alpha+n) / \alpha \Gamma(2+1/\alpha) \Gamma(1+n) \sim \frac{n^{1+1/\alpha}}{\alpha \Gamma(2+1/\alpha)}$</td>
<td>$-\infty$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fréchet</td>
<td>$\alpha x^{-\alpha-1} e^{-x^\alpha}$, $\alpha &gt; 1, x \geq 0$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{\alpha \Gamma(2+1/\alpha)} \frac{n^{1+1/\alpha}}{n^{1-1/\alpha}} \sim \frac{n^{1/\alpha}}{\alpha \Gamma(2+1/\alpha)}$</td>
<td>$-\infty$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
case and $1/n^{1+\gamma}$ in the Sattinger case.

This phenomenon whereby prices rise with more intense competition has recently attracted some attention. Chen and Riordan (2008) present a model where markups rise when competition goes from one to two firms. As in our paper, this is because consumers can become less price-sensitive when there are more firms. In the context of a broad analysis of pass-through, Weyl and Fabinger (2012) clarifies this effect by showing that the right-hand side of our mark-up formula (19) falls with $n$ for log-concave distributions, and rises with $n$ for log-convex distributions. The result can also be verified by taking the derivative of our asymptotic formula with respect to $n$. Weyl and Fabinger (2012) show how in the log-concave case pricing strategies are strategic complements, while in the log-convex case, they are strategic substitutes.

Thin-tailed distributions (e.g. uniform) and fat-tailed distributions (e.g. power-laws) are the extreme cases in Table 2. Most of the distributional cases imply that competition typically has remarkably little impact on markups. For instance with Gaussian noise, the markup $\mu_n$ is proportional to $1/\sqrt{\ln n}$, and the elasticity of the markup with respect to $n$ is asymptotically zero. So $\mu_n$ converges to zero, but this convergence proceeds at a glacial pace. Indeed, the elasticity of the markup with respect to $n$ converges to zero.

To illustrate the slow convergence, we calculate $\mu_n$ when noise is Gaussian for a series of values of $n$. Table 3 shows that in the models we study and with Gaussian noise, a highly competitive industry with $n = 1,000,000$ firms will retain a third of the markup of a highly concentrated industry with only $n = 10$ competitors. We also compare markups in our monopolistic competition models to those in the Cournot model, which features markups proportional to $1/n$ and a markup elasticity w.r.t. $n$ of $-1$ (note that this is equal to markups in the Perloff-Salop model with uniformly distributed noise.)

More generally, in cases with moderate fatness, such as the Gumbel (i.e. logit), exponential, and log-normal densities, the markup again shows little (or no) response to changes in $n$. Nevertheless, the markups become unbounded for the lognormal distribution. Finally, the case of Bounded Power Law noise shows that an infinite support is not necessary for our results. In this case the markup is proportional to $n^{-1/\alpha}$ and markup decay remains slow for large $\alpha$.

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11 For more background, see Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).
Table 3: Markups with Gaussian Noise and Uniform Noise

Markups are calculated for (i) the symmetric equilibrium of the Perloff-Salop model for Gaussian noise and (ii) under Cournot Competition, for various values of the number of firms $n$. Note that markups in the Sattinger model and the Hart model are asymptotically equal, up to a constant factor $c$, to markups in the Perloff-Salop model. $n$ is the number of firms in the market. Markups are normalized to equal one when $n = 10$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>Markup with Gaussian noise</th>
<th>Markup under Cournot Competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In practical terms, these results imply that in markets with noise we should not necessarily expect increased competition to dramatically reduce markups. The mutual fund industry may exemplify such stickiness. Currently 10,000 mutual funds are available in the U.S. and many of these funds offer similar portfolios. Even in a narrow class of homogenous products, such as medium capitalization value stocks or S&P 500 index funds, it is normal to find 100 or more competing funds (Hortacsu and Syverson 2004). Despite the large number of competitors in such sub-markets, mutual funds still charge high annual fees, often more than 1% of assets under management. Most interestingly, these fees have not fallen as the number of homogeneous competing funds has increased by a factor of 10 over the past several decades.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{12}\)Finally, we add a note about the well-known behavior of markups when the noise is multiplied by a constant. Consider random shock $X$ and its linear transform $X' = \sigma X + k$. A higher $\sigma$ means that there is a higher standard deviation of the noise, while $k$ is simply a shift. Calling $\mu_n = \mu_n (1, 0)$ the markup under $X$ and $\mu_n (\sigma, k)$ the markup under the distribution of $X'$, we have $\mu_n^{PS} (\sigma, k)' = \sigma \mu_n^{PS}$ i.e., the markup is simply multiplied by $\sigma$, while $k$ does not matter for the markup (it is the difference in qualities that matters, not their absolute level). Likewise, $\mu_n^{Satt} (\sigma, k)' = \sigma \mu_n^{Satt}$, and $\mu_n^{Hart} (\psi, \sigma) = \sigma \mu_n^{Hart} (\psi \sigma, 1)$. So asymptotically, the markup is simply multiplied by $\sigma$. 

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4.3 Consumer Surplus

Sometimes the random utility framework is criticized as generating too high a value for consumer surplus. Indeed, if the distribution is unbounded, the total surplus goes to $\infty$ as the number of firms increases. Our analytical results allow us to examine this criticism. For brevity, we restrict ourself to the Perloff-Salop case, with unbounded distributions and $\gamma \geq 0$. Expected gross surplus is $E[M_n]$, where $M_n$ is the highest of $n$ draws. Theorem 1 shows that $E[M_n] \sim \Gamma(2 - \gamma) F^{-1}(1/n)$ for $\gamma \geq 0$. For all the distributions that we study except the unbounded power law case, $F^{-1}(1/n)$ rises only slowly with $n$. Hence, even for unbounded distributions, and large numbers of producers, consumer surplus can be quite small. For example, for the case of Gaussian noise when consumer preferences have a standard deviation of $\$1$, $F^{-1}(1/n) \sim \sqrt{2 \ln n}$. So, with a million toothpaste producers, consumer surplus averages only $\$5.25 per tube. Hence, in many instances, the framework — even with unbounded distributions — does not generate counterfactual predictions about consumer surplus or counterfactual predictions about the prices that cartels would set.

4.4 Limit Pricing Model Interpretation

We now derive equilibrium markups for an alternative model of oligopolistic competition, and show that it produces markups that are asymptotically equal to those from the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger, and Hart models. Importantly, we explain how the same logic underlies the equilibrium markups for all of these models. This generates an simple but useful interpretation of our economic results from Section 4. As an aside, we demonstrate an equivalence between our results and the mathematics of second-price auctions in Section 5.4.

This model is sometimes called “limit pricing”, and has proved very useful in trade and macroeconomics (e.g. Bernard et al. 2003, see also Auer and Chaney 2009). Each firm $i$ draws a quality shock $X_i$, then sets a price $p_i$. (This is in contrast with the models of Section 2, where prices are set before taste shocks are observed.) The representative consumer needs to consume one unit of the good, and picks the firm with the largest of $X_i - p_i$. As before, call $M_n = \max_{i=1,...,n} X_i$ the maximum draw of the $n$ qualities, and $S_n$ the second-largest draw. In the competitive equilibrium, the firm with the highest quality, $M_n$, gets all the market share, and sets a price $p = c + M_n - S_n$. This is just enough to take all the market away from the firm with the second-highest quality. So, the markup is $\mu_{LP}^n = M_n - S_n$.

The next Proposition analyzes the average behavior of that Limit Pricing markup.
Proposition 3 Let $F$ be well-behaved with tail index $\gamma < 1$, and assume that $xf(x)$ is $[w_1, w_u]$-integrable. Call $M_n$ and $S_n$, respectively, the largest and second largest realizations of $n$ i.i.d. random variables with CDF $F$. Then limit pricing markup is $\mu_{n}^{LP} = M_n - S_n$, and

$$\mathbb{E} [\mu_{n}^{LP}] \sim_{n \to \infty} \frac{\Gamma (1 - \gamma)}{nf \left( \frac{1}{n} \right)}.$$  

(20)

We see that the markup is asymptotic to the markup in the other three random utility models, derived in Theorem 2. This strengthens the result that the behavior in the markup is in many ways independent of the details of the modelling of competition. There is also an intuitive interpretation for Proposition 3, which clarifies the general economics of competition with a large number of firms.

We observed that $\mathbb{E} [\bar{F} (M_n)] \simeq 1/(n+1)$, which suggested that $M_n$ will be close to $F^{-1}(1/n)$. Similarly, with $S_n$ the second-highest draw, $\mathbb{E} [\bar{F} (S_n)] \simeq 2/(n+1)$. So it is likely that $S_{n-1} \approx F^{-1}(2/n)$. So

$$\mathbb{E} [\mu_{n}^{LP}] \approx M_n - S_n \approx \bar{F}^{-1}(1/n) - \bar{F}^{-1}(2/n) = \bar{F}^{-1}(1/n) - \bar{F}^{-1}(1/n + 1/n)$$

$$\approx - \frac{d\bar{F}^{-1}(x)}{dx} \bigg|_{x=1/n} \cdot \frac{1}{n} \text{ by Taylor expansion}$$

$$= \frac{1}{nf \left( \bar{F}^{-1}(1/n) \right)}.$$

Proposition 1 shows that the heuristic argument generates the right approximation for the distributions when $\gamma = 0$ (e.g. Gaussian, logit (Gumbel), exponential, and lognormal), and that the approximation remains accurate up to a corrective constant in the other cases. So an informal intuition for the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger and Hart models is as follows. To set its optimum price, a firm conditions on its getting the largest draw, then evaluates the likely draw of the second highest firm, and engages in limit pricing, where it charges a markup equal to the difference between its draw and the next highest draw.

5 Extensions and Applications

This section discusses two extensions of our basic models and an application to trade / macro-economics. Section 5.1 endogenizes the degree of product differentiation between firms, and
in doing so demonstrates a connection between our results and the functional form of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) demand function. The Dixit-Stiglitz specification is highly popular in macroeconomics. We develop a simple macroeconomic framework in Section 5.2 to demonstrate how the random demand specification may be used in place of the common Dixit-Stiglitz specification. In Section 5.3, we enrich the Perloff-Salop model and show that (i) our mathematical methods can be applied to richer oligopoly models that incorporate complicated assumptions about consumer preferences (beyond the standard models that we previously introduced), and that (ii) our economic insights about the "noise-dependence" of equilibrium markups remain under such additional assumptions.

5.1 Endogenous Product Differentiation or Noise

Until now, we have assumed that the standard deviation of the noise term is exogenous. We now relax this assumption and allow firms to choose the degree of product differentiation (in the traditional economic interpretation), or the degree of “confusion” (in a complementary behavioral interpretation). In the course of this analysis, we also show that the Hart model with (i) Gumbel-distributed noise and (ii) endogenous product differentiation, produces the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz (1997) demand function.

Assume that firms can choose the degree to which their own product is differentiated from the rest of the market; specifically, assume that each firm \( i \) can choose \( \sigma_i \) at a cost \( c(\sigma_i) \) so that the firm’s demand shock is \( X_i = \sigma_i X \), where \( X \) has CDF \( F \). The game then has the following timing:

1. firms simultaneously choose \((p_i, \sigma_i)\)
2. random taste shocks are realized
3. consumers make purchase decisions
4. profits are realized

Firm \( i \)’s profit function is given by

\[
\pi ((p_i, \sigma_i), (p, \sigma); n) = (p_i - c(\sigma_i)) D ((p_i, \sigma_i), (p, \sigma); n)
\]

in step 1, where \( D ((p_i, \sigma_i), (p, \sigma); n) \) is the demand for good \( i \) when the firm chooses \((p_i, \sigma_i)\) and the remaining \( n - 1 \) firms choose \((p, \sigma)\). Each firm \( i \) then chooses \((p_i, \sigma_i)\) to maximize
\[ \pi((p_i, \sigma_i), (p, \sigma); n) \]. The symmetric equilibrium is then characterized by

\[ (p, \sigma) = \arg \max_{(p', \sigma')} \pi((p', \sigma'), (p, \sigma); n). \]

Our techniques allow us to analyze the symmetric equilibrium outcome of this game, for each of the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger and Hart models.

**Proposition 4** Consider the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger and Hart models where firms simultaneously choose \( p \) and \( \sigma \), under the same assumptions as Theorem 2. Assume that \( w_u > 0 \).\(^{13}\) Further, in the Perloff-Salop and Sattinger cases, assume that \( x f^2(x) \, dx \) is \([w_l, w_u]\)-integrable, and that \( c' > 0, c'' > 0, \lim_{t \to -\infty} c'(t) = \infty \). In the Hart case, assume that \( c' > 0, (\ln c)'' > 0, \lim_{t \to -\infty} (\ln c(t))' = \infty \).

Then the equilibrium outcome with \( n \) firms is asymptotically, as \( n \to \infty \)

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu_n^{PS}(\sigma_n) &= \frac{\mu_n^{Satt}(\sigma_n)}{c_n^{Satt}(\sigma_n)} \sim \frac{\mu_n^{Hart}(\sigma_n)}{c_n^{Hart}(\sigma_n)} \sim \frac{\sigma_n}{n f \left(F^{-1}(1-\frac{1}{n})\right) \Gamma(\gamma+2)}, \\
c_n^{PS'}(\sigma_n) &= \frac{c_n^{Satt'}(\sigma_n)}{c_n^{Satt}(\sigma_n)} \sim \frac{c_n^{Hart'}(\sigma_n)}{c_n^{Hart}(\sigma_n)} \sim \begin{cases} 
\overline{F}^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{n}\right): w_u < \infty \\
\frac{\overline{F}^{-1}(1/n)}{\overline{F}(\gamma+2)}: w_u = \infty
\end{cases}.
\end{align*}
\]

In other words, at the symmetric equilibrium, the normalized marginal cost of \( \sigma \) – that is \( c'(\sigma_n) \) in the Perloff-Salop case and \( c'(\sigma_n)/c(\sigma_n) \) in the Sattinger and Hart cases – asymptotically equals \( \overline{F}^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{n}\right) \), up to a scaling constant. In particular, the normalized marginal cost of \( \sigma \) goes closer to the upper bound of the distribution as the number of firms increases. Hence, Proposition 4 quantitatively characterizes the monotonic relationship between the number of firms and the degree of endogenous product differentiation (in the traditional economic interpretation), and/or the relationship between the number of firms and the degree of endogenous confusion (in the behavioral interpretation). We note that this effect of competition on the supply of confusion or noise is potentially important (see e.g., Gabaix and Laibson 2006, Spiegler 2006, Carlin 2009, and Ellison and Ellison 2009).

We can use the limit pricing heuristic from Section 4.4 to obtain an intuition for this result. Consider the Perloff-Salop case. Since the firm engages in limit pricing, it can charge

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\(^{13}\)This assumption that the largest possible realization of \( X_i \) is positive (possibly infinite) makes the firm’s problem economically sensible. If, on the contrary, \( w_u \leq 0 \), then each realization of \( X_i \) would be negative with probability 1. In that case, increasing \( \sigma \) would reduce the attractiveness of the firm’s product to the consumer. To eliminate this possibility, we assume \( w_u > 0 \).
a markup of $\sigma M_n - \sigma^* S_n$ where $\sigma$ is the firm’s product differentiation choice and $\sigma^*$ is the choice of all other firms, which we take as given. The marginal value of an additional unit of noise $\sigma$ is thus $M_n \approx F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right)$.

5.2 A Trade / Macroeconomic Style Framework with Endogenous Markups

To model pricing power in trade and macroeconomic models, economists typically utilize the monopolistically competitive differentiated goods specification of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) with a large number of goods. Shocks to the demand side are often modeled by shocking the coefficient of substitution in the Dixit Stiglitz specification; see e.g. Woodford (2003, ch. 6), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Gali et al. (2012). This practice is criticized by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2009), who argue that such shocks are not structural.14 To meet this criticism, we investigate the implications of a random demand specification. As we show below, demand shocks in the random demand approach are taken into account by the firms when setting prices, rather than treating these exogenously. Here we take an extreme view of demand shocks and model these as a taste of the entire population for a specific item from the set of differentiated goods (one year everybody desires a BlackBerry, the next year the iPhone).

To be able to demonstrate the implications of random demand for macro, we develop two trade / macro style models. One is based on the traditional Dixit Stiglitz specification, the other is based on the random demand specification. (See the online appendix for more details.) The two models only differ with respect to utility function. The familiar Dixit-Stiglitz specification with endogenous labor supply is

$$U = Z^{1-\theta} \left[ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} Q_i^{1/(1+\tau)} \right]^{\theta(1+\tau)} - \frac{1}{1+\eta} L^{1+\eta},$$

(21)

where $Z$ is the composite good, the $Q_i$ are the differentiated goods and $L$ is labor. The substitution coefficient $\tau$ is constrained to $\tau \in (0, \infty)$, which implies concavity; $\theta \in (0,1)$.

The random demand model is based on Sattinger’s (1984) type utility function (5) amended

---

14See Atkeson and Burstein (2008), Melitz and Ottaviano (2009) and Auer and Chaney (2009) for other ways to generate varying markups in trade.
with the same disutility of labor as in the Dixit-Stiglitz specification

\[ U = Z^{1-\theta} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \exp (X_i) Q_i \right]^{\theta} - \frac{1}{1+\eta} L^{1+\eta}. \quad (22) \]

In this setup the taste shock affects all consumers equally, i.e. the demand shocks \( X_i \) are identical across consumers.

The supply side technologies are linear:

\[ Z = BN \text{ and } Q_i = AN_i, \quad (23) \]

where \( A \) and \( B \) are the labor productivity coefficients while \( N \) and \( N_i \) are the respective labor demands. Note that \( A \) and \( B \) also capture the supply side productivity shocks. Perfect competition in the composite goods market implies that prices equal the per unit labor costs.

The differentiated goods producer exploits his direct pricing power, but ignores his pricing effect on the price index of the differentiated goods and the consumer income. For the random demand case, the markup is \( \mu_n \) from (7), in the Dixit-Stiglitz specification the markup is \( \tau \). Note that the markup factors \( \tau \) and \( \mu_n \) can take on similar values, cf. Table 2. The models’ solutions from the first order conditions is given in the online Appendix.

The respective labor productivities for the competitive good are as follows:

**Lemma 2** The Dixit-Stiglitz and random demand labor productivities are

\[ Q_j/L = \frac{\theta A}{1+(1-\theta)\tau} \text{ and } Q_i/L = \frac{\theta A}{1+(1-\theta)\mu_n}. \quad (24) \]

There is an immediate implication:

**Corollary 1** The labor productivity in the Dixit-Stiglitz specification is a mixture of demand and supply shocks, while in the random demand specification there are only supply shocks.

The main difference between the two demand specifications stems from the way in which demand shocks impinge on the macro variables. Woodford (2003, ch. 6), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Gali et al. (2012) generate demand shocks by shocking \( \tau \). This is different from the demand shock that arises from the random utility concept. Letting \( \tau \) be random produces a time varying markup factor. The markup factor \( \mu_n \) in the case of random utility, though, is not
random, see (7). Only the amount demanded is random as $X_i$ is part of the demand function. The deterministic markup in case of the random demand model can be explained by the fact that the uncertainty is anticipated on the supply side and ‘disappears as an expectation’.

In the random demand expression from (24) the number of competitors $n$ plays a role through the markup $\mu_n$. In the case of the Dixit-Stiglitz specification, however, $n$ does not enter as $\tau$ is exogenous. Consider the implications for the goods ratios $Q/Z$:

**Proposition 5** In the Dixit-Stiglitz specification, the goods ratio $Q_j/Z$ does not depend on $n$. In the random demand case if the distribution of the fashion shock is bounded or has exponential like tails, then $Q_i/Z$ (approximately) equals the ratio of the expenditure shares $\theta/(1-\theta)$ times the ratio of the productivity shocks $A/B$. But in the case that the preference shocks have fat tails, the goods ratio $Q_i/Z \to 0$.

**Proof of Proposition 5** Combining (53) and (54), and (50) and (51) yields for respectively the Dixit-Stiglitz and random demand specifications

$$
\frac{Q_j}{Z} = \frac{\theta}{(1-\theta)(1+\tau)} \frac{A}{B} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{Q_i}{Z} = \frac{\theta}{(1-\theta)(1+\mu_n)} \frac{A}{B}.
$$

Then use Table 2 to plug in the details for $\mu_n$ depending on the type of distribution. With $\gamma \geq 0$ and $a$ unbounded, $\lim_{n \to \infty} (Q_i/Z) = \lim_{n \to \infty} (1/\mu_n) = 0$. ■

Thus in the case that the preference shocks have fat tails and with numerous competitors, the differentiated good becomes unimportant relative to the competitive good.

5.2.1 Another way to derive a Dixit-Stiglitz reduced form with endogenous elasticity

The Hart model with Gumbel-distributed noise generates the familiar demand function from Dixit-Stiglitz (1977), as the following proposition shows.$^{15}$

**Proposition 6** Let $X_i$ be Gumbel distributed with parameter $\phi$: $F(x) = \exp \left( -e^{-x/\phi} \right)$. Then in the Hart model, demand for good $i$ equals

$$
D(p_1, \ldots, p_n; i) = \Gamma \left( 1 - \phi \psi \sigma \right) \frac{p_i^{-\left(1+1/(\phi \sigma)\right)}}{\left( \sum_{i=1}^n p_j^{-1/(\phi \sigma)} \right)^{1-\phi \psi \sigma}}.
$$

$^{15}$Anderson et al (1992, pp. 85-90) derive this result for the case $\psi = 0$. 

26
This result is of independent interest. For example, it implies that our framework generates a Dixit-Stiglitz demand functions with elasticity equal to $\phi \sigma$. When $\phi \sigma$ is time-varying or endogenous (see section 5.1), then the Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity will be time-varying or endogenous as well.

5.3 Enriched Linear Random Utility (ELRU)

In this section we add two features, drawn from recent random demand models (see, for example, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995), to the Perloff-Salop model: an outside option good, and stochastic consumer price sensitivity. This enriches the Perloff-Salop model, while keeping the Berry et al. (1995) extension within the scope of the paper. We dub this extension the Enriched Linear Random Utility (ELRU). We show that the essential insights we obtain in Section 4 carry over to this setting. As before, we go through the modeling assumptions, then introduce the mathematical machinery before applying it to the equilibrium markup problem. The proofs are in the online Appendix.

5.3.1 Model Setup: ELRU

There are $n$ firms each producing a monopolistically competitive good, and a consumer who chooses either to purchase exactly one unit of the good from one firm, or to take his outside option. The consumer’s utility from consuming firm $i$’s good is

$$u_i = -\beta p_i + X_i, \quad u_0 = \epsilon_0,$$

where $p_i$ is the price of good $i$ (set by firm $i$), $\beta \geq 0$ is a "taste for money", $\epsilon_0 \geq 0$ is the value of the consumer’s outside option, and $X_i$ is the random taste shock associated with good $i$. Each of $X_1, ..., X_n$ are identically distributed and independent of each other and $(\beta, \epsilon_0)$. The $\epsilon_0$ may not be independent of $\beta$. Each $X_i$ has CDF $F$. The joint distribution of $(\beta, \epsilon_0)$ is denoted by $H(.)$ and has a density $h(.)$; some times we use vector notation $y = (\beta, \epsilon_0)$ and will just write $H(y)$ and $h(y)$ respectively.

The demand function for good $i$ at price $p$ (given that all other goods are priced at $p'$) is the probability that the consumer’s payoff for good $i$ exceeds his payoff to all other goods, as
well as the outside option:

\[ D(p_1, \ldots, p_n; i) = \mathbb{P} \left( -\beta p_i + X_i \geq \max \left\{ \max_{j \neq i} \{-\beta p_j + X_j\}, \epsilon_0 \right\} \right). \]

If we set \( \epsilon_0 = -\infty \) and \( \beta \) to be a constant, this simplifies to the Perloff-Salop model. Evaluation of (2) gives the following markup expression for the symmetric equilibrium of the ELRU model:

\[
\mu_{n}^{ELRU} = \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[ 1 - F \left( \max \{M_{n-1}, \beta p + \epsilon_0\} \right) \right]}{\mathbb{E} \left[ f \left( \max \{M_{n-1}, \beta p + \epsilon_0\} \right) \right]},
\]

where \( M_{n-1} = \max_{j=1, \ldots, n-1} X_j \) is the maximum of \( n - 1 \) independent random variables \( X_j \) with distribution \( F \).

5.3.2 Equilibrium Markup: ELRU

We limit the calculation of equilibrium markups to the case where the distribution satisfies \( \gamma = 0 \) and \( a < \infty \); that is, to distributions that are weakly thinner than the exponential. This restriction allows us to retain common distributions such as the Gumbel, Gaussian, and Exponential; put another way, distributions that produce equilibrium markups that are weakly decreasing with the degree \( n \) of competition. Specifically, suppose that the densities \( f(x) \) are of the Rootzen (1987) type

\[
f(x) \sim_{x \to \infty} \kappa \lambda \phi x^{\phi+\nu-1} \exp \left( -\lambda x^\phi \right), \ \kappa > 0, \ \lambda > 0, \ \phi \geq 1, \ \nu \in \mathbb{R}
\]

It is a simple calculation to check that for this class \( \gamma = 0 \) and \( a = 0 \) whenever \( \phi > 1 \). Note that the classic tail expansion of the normal distribution \( 1 - \Phi(x) \sim \phi(x)/x \) fits the Rootzen class (38) when we take \( \phi = 2, \ \lambda = 1/2, \ \kappa = 1/\sqrt{2\pi} \) and \( a = -1 \). The main result of this section is that if the joint distribution \( H(y) \) of \( \beta \) and \( \epsilon_0 \) has bounded support and if \( E[\beta^2] > V[\beta] \), where \( V[.] \) is the variance operator, then equilibrium markups are asymptotically equal (up to the factor \( \mathbb{E}[\beta] \)) to the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger and Hart markups.

**Theorem 3** Assume that \( f(x) \) is of the Rootzen type as defined in (27). Assume also that the density function \( h(y) \) has bounded support and that \( E[\beta^2] > V[\beta] \). Then the symmetric equilibrium markup in the ELRU model is asymptotically

\[
\mu_{n}^{ELRU} \sim \frac{1/\mathbb{E}[\beta]}{\phi \lambda^{1/\phi} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi}}.
\]
Note the similarity with (19) and (20). In each of the Hart, Perloff-Salop, and Sattinger models, the marginal utility of money equals 1, which corresponds to the case $\beta \equiv 1$ in the ELRU model.

5.4 Auctions

Consider an second-price auction with a single good and $n$ bidders where each bidder $i$ privately values the good at $X_i$, which is i.i.d. with CDF $F$. It is well-known that if $F$ is strictly increasing on $(w_l, w_u)$, then the equilibrium outcome of this auction is that each bidder makes a bid equal to his private valuation; the bidder with the highest valuation ($M_n$) wins and pays the second-highest valuation ($S_n$). Thus the expected revenue in a second price auction equals $E[S_n]$, and the expected surplus for the winner in a second price auction equals $E[M_n - S_n]$. We can apply Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 to obtain asymptotic approximations for both of these expressions.\footnote{Result (29) appeared in Caserta (2002, Prop. 4.1) in the case $\gamma \neq 0$. Caserta does not have the key argument of the proof, with the integration by parts.} Since this is closely related to the results for limit pricing model, we state the following without proof.

**Proposition 7** Let $F$ be well-behaved with tail index $\gamma < 1$, and assume that $xf(x)$ is $[w_l, w_u]$-integrable. Then in a second-price auction where valuations are i.i.d. as $F$, the expected revenue to the seller, $E[S_n]$, is

$$E[S_n] \sim_{n \to \infty} F^{-1}(1/n) \Gamma(2 - \gamma) \quad \text{if } w_u = \infty,$$

$$E[S_n] = w_u - \left(w_u - F^{-1}(1/n)\right) \Gamma(2 - \gamma) + o\left(w_u - F^{-1}(1/n)\right) \quad \text{if } w_u < \infty,$$

and the expected surplus for the winner of the auction is:

$$E[M_n - S_n] \sim_{n \to \infty} \frac{\Gamma(1 - \gamma)}{nf\left(F^{-1}(1/n)\right)}.$$  

(29)

6 Conclusion and Conjectures

The choice of noise distributions in market models is often influenced by tractability concerns. It is important to understand the consequences of these modeling choices and, when possible,
to greatly expand the set of tractable models. With this challenge in mind, our paper makes three sets of contributions.

First, we derive equilibrium markups for general noise distributions in various types of monopolistically competitive markets.

Second, our results reveal a surprising degree of “detail-independence.” Specifically, the behavior of price markups are asymptotically identical (up to a constant factor) for all models that we study. Moreover, for the wide class of distributions with a zero extreme value tail exponent – including the canonical case of Gaussian noise – we show that the elasticity of markups to the number of firms is asymptotically zero. Hence, we have shown that in many types of large markets, markups are relatively insensitive to the degree of competition.

Third, we show how to approximate a key integral that is useful for studying a wide range of economic environments in which extreme outcomes determine the equilibrium allocation.

We conjecture that our results will extend to non-symmetric models (i.e., where firms have different qualities). Using our paper, one can form the following conjecture.\footnote{Building on the results in an earlier version of this paper, Li (2008) partially proves this conjecture for the shape of the demand curve, which is $D_{i,n} \sim \frac{e^{(q_i-p_i)/\mu_n}}{\sum_{j=1}^n e^{(q_j-p_j)/\mu_n}}$, when firms have non-symmetric (though not too dispersed) prices and qualities, in a Perloff-Salop model where firm $i$ yields utility $q_i - p_i + X_i$, where $X_i$ is a random variable which is not necessarily logit, e.g. it could be Gaussian. This is the well-known logit expression, but it asymptotically applies for many other thin-tailed distributions (e.g., Gaussian, lognormal). Our paper was the first to derive this result for markups with symmetric firms.}

Take distributions that are thin-tailed with zero extreme-value tail exponent (e.g. the Gaussian, the exponential and the lognormal). With respect to the demand functions and markups, we conjecture that models with arbitrary random noise (with zero tail exponent) behave asymptotically like models with logit noise, after a rescaling of the size of unit noise, by a factor $\mu_n$.\footnote{For instance, consider a Gaussian Perloff-Salop model, where firm $i$ offers a value $X_i - p_i$ and $X_i \sim N(0,\sigma^2)$. We conjecture that this model behaves like a logit Perloff-Salop model where (i) firm $i$ offers a surplus $\sigma' X_i' - p_i$, (ii) $X_i$ follows the pure logit distribution ($P(X_i' \leq x) = e^{-e^{-x}}$), (iii) $\sigma' := \mu_n^{\text{Gaussian}}$, where $\mu_n^{\text{Gaussian}} \sim \sigma/\sqrt{2 \ln n}$ is the expression we derive in the paper. The behavior of the two models (Gaussian and logit) will be the same, we conjecture, not only for the markup, but also for the shape of the demand function, the profit function etc. – at least when firms are not too different. We could also refine the conjecture by $\sigma' := \mu_n^{\text{Gaussian}}/\mu_n^{\text{Logit}} = \frac{n-1}{n} \mu_n^{\text{Gaussian}}$.} This is true for the case of symmetric firms (as we have proven in this paper) and is also likely to be true for the non-symmetric case. Proving this conjecture would offer a vast generalization of existing results that focus on the logit case (e.g. Armstrong 2013), and generally improve our understanding of the behavior of markets.

We also conjecture that our model will extend to models that do not have the property of “independence of irrelevant alternatives.” For instance, if someone buys a global equities...
mutual fund, it is more likely that his second choice is another global equities fund. To cover cases like this, one could assume that noise is correlated across firms. Intuitively, what matters is the “effective” number of firms, \( n_e \), in a given submarket (e.g., global equities fund). Then the markup is \( \mu_{n_e} \), and is characterized by our results. It would be interesting, though mathematically challenging, to prove the following conjecture: as long as the “effective number of firms in competition” in submarkets is above a constant fraction of the total number of firms in competition, then our results go through, at last in the key case of thin-tailed noise (extreme value theory tail exponent of 0).\(^{19}\)

In conclusion, this paper uses extreme value theory to clarify the quantitative impact of competition on prices in the symmetric-firms case. We anticipate that many of our results will extend with minor variations to the nonsymmetric case.\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\)For instance, if noise is Gaussian, and a submarket (e.g., global equities) has \( n_e = n/5 \) mutual funds rather than \( n \) mutual funds, then the markup is proportional to \( \mu_{n_e} \sim 1/\sqrt{2\ln \frac{n}{5}} \sim 1/\sqrt{2\ln n} \). Somewhat surprisingly the markup remains asymptotically the same in that case, as it does for other cases with thin tails.

\(^{20}\)Those minor economic variations will bring substantial additional mathematical challenges.
Appendix: Proofs

First, to clarify notation: denote \( f_n \sim g_n \) if \( f_n/g_n \to 1 \), \( f_n = o(g_n) \) if \( f_n/g_n \to 0 \) and \( f_n = O(g_n) \) if there exists \( M > 0 \) and \( n' \geq 1 \) such that for all \( n \geq n' \), \(|f_n| \leq M |g_n| \). We start by collecting some useful facts about regular variation, see Resnick (1987) or Bingham et al. (1989).

Lemma 3 1. If \( g(t) \in RV^0_a \), then the limit \( \lim_{t \to 0} g(x) / g(t) = x^a \) holds locally uniformly (with respect to \( x \)) on \((0, \infty)\).

2. If \( \lim_{x \to 0} h(x)/s(x) = 1 \), \( \lim_{x \to 0} s(x) = 0 \) and \( g(x) \in RV^0_\rho \), then \( g(h(x)) \sim g(s(x)) \).

3. If \( g(t) \in RV^0_a \) and \( h(t) \in RV^0_b \), then \( g(t) h(t) \in RV^0_{a+b} \).

4. If \( g(t) \in RV^0_a \), \( h(t) \in RV^0_a \) and \( \lim_{t \to 0} h(t) = 0 \), then \( g \circ h(t) \in RV^0_{ab} \).

5. If \( g(t) \in RV^0_a \) and non-decreasing, then \( g^{-1}(t) \in RV^0_{a-1} \) if \( \lim_{t \to 0} g(t) = 0 \).

6. Let \( U \in RV^0_\rho \). If \( \rho > -1 \) (or \( \rho = -1 \) and \( \int_0^x U(t) \, dt < \infty \)), then \( \int_0^x U(t) \, dt \in RV^0_{\rho+1} \) and

\[
\lim_{x \to 0} \frac{xU(x)}{\int_0^x U(t) \, dt} = \rho + 1.
\]

If \( \rho \leq -1 \), then for \( \bar{x} > 0 \), \( \int_0^x U(t) \, dt \in RV^0_{\rho+1} \) and

\[
\lim_{x \to 0} \frac{xU(x)}{\int_0^x U(t) \, dt} = -\rho - 1.
\]

7. If \( \lim_{t \to \infty} tj'(t)/j(t) = \rho \), then \( j \in RV_\rho^\infty \). Similarly, if \( \lim_{t \to 0} tj'(t)/j(t) = \rho \), then \( j \in RV_\rho^0 \).

8. If \( g \in RV_\rho^\infty \) and \( \varepsilon > 0 \), then \( g(t) = o(t^{\rho+\varepsilon}) \) and \( t^{\rho-\varepsilon} = o(g(t)) \) as \( t \to \infty \); and if \( g \in RV_\rho^0 \) and \( \varepsilon > 0 \), then \( g(t) = o(t^{\rho-\varepsilon}) \) and \( t^{\rho+\varepsilon} = o(g(t)) \) as \( t \to 0 \).

Proof See the online appendix. ■

Our proof of Theorem 1 depends critically on the following result.
Theorem 4 (Karamata’s Tauberian Theorem) Assume $U : (0, \infty) \rightarrow [0, \infty)$ is weakly increasing, $U(x) = 0$ for $x < 0$, and assume $\int_0^\infty e^{-sx}dU(x) < \infty$ for all sufficiently large $s$. With $\alpha \geq 0$, $U(x) \in RV_\alpha^0$ if and only if

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-sx}dU(x) \sim_{s \to \infty} U(1/s) \Gamma(\alpha + 1).$$

For a proof, see Bingham et al. (1987, pp.38, Th. 1.7.1’) or Feller (1972, XIII.5, Th. 1) for another version of Karamata’s Tauberian theorem.

Proof of Theorem 1 Assume for now that $G(x) \geq 0$ for all $x \in (w_1, w_u)$, and show later that this assumption can be relaxed. Differentiation of $\mathbb{P}(M_n \leq x) = F^n(x)$ gives the density of $M_n$: $f_n(x) = nf(x)F^{n-1}(x)$. Using the change of variable $x = F^{-1}(t)$ and observing that $dF^{-1}(t)/dt = -1/f(F^{-1}(t))$

$$\mathbb{E}[G(M_n)] = \int_{w_1}^{w_u} G(x)f(x)F^{n-1}(x)dx$$

$$= n \int_{w_1}^{w_u} G(x)F^{n-1}(x) (f(x)dx)$$

$$= n \int_0^1 G(F^{-1}(t))[F(F^{-1}(t))]^{n-1}dt$$

$$= n \int_0^1 \hat{G}(t) (1-t)^{n-1} dt.$$

We next use the change in variables $x = -\ln (1-t)$, so $t = 1 - e^{-x}$, $dt = e^{-x}dx$, and so

$$\mathbb{E}[G(M_n)] = n \int_0^\infty \hat{G} (1 - e^{-x}) e^{-x}e^{-n'x}dx$$

where $n' = n - 1$.

Next, define $h(x) = \hat{G} (1 - e^{-x}) e^{-x}$, and $\mu(x) = \int_0^x h(y) dy$. Since $\hat{G}$ is regularly varying at zero with index $\rho > -1$, Lemma 3(8) implies that $\int_0^s |\hat{G}(t)| dt < \infty$ for sufficiently small $s$. This, with the assumptions $G(t) \geq 0$ and $\int_0^1 |\hat{G}(t)| dt < \infty$ for all $s \in (0, 1)$, ensure that $\mu(x) = \int_0^{1-e^{-x}} \hat{G}(t) dt$ is finite and non-decreasing on $[0, \infty)$. By Lemma 3(2), $h(x) \sim_{x \to 0}$
\( \tilde{G}(x) \). So \( h \in RV_\rho^0 \), and by Lemma 3(6)

\[
\mu(x) = \int_0^x h(y) dy \sim_{x \to 0} \frac{1}{1 + \rho} h(x) x
\]

Therefore \( \mu(x) \in RV_{\rho+1}^0 \).

Noting our assumption that \( \rho + 1 > 0 \), we can now apply Karamata’s Theorem 4 in combination with the last expression to obtain

\[
\int_0^\infty e^{-n'x} d\mu(x) \sim_{n' \to \infty} \mu(1/n') \Gamma(2 + \rho) \\
\sim_{n' \to \infty} \frac{1}{1 + \rho} \tilde{G}(1/n') (n')^{-1} \Gamma(2 + \rho) \\
\sim_{n \to \infty} \tilde{G}(1/n) n^{-1} \Gamma(1 + \rho).
\]

Thus

\[
\mathbb{E}[G(M_n)] = n \int_0^\infty e^{-n'x} d\mu(x) \\
\sim n \tilde{G}(1/n) n^{-1} \Gamma(1 + \rho) = G(F^{-1}(1/n)) \Gamma(1 + \rho)
\]

holds when \( G(x) \geq 0 \) for all \( x \in (w_l, w_u) \).

Now relax the assumption that \( G(x) \geq 0 \) for all \( x \in (w_l, w_u) \). Choose \( \bar{t} \in (0, 1) \) such that \( G(t) > 0 \) for \( t \in [0, \bar{t}] \). The assumption that \( G(\cdot) \) is strictly positive in a left neighborhood of \( w_u \) ensures that such \( \bar{t} \) exists. Thus we can write

\[
\mathbb{E}[G(M_n)] = n \int_0^\bar{t} \tilde{G}(t) (1 - t)^{n-1} dt + n \int_{\bar{t}}^1 \tilde{G}(t) (1 - t)^{n-1} dt
\]

Consider \( \tilde{G} : (0, 1) \to \mathbb{R} \) defined by

\[
\tilde{G}(t) \equiv \begin{cases} 
\tilde{G}(t) : t \leq \bar{t} \\
0 : t > \bar{t}
\end{cases}
\]
It is easy to check that $\tilde{G}$ satisfies the conditions of the theorem and additionally is weakly positive everywhere on $(w, \infty)$. The argument above shows that as $1/n \to 0$

$$n \int_0^\tau \tilde{G}(t) (1-t)^{n-1} dt = n \int_0^1 \tilde{G}(t) (1-t)^{n-1} dt \sim \tilde{G}(1/n) \Gamma(1+\rho) \sim \tilde{G}(1/n) \Gamma(1+\rho).$$

(30)

To complete the proof we demonstrate that as $n \to \infty$

$$\left| \int_\tau^1 \tilde{G}(t) (1-t)^{n-1} dt \right| = o \left( \int_0^\tau \tilde{G}(t) (1-t)^{n-1} dt \right).$$

First, by (30) for $n \to \infty$

$$\int_0^\tau \tilde{G}(t) (1-t)^{n-1} dt \sim n^{-1} \tilde{G}(1/n) \Gamma(1+\rho) \in RV_{-\rho-1}^\infty.$$ 

Lemma 3(8) implies that $\int_0^\tau \tilde{G}(t) (1-t)^{n-1} dt > n^{-\rho-1-\varepsilon}$ for sufficiently large $n$ and given some $\varepsilon > 0$. Also,

$$\left| \int_\tau^1 \tilde{G}(t) (1-t)^{n-1} dt \right| \leq \int_\tau^1 \tilde{G}(t) (1-t)^{n-1} dt \leq (1-\tau)^{n-1} \int_\tau^1 \tilde{G}(t) dt \leq (1-\tau)^{n-1} \int_0^1 \tilde{G}(t) dt.$$ 

By assumption $\int_s^1 |\tilde{G}(t)| dt < \infty$ for all $s \in (0, 1)$, therefore

$$\frac{\int_\tau^1 \tilde{G}(t) (1-t)^{n-1} dt}{\int_0^\tau \tilde{G}(t) (1-t)^{n-1} dt} \leq \frac{(1-\tau)^{n-1} \int_0^1 |\tilde{G}(t)| dt}{n^{-\rho-1-\varepsilon}} = o(1) \text{ as } n \to \infty.$$ 

This completes the proof. ■

**Proof of Lemma 1** See the online appendix.

**Proof of Theorem 2** The Perloff-Salop and Sattinger cases follow immediately from Proposition 1; we will omit those calculations and focus on the Hart case. Applying Proposition 1
to (11), we immediately infer that

$$
\frac{\mu_n^{Hart}}{c} \sim \frac{1}{\psi + n f \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right) \frac{\Gamma(\gamma+2-\psi a)}{\Gamma(1-\psi a)}}
$$

under the conditions of the theorem. We will use the fact that \( anf(U_n) \sim 1 \), which holds because

$$
\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{nf \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right)} = \lim_{x \to w_u} \frac{F(x)}{f(x)} = a.
$$

Consider first the case where \( a = 0 \). Then \( nf \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right) \to \infty \), and the expression simplifies to

$$
\frac{\mu_n^{Hart}}{c} \sim \frac{1}{nf \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right) \left[ \frac{\psi}{nf \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right)} + \frac{\Gamma(\gamma+2-\psi a)}{\Gamma(1-\psi a)} \right]} \sim \frac{1}{nf \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right) \Gamma(\gamma + 2)}.
$$

Next, consider the case \( 0 < a < \infty \), which implies \( \gamma = 0 \). We have

$$
\frac{\mu_n^{Hart}}{c} \sim \frac{1}{\psi + n f \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right) \frac{\Gamma(2-\psi a)}{\Gamma(1-\psi a)}} \frac{1}{\psi + n f \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right) \left( 1 - \psi a \right)}
$$

$$
= \frac{1}{\psi \left( 1 - anf \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right) \right) + nf \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right)}
$$

$$
\sim \frac{1}{nf \left( F^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \right) \Gamma(2 + \gamma)}
$$

when \( \gamma = 0 \).
References


This online appendix discusses some additional issues. Section 7 contains details of the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger, and Hart models. Section 8 contains proofs that are omitted from the papers. Section 9 analyses the macroeconomic framework from Section 5.2 in greater detail. Section 10 derives second-order conditions for equilibrium, for the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger and Hart models.

7 Details of Monopolistic Competition Models

This section provides details for the derivation of the markup expressions for the four monopolistic competition models.

Perloff-Salop

Recall from (3) that in the Perloff-Salop model, the demand function for good i is the probability that difference between the demand shock and the price is maximized by good i:

\[
D(p_1, \ldots, p_n; i) = \mathbb{P} \left( X_i - p_i \geq \max_{j \neq i} X_j - p_j \right)
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E}_{X_i} \left[ \prod_{j \neq i} \mathbb{P} \left( x - p_i \geq X_j - p_j \mid X_i = x \right) \right]
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E}_{X_i} \left[ \prod_{j \neq i} F \left( x - p_i + p_j \right) \right]
\]

\[
= \int_{u_i}^{u_n} f(x) \prod_{j \neq i} F \left( x - p_i + p_j \right) dx.
\]
Using $D(p_i, p; n)$ to denote the demand for good $i$ at price $p_i$ when all other firms set price $p$ and using $D_1(p_i, p; n)$ to denote $\partial D(p_i, p; n) / \partial p_i$, we may calculate

$$D(p_i, p; n) = \int_{w_i}^{w_u} f(x) F^{n-1}(x - p_i + p) \, dx$$

$$D_1(p_i, p; n) = -(n - 1) \int_{w_i}^{w_u} f(x) f(x - p_i + p) F^{n-2}(x - p_i + p) \, dx.$$

Note that in a symmetric equilibrium

$$D(p, p; n) = \int_{w_i}^{w_u} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx = 1/n,$$

$$D_1(p, p; n) = -(n - 1) \int_{w_i}^{w_u} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx.$$

It follows that

$$\mu_{PS} = \frac{D(p, p; n)}{D_1(p, p; n)} = \frac{1}{n(n - 1) \int_{w_i}^{w_u} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}.$$

To interpret the Perloff-Salop markup equation, use the notation $M_{n-1}$ (the largest of the $n - 1$ noise realizations: $M_{n-1} = \max_{j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}, j \neq i} X_j$). Then, $D(p, p; n) = P(X_i > M_{n-1})$, so

$$D(p, p; n) = E[F(M_{n-1})]. \quad (31)$$

This formulation emphasizes that the demand for good $i$ is driven by the properties of the right-hand tail of the cumulative distribution function $\bar{F}$, as $M_{n-1}$ is likely to be large.

**Sattinger**

Under the utility specification (5), goods from the monopolistically competitive (MC) market are perfect substitutes. The consumer optimizes by buying only one monopolistically competitive good; the good $i$ which maximizes $e^{X_i} / p_i$. The consumer’s utility function is thus Cobb-Douglas in the composite good and the chosen MC good; it is then easy to show that the consumer spends fraction $\theta$ of his income on the chosen MC good. Without loss of generality, normalize the consumer’s endowment $y$ to equal $1/\theta$, so that the consumer always spends 1 unit of income on the MC good.

The demand function of firm $i$ is the probability that the good $i$ has a higher attraction-price ratio than all other goods, multiplied by the purchased quantity $1/p_i$ of the chosen good.
\( i; \) so

\[
D (p_1, \ldots, p_n; i) = \frac{1}{p_i} \mathbb{P} \left( e^{X_i} = \max_{j=1,\ldots,n} e^{X_j} \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{p_i} \mathbb{P} \left( X_i - \ln p_i = \max_{j=1,\ldots,n} X_j - \ln p_j \right).
\]

(32)

We may rewrite this expression as

\[
D (p_1, \ldots, p_n; i) = \frac{1}{p_i} \int f(x) \prod_{j \neq i} F \left( x - \ln p_i + \ln p_j \right) \, dx.
\]

Proceeding as in the case of the Perloff-Salop model, we get

\[
D (p_i, p_n; n) = \frac{1}{p_i} \int_{w_l}^{w_u} f(x) F^{n-1} (x - \ln p_i + \ln p) \, dx,
\]

\[
D_1 (p_i, p_n; n) = -\frac{1}{p_i^2} \int_{w_l}^{w_u} f(x) F^{n-1} (x - \ln p_i + \ln p) \, dx
\]

\[
- \frac{(n-1)}{p_i^2} \int_{w_l}^{w_u} f(x) f(x - \ln p_i + \ln p) F^{n-2} (x - \ln p_i + \ln p) \, dx
\]

In a symmetric equilibrium

\[
D(p, p; n) = \int_{w_l}^{w_u} f(x) F^{n-1} (x) \, dx = \frac{1}{pn},
\]

\[
D_1 (p, p; n) = -\frac{1}{p^2} \left( \frac{1}{n} + (n-1) \int_{w_l}^{w_u} f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx \right)
\]

After some simple manipulations, it follows that the Sattinger markup in symmetric equilibrium is

\[
\mu_{n}^{Sat} = -\frac{D(p, p; n)}{D_1 (p, p; n)} = \frac{c}{n (n-1) \int_{w_l}^{w_u} f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx}.
\]

**Hart**

Recall that the consumer’s objective is to choose quantities to maximize:

\[
\max_{i=1,\ldots,n} \max_{Q_i \geq 0} U = \frac{\psi + 1}{\psi} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} e^{X_i} Q_i \right)^{\psi/(\psi+1)} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i Q_i.
\]

(33)
As in the Sattinger case, it is clear that because goods are perfect substitutes, the consumer
will purchase only from one firm, which we denote by \( i \). The first-order condition of the
consumer’s problem is then

\[
0 = \frac{d}{dQ_i} \left[ \psi \left( e^{X_i Q_i} \right)^{\psi/(\psi+1)} - p_i Q_i \right] = e^{X_i \psi/(\psi+1)} Q_i^{-1/(\psi+1)} - p_i
\]

which gives us the optimal quantity for the chosen good \( i \): \( Q_i = e^{X_i \psi / p_i^{1+\psi}} \), and the total net utility is:

\[
V_i = \frac{\psi + 1}{\psi} \left( e^{X_i Q_i} \right)^{\psi/(\psi+1)} - p_i Q_i
\]

\[
= \left( \frac{\psi + 1}{\psi} - 1 \right) p_i Q_i = \frac{1}{\psi} p_i e^{X_i \psi / p_i^{1+\psi}} = \frac{1}{\psi} \left( \frac{e^{X_i}}{p_i} \right)^{\psi}
\]

The consumer chooses the good that maximizes his net utility, i.e. \( \arg \max_i \left( e^{X_i} / p_i \right) \). We may then calculate the demand function for good \( i \) as

\[
D(p_1, \ldots, p_n; i) = \mathbb{E} \left[ e^{X_i} \left( \frac{e^{X_i}}{p_i^{1+\psi}} \right) I\left\{ e^{X_i} / p_i = \max_j (X_j - \ln p_j) \right\} \right]
\]  

(34)

\[
= \mathbb{E} \left[ e^{X_i} \left( \frac{e^{X_i}}{p_i^{1+\psi}} \right) I\left\{ X_i - \ln p_i = \max_j (X_j - \ln p_j) \right\} \right]
\]  

(35)

where \( I \{ \cdot \} \) is the indicator function. Writing out the expectation and differentiating gives

\[
D(p, p; n) = \frac{1}{p_1^{1+\psi}} \int_{w_1}^{w_u} e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x - \ln p + \ln p) \, dx,
\]

\[
D_1(p, p; n) = - \frac{1 + \psi}{p_1^{2+\psi}} \int_{w_1}^{w_u} e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x - \ln p + \ln p) \, dx
\]

\[
- \frac{n - 1}{p_1^{2+\psi}} \int_{w_1}^{w_u} e^{\psi x} f(x) (x - \ln p + \ln p) F^{n-2}(x - \ln p + \ln p) \, dx.
\]

In a symmetric equilibrium

\[
D(p, p; n) = \frac{1}{p^{1+\psi}} \int_{w_1}^{w_u} e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx
\]

\[
D_1(p, p; n) = - \frac{1}{p^{2+\psi}} \left( (1 + \psi) \int_{w_1}^{w_u} e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + (n - 1) \int_{w_1}^{w_u} e^{\psi x} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx \right).
\]
With some simple calculations, it follows that the Hart markup in symmetric equilibrium is

\[ \mu^{Hart}_{\Delta} = - \frac{D(p, p; n)}{D_1(p, p; n)} \]

\[ = c \left( \psi + (n - 1) \frac{\int e^{\psi x} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x)}{\int e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) dx} \right)^{-1}. \]

8 Proofs Omitted from the Paper

Proof of Lemma 3

1. Follows upon inversion from Resnick (1987, Prop. 0.5).

2. This fact follows from the observation that for \( \frac{g(s(x))}{g(h(x))} = \frac{g(s(x)/h(x))}{g(h(x))} \sim \left( \frac{s(x)}{h(x)} \right)^p \rightarrow_{x \to 0} 1 \)
where we can take the limit as \( x \to 0 \) because of Lemma 3(1). Going into more detail, choose \( \delta(\cdot) \) such that \( \lim_{t \to 0} \delta(t) = 0 \) and \( |s(t')/h(t') - 1| < \delta(t) \) for \( t' < t \). Such \( \delta(\cdot) \) exists by our assumptions on \( s \) and \( h \). Choose \( \varepsilon(\cdot, \cdot) \) such that \( \lim_{t \to 0} \varepsilon(t, \delta) = \lim_{t \to 0} \varepsilon(t, \delta) = 0 \) and \( |g(xt')/g(t') - x^p| < \varepsilon(t, \delta) \) for \( x \in (1 - \delta, 1 + \delta) \) and \( t' < t \).
Lemma 3(1) ensures that such \( \varepsilon(\cdot, \cdot) \) exists. Then

\[ |g(s(t'))/g(h(t')) - 1| = \left| g \left( \frac{s(t')}{h(t')} \right) / g(h(t')) - 1 \right| < \varepsilon(h(t'), \delta(t)) + \rho O(\delta(t)) \]

for \( t' < t \). Since the RHS goes to zero as \( t \to 0 \), the result follows.

3. Since \( \lim_{t \to 0} \frac{g(xt)}{g(t)} = x^a \) and \( \lim_{t \to 0} \frac{h(xt)}{h(t)} = x^b \), we have \( \lim_{t \to 0} \frac{g(xt)h(xt)}{g(t)h(t)} = x^{a+b} \).

4. Follows upon inversion from Resnick (1987, Prop. 0.8, iv).

5. Follows upon inversion from Resnick (1987, Prop. 0.8, v).

6. Both parts follow upon inversion from Resnick (1987, Th. 0.6, a).

7. Follows from Resnick (1987, Prop. 0.7) and by inversion.

8. Directly by Resnick (1987, Prop. 0.8, ii) and upon inversion.

Proof of Lemma 1
1. Note that \( F\left(F^{-1}(t)\right) = 1-t \) implies \( f\left(F^{-1}(t)\right) \left(F^{-1}(t)\right)' = -1 \). Let \( x = F^{-1}(t), \ j(t) = f\left(F^{-1}(t)\right). \) Then \( tj'(t) \) / \( j(t) = -tf'\left(F^{-1}(t)\right) / f^2\left(F^{-1}(t)\right) = -F(x)f'(x)/f^2(x) = (F/f)'(x) + 1 \), so \( \lim_{t \to 0} tj'(t)/j(t) = \lim_{x \to F^{-1}(1)} (F/f)'(x) + 1 = \gamma + 1 \) by Definition 1. Lemma 3(7) then implies the desired result.

2. Note that \(-\frac{d}{dt} F^{-1}(t) = 1/f\left(F^{-1}(t)\right) \in RV^0_{\gamma-1}. \) So if \( w_u < \infty \) (which implies \( \gamma \leq 0 \); see Embrechts et al., 1997) then Lemma 3(6) implies

\[
F^{-1}(0) - F^{-1}(t) = \int_0^t 1/f\left(F^{-1}(s)\right) ds \in RV^0_{\gamma},
\]

If \( w_u = \infty \) (which implies \( \gamma \geq 0 \)) then Lemma 3(6) implies, for any choice of \( \bar{t} > 0, \) that

\[
F^{-1}(t) \sim F^{-1}(t) - F^{-1}(\bar{t}) = \int_t^{\bar{t}} 1/f\left(F^{-1}(s)\right) ds \in RV^0_{-\gamma};
\]

see also Embrechts et al. (1997, pp. 160).

3. We have

\[
\frac{t^d}{e^{F^{-1}(t)}} = \frac{-t}{f\left(F^{-1}(t)\right)} = \frac{-F(x)}{f(x)} \quad \text{for } x = F^{-1}(t).
\]

Lemma 3(7) then implies the desired result.

**Proof of Proposition 2** First we treat the Perloff-Salop case. Treating \( n \) as continuous, we have

\[
\frac{n}{\mu_n} \frac{d\mu_n^{PS}}{dn} = -\left(\frac{2n-1}{n-1} + \frac{n \int f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \log F(x) \, dx}{\int f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx}\right).
\]

Noting that \(-\log (1-x) \sim x \in RV^0_1, \) applying Theorem 1 to \( G(x) \equiv \frac{f(x)}{F(x)} \log F(x), \) using Lemma 3(3), we obtain

\[
\int f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \log F(x) \, dx \sim -n^{-2} f(U_n) \Gamma (3 + \gamma).
\]

Together with Theorem 2, it follows that

\[
\frac{n}{\mu_n} \frac{d\mu_n}{dn} = -\left(2 - \frac{n^{-2} nf\left(F^{-1}(1/n)\right) \Gamma (3 + \gamma)}{n^{-2} nf\left(F^{-1}(1/n)\right) \Gamma (2 + \gamma)} + o(1)\right) = \gamma + o(1).
\]
Note that this also proves our claim for the Sattinger case. Next we treat the Hart case.

Notationally, let

\[ J_{\psi,n}(k,l) = \int e^{\psi x} f^k(x) F^{n-k}(x) (\log F(x))^l \, dx. \]

Then we have

\[ \mu_n^{Hart} = c \left( \psi + (n - 1) \frac{\int e^{\psi x} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}{\int e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx} \right)^{-1}, \]

so

\[ n \frac{d\mu_n^{Hart}}{dn} = -n \frac{J_{\psi,n}(2,0) + (n - 1) J_{\psi,n}(1,0) J_{\psi,n}(2,1) - J_{\psi,n}(2,0) J_{\psi,n}(1,0)}{\left( \psi + (n - 1) \frac{J_{\psi,n}(2,0)}{J_{\psi,n}(1,0)} \right)^2}. \]

Again, using the methods from Proposition 1, we may show that

\[ J_{\psi,n}(k,l) \sim \begin{cases} (-1)^l n^{-l-1} f^{k-1} \left( F^{-1}(1/n) \right) e^{\psi F^{-1}(1/n)} \Gamma((\gamma + 1)(k - 1) + l + 1) : \gamma < 0 \\ (-1)^l n^{-l-1} f^{k-1} \left( F^{-1}(1/n) \right) e^{\psi F^{-1}(1/n)} \Gamma(k + l - \psi a) : \gamma = 0 \end{cases}. \]

In the case \( a = 0 \), we may then verify that

\[ n \frac{d\mu_n^{Hart}}{dn} = -2 \frac{\Gamma(\gamma + 2) - \Gamma(\gamma + 3)}{\Gamma(\gamma + 2)} + o(1) = \gamma + o(1). \]

In the case \( 0 < a < \infty \) (which implies \( \gamma = 0 \); we do not consider \( \gamma > 0 \)), we may verify that

\[ \lim_{n \to \infty} n \frac{d\mu_n^{Hart}}{dn} = - (1 - \psi a) \left[ (1 - \psi a) - (1 - \psi a) \right] = 0. \]

**Proof of Proposition 3** We first show a lemma that links differences between the two top order statistics to the behavior of the top tail statistics, and hence allows us to apply our general results.

**Lemma 4** Call \( M_n \) and \( S_n \), respectively, the largest and second largest realizations of \( n \) i.i.d. random variables with CDF \( F \) and density \( f = F' \), and \( G \) a function such that \( \int G(x) f(x) \, dx < \infty \), \( \lim_{x \to F^{-1}(0)} G(x) F(x) = \lim_{x \to F^{-1}(1)} G(x) F(x) = 0 \). Then:

\[ \mathbb{E} [G(M_n) - G(S_n)] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{G'(M_n) F(M_n)}{f(M_n)} \right] \]  

(36)
**Proof:** Recall that the density of $M_n$ is $n f (x) F^{n-1} (x)$, and the density of $S_n$ is

$$n (n - 1) f (x) F (x) F^{n-2} (x).$$

So

$$\mathbb{E} [G (S_n)] = \int n (n - 1) G (x) f (x) F (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx$$

$$= n \left[ G (x) F (x) F^{n-1} (x) \right]_{F^{-1} (0)}^{F^{-1} (1)} - \int n (G (x) F (x))' F^{n-1} (x) \, dx$$

$$= 0 + \int n G (x) f (x) F^{n-1} (x) \, dx - \int n \frac{G' (x) F (x)}{f (x)} f (x) F^{n-1} (x) \, dx$$

$$= \mathbb{E} [G (M_n)] - \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{G' (M_n) F (M_n)}{f (M_n)} \right]$$

From this lemma, the proof follows for $G (x) = x$. As $f (F^{-1} (t)) \in RV_{1+\gamma}^0$, $t / f (F^{-1} (t)) \in RV_{1-\gamma}^0$, and we may apply Theorem 1 to obtain the desired result. ■

**Proof of Proposition 4** First, some notation: $\pi ((p, \sigma), (p^*, \sigma^* ); n)$ denotes the profit function of a firm that chooses $(p, \sigma)$ when the remaining $n - 1$ firms choose $(p^*, \sigma^*)$. Also, $\pi (p, \sigma; n)$ denotes the profit function of a firm when all $n$ firms choose $(p, \sigma)$.

**Perloff-Salop Case**

Call $\sigma^*$ and $p^*$ the equilibrium choices of the other firms:

$$\pi ((p, \sigma), (p^*, \sigma^* ); n) = (p - c (\sigma)) \mathbb{P} \left( \sigma X_1 - p \geq \max_{j \neq i} \sigma^* X_j - p^* \right)$$

$$= (p - c (\sigma)) \mathbb{P} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma^*} X_i + \frac{p^* - p}{\sigma^*} \geq \max_{j \neq i} X_j \right)$$

$$= (p - c (\sigma)) \int f (x) F^{n-1} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma^*} x + \frac{p^* - p}{\sigma^*} \right) \, dx.$$  

The first-order conditions for profit maximization are as follows. Differentiating with respect to $p$ yields

$$p - c (\sigma) = \frac{\int f (x) F^{n-1} (x) \, dx}{\frac{1}{\sigma} (n - 1) \int f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx}$$

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and differentiating with respect to $\sigma$ gives

$$c' (\sigma) \int f (x) F^{n-1} (x) \, dx = (n - 1) \left( p - c (\sigma) \right) \int x f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx \frac{1}{\sigma}.$$  

Some manipulation reveals

$$c' (\sigma) = \frac{\int x f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx}{\int f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx}.$$  

Now we consider two cases: $w_u < \infty$ and $w_u = \infty$. If $w_u < \infty$, then

$$\frac{\int x f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx}{\int f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx} = \frac{n^{-1} w_u f \left( \frac{1}{F^{-1} (1/n)} \right) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)}{n^{-1} f \left( \frac{1}{F^{-1} (1/n)} \right) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)} + o (1) = w_u + o (1).$$  

If $w_u = \infty$ then

$$\frac{\int x f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx}{\int f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx} \sim \frac{n^{-1} F^{-1} (1/n) f \left( \frac{1}{F^{-1} (1/n)} \right) \Gamma (2)}{n^{-1} f \left( \frac{1}{F^{-1} (1/n)} \right) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)} \sim \frac{1}{\Gamma (\gamma + 2)}.$$  

**Sattinger Case**

We have

$$\pi ((p, \sigma), (p^*, \sigma^*); n) = \frac{p - c (\sigma)}{p} \mathbb{P} \left( \frac{e^{\sigma X_i}}{p} \geq \max_{j \neq i} \frac{e^{\sigma^* X_j}}{p^*} \right) = \frac{p - c (\sigma)}{p} \int f (x) F^{n-1} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma^*} x + \frac{\log p^* - \log p}{\sigma^*} \right) \, dx$$  

so the first-order conditions for profit maximization become

$$0 = \pi_2 (p, \sigma; n) = -\frac{c' (\sigma)}{p} \int f (x) F^{n-1} (x) \, dx + \frac{p - c (\sigma)}{\sigma p} (n - 1) \int x f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx$$  

and

$$0 = \pi_1 (p, \sigma; n) = \frac{c (\sigma)}{p^2} \int f (x) F^{n-1} (x) \, dx - \frac{p - c (\sigma)}{\sigma p^2} (n - 1) \int f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx.$$  

50
Rearranging, we get

\[
\frac{p - c(\sigma)}{c(\sigma)} = \frac{\sigma}{n(n - 1) \int f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}
\]

and

\[
c'(\sigma) = \frac{\frac{p - c(\sigma)}{\sigma}}{n - 1} \int x f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx
\]

\[
\int f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx,
\]

so

\[
c'(\sigma) = \frac{\int x f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}{\int f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx}
\]

\[
= \begin{cases} 
\overline{F}^{-1}(1/n) + o\left(\overline{F}^{-1}(1/n)\right) = w_u + o(1) : w_u < \infty \\
\overline{F}^{-1}(1/n) + o(F^{-1}(1/n)) \quad : w_u = \infty
\end{cases}
\]

as calculated in the Perloff-Salop case.

**Hart Case**

We have

\[
\pi((p, \sigma), (p^*, \sigma^*); n) = (p - c(\sigma)) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{e^{\psi x} X_i}{p^{1+\psi}} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{x} \right\} I \left\{ X_i \geq \max_{j \neq i} \frac{\alpha x_j}{x} \right\} \right] \\
= (p - c(\sigma)) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{e^{\psi x} X_i}{p^{1+\psi}} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{x} \right\} I \left\{ \frac{\alpha x_i + \log p^* - \log p - \max_{j \neq i} x_j}{p} \right\} \right] \\
= (p - c(\sigma)) \int \frac{e^{\psi x}}{p^{1+\psi}} f(x) F^{n-1} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma^*} x + \frac{\log p^* - \log p}{\sigma^*} \right) \, dx
\]

so the first-order conditions for profit maximization become

\[
0 = \pi_2(p, \sigma; n) = -c'(\sigma) \int \frac{e^{\psi x}}{p^{1+\psi}} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + (p - c(\sigma)) \left\{ \int \frac{\psi x}{p^{1+\psi}} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + \frac{n-1}{\sigma} \int x \frac{e^{\psi x}}{p^{1+\psi}} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx \right\}
\]

and

\[
0 = \pi_1(p, \sigma; n) = \int \frac{e^{\psi x}}{p^{1+\psi}} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx - (p - c(\sigma)) \left\{ (1 + \psi) \int \frac{e^{\psi x}}{p^{1+\psi}} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + \frac{n-1}{\sigma} \int \frac{e^{\psi x}}{p^{1+\psi}} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx \right\}
\]

so

\[
\frac{p - c(\sigma)}{c(\sigma)} = \frac{\int e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx}{\psi \int e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + \frac{n-1}{\sigma} \int e^{\psi x} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}
\]
and

\[
\frac{c'(\sigma)}{c(\sigma)} = \frac{p - c(\sigma) \int \psi xe^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + \frac{n-1}{\sigma} \int xe^{\psi x} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}{\psi \int e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + \frac{n-1}{\sigma} \int e^{\psi x} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}
\]

Now we consider two cases: \( w_u < \infty \) and \( w_u = \infty \). If \( w_u < \infty \), then (noting that \( a = 0 \) in this case)

\[
\frac{c'(\sigma)}{c(\sigma)} = \frac{\psi \int xe^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + \frac{n-1}{\sigma} \int xe^{\psi x} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}{\psi \int e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + \frac{n-1}{\sigma} \int e^{\psi x} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}
\]

\[
= \frac{\psi n^{-1} w_u e^{\sigma w_u} \Gamma(1) + \frac{1}{\sigma} w_u e^{\sigma w_u} f \left( \frac{F^{-1}(1/n)}{F} \right) \Gamma(\gamma + k)}{\psi n^{-1} e^{\sigma w_u} \Gamma(1) + \frac{1}{\sigma} e^{\sigma w_u} f \left( \frac{F^{-1}(1/n)}{F} \right) \Gamma(\gamma + k)} + o(1)
\]

\[
= w_u + o(1).
\]

If \( w_u = \infty \), then noting that \( \gamma = 0 \),

\[
\frac{c'(\sigma)}{c(\sigma)} = \frac{\psi \int xe^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + \frac{n-1}{\sigma} \int xe^{\psi x} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}{\psi \int e^{\psi x} f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + \frac{n-1}{\sigma} \int e^{\psi x} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx}
\]

\[
\approx \frac{\psi n^{-1} F^{-1}(1/n) e^{\sigma F^{-1}(1/n)} \Gamma(1 - \psi) + \frac{1}{\sigma} \psi \Gamma(2 - \psi a)}{\psi n^{-1} e^{\sigma F^{-1}(1/n)} \Gamma(1 - \psi) + \frac{1}{\sigma} \psi} f \left( \frac{U_n}{\sigma} \right) e^{\sigma \psi U_n} \Gamma(2 + \gamma - \psi a)
\]

\[
= \frac{F^{-1}(1/n)}{F}.
\]

**Proof of Proposition 6** First, note that the demand function under the Hart specification is

\[
E \left[ \frac{e^{\psi X_i}}{p_i^{1+\psi} \prod_{j \neq i} e^{\sigma x_j \frac{p_i}{p_j}}} \right] = \frac{1}{p_i^{1+\psi}} \int_{w_i}^{w_u} e^{\psi x} f(x) \prod_{j \neq i} F \left( x + \frac{\ln p_i - \ln p_j}{\sigma^*} \right) \, dx.
\]

We can then make the substitutions \( F(y) = \exp(-e^{-y/\phi}) \) and \( f(x) = \frac{1}{\phi} \exp \left( -\frac{x}{\phi} - e^{-x/\phi} \right) \) to calculate
\[
D (p_1, \ldots, p_n; \sigma^*) = \frac{1}{p_i^{1+\psi}} \int_{w_i}^{w_u} e^{\psi \sigma^* x} f(x) \prod_{j \neq i} F \left( x + \frac{\ln p_i - \ln p_j}{\sigma^*} \right) dx \\
= \frac{1}{p_i^{1+\psi}} \int_{w_i}^{w_u} \frac{1}{\phi} e^{\psi \sigma^* x} \exp \left( -\frac{x}{\phi} - e^{-x/\phi} \right) \exp \left( -\prod_{j \neq i} e^{-\left( x + \frac{\ln p_i - \ln p_j}{\sigma^*} \right)/\phi} \right) dx \\
= \frac{1}{\phi p_i^{1+\psi}} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \exp \left( x \left( \sigma^* \psi - \frac{1}{\phi} \right) - \sum_{j=1}^{n} \left( \frac{p_i}{p_j} \right)^{1/(\sigma^*)} e^{-x/\phi} \right) dx \\
= \Gamma \left( 1 - \phi \psi \sigma^* \right) \frac{p_i^{-(1+1/(\phi \sigma^*))}}{\left( \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_j^{-1/(\phi \sigma^*)} \right)^{1-\phi \psi \sigma^*}}
\]

where, for the last equality, we use the identity

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \exp \left( ax + be^{-x} \right) = b^a \Gamma \left( -a \right). \quad \blacksquare
\]

### 8.1 ELRU

We first present some results that we will use in the proof of Theorem 3, followed by the proof of the Theorem itself.

**Lemma 5** Under the assumptions of section 5.3

\[
D (p, p) \sim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n}. 
\]

**Proof of Lemma 5**

Some notation: we use \( x \lor y \) to denote \( \max \{x, y\} \). Note that \( M_{n-1} \) is independent of \( Q = w + \beta p \) and therefore

\[
D(p, p) = \mathbb{P} \left\{ X_i \geq \bigvee_{j \neq i} X_j \lor Q \right\} \\
= \mathbb{E}_Q \left[ \int_{q}^{\infty} F^{n-1}(s) f(s) ds \right] \\
= \frac{1}{n} - \frac{1}{n} \mathbb{E}_Q [F^n(q)] \\
= \frac{1}{n} + o \left( \frac{1}{n} \right) \quad \blacksquare
\]

(37)
To obtain the partial derivative \( \partial D(p_i, p_j) / \partial p_i \) note that we can alternatively express demand in a symmetric equilibrium in terms of the distribution of \( X_i \)

\[
D(p, p) = \Pr \left\{ X_i \geq \bigvee_{j \neq i} X_j \vee Q \right\} = 1 - \Pr \left\{ X_i \leq M_{n-1} \vee Q \right\} = 1 - \mathbb{E}_Q \mathbb{E}_{M_{n-1}} \left[ F(m_{n-1} \vee q) \right].
\]

This facilitates the differentiation with respect \( p_i \) at a symmetric equilibrium

\[
\left. \frac{\partial D(p_i, p_j)}{\partial p_i} \right|_{p_i = p_j = p} = \frac{\partial \left\{ 1 - \mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} \mathbb{E}_{M_{n-1}} \left[ F(m_{n-1} \vee w + \beta p_i) \right] \right\}}{\partial p_i} = -\mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} \mathbb{E}_{M_{n-1}} \left[ f(m_{n-1} \vee q) \times \beta \right]
\]

\[
= -\mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} \left[ \beta \int_q^{\infty} (n-1) f(s) F_{m-2}(s) f(s) ds \right]
\]

We like to use the Theorem 1. To this end we first need the asymptotic inverse of the Rootzen distributions

\[
\overline{F}(x) = 1 - F(x) \sim \kappa x^\nu \exp \left( -\lambda x^\phi \right), \kappa > 0, \lambda > 0, \phi \geq 1, \nu \in \mathbb{R}
\]

The asymptotic inverse of the upper tail of (38) is

\[
\overline{F}^{-1}(y) \sim \left( \frac{1}{\lambda} \right)^{1/\phi} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{\kappa \lambda^{-\nu/\phi}}{y} \times \left[ \ln \left( \frac{\kappa \lambda^{-\nu/\phi}}{y} \right) \right]^{\nu/\phi} \right) \right]^{1/\phi}
\]

for \( y \) close to zero, see Li (2008).

**Lemma 6** For the distribution with upper tail (38) it holds that \( f\left( \overline{F}^{-1}(y) \right) \in RV_\rho^0 \) with \( \rho > -1 \).

**Proof of Lemma 6**
Write shorthand $A = \kappa \lambda^{-\nu/\phi}$. Then, for $y$ close to zero,
\[
f \left( F^{-1}(y) \right) \sim \kappa \lambda \phi \left[ \left( \frac{1}{\lambda} \right)^{1/\phi} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{A}{y} \times \left[ \ln \frac{A}{y} \right]^{\nu/\phi} \right) \right] \right]^{\frac{1}{\phi}} \times \\
\exp \left( -\lambda \left[ \left( \frac{1}{\lambda} \right)^{1/\phi} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{A}{y} \times \left[ \ln \frac{A}{y} \right]^{\nu/\phi} \right) \right] \right]^{\frac{1}{\phi}} \right) \phi)
\]
\[
= y \lambda^{1/\phi} \left[ \ln \frac{A}{y} \right]^{-\nu/\phi} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{A}{y} \times \left[ \ln \frac{A}{y} \right]^{\nu/\phi} \right) \right]^{(\nu-1)/\phi} \phi \ln \left( \frac{A}{y} \times \left[ \ln \frac{A}{y} \right]^{\nu/\phi} \right).
\]

Taking ratios shows
\[
\lim_{y \to 0} \frac{f \left( F^{-1}(xy) \right)}{f \left( F^{-1}(y) \right)} = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{f \left( F^{-1}(x/t) \right)}{f \left( F^{-1}(1/t) \right)} = x.
\]

Hence, $f \left( F^{-1}(y) \right) \in RV_{1}^{0}$, so that $\rho > -1$. ■

Define the function $G(s)$ from the Theorem 1 as the density $f(s)$ from (27)
\[
G(s) = \kappa \lambda \phi x^{\phi+\nu-1} \exp \left( -\lambda x^{\phi} \right).
\]

Thus $G(x)$ is positive, moreover $\widehat{G}(s)$ is integrable on $(0, 1)$. Lastly, recall that $q$ is bounded.

**Lemma 7** Asymptotically
\[
\frac{\partial D(p,p)}{\partial p_i} \sim -\phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \mathbb{E}[^{\beta}].
\]

**Proof of Lemma 7**
By the main Theorem 1 at given values of $\beta$ and $w$:

\[
\left. \frac{\partial D(p, p)}{\partial p_i} \right|_{w+\beta p=q} = -(n-1) \beta \int_q^\infty f(s) F^{n-2}(s) f(s) ds = -(n-1) \beta \int_q^\infty G(s) F^{n-2}(s) f(s) ds \\
\sim -\beta G \left( F^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{n-1} \right) \right) \Gamma(2) \\
\sim -\beta \phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} .
\]

(39)

By the boundedness assumption there exist $w = \inf(w)$, $\bar{w} = \sup(w)$ and $\underline{\beta} = \inf(\beta)$ and $\overline{\beta} = \sup(\beta)$. Let $m = n-1$. Now

\[
\mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} \left[ \beta \int_{\frac{w+\beta p}{\bar{w}}}^\infty m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \right] \geq \\
\mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} \left[ \beta \int_{\frac{w+\beta p}{\underline{\beta}}}^\infty m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \right] \geq \\
\mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} \left[ \beta \int_{\frac{w+\beta p}{\overline{\beta}}}^\infty m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \right] .
\]

By (39) the inner integrals on the left and right are asymptotic to the same expression in $n$

\[
\int_{\frac{w+\beta p}{\overline{\beta}}}^\infty m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \sim \int_{\frac{w+\beta p}{\overline{\beta}}}^\infty m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \sim \phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} .
\]

Hence, the middle term is asymptotic to

\[
\mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} \left[ \beta \int_{\frac{w+\beta p}{\overline{\beta}}}^\infty m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \right] \sim \phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} [\beta] .
\]

(40)

Using this middle term on the left and proceeding analogously gives

\[
\mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} \left[ \beta \int_{\frac{w+\beta p}{\overline{\beta}}}^\infty m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \right] \leq \mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} \left[ \beta \int_{\frac{w+\beta p}{\overline{\beta}}}^{\infty} m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \right] \\
\leq \mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} \left[ \beta \int_{0}^{\infty} m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \right] .
\]
By (39) and (40)
\[
\int_0^\infty m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \sim \int_0^\infty m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \sim \phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi}.
\]
So that the middle term is asymptotic to
\[
\beta \int_0^\infty m F^{m-1}(s) f^2(s) ds \sim \phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} [\beta].
\]
Thus, unconditionally
\[
\frac{\partial D(p, p)}{\partial p_i} = -\mathbb{E}_{\beta, w} \left[ \beta \int_q^\infty (n - 1) f(s) F^{n-2}(s) f(s) ds \right]
\]
\[\sim -\phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \mathbb{E}[\beta]. \]

**Proof of Theorem 3.**

First, note that both $D(p, p; n)$ and $D_1(p, p; n)$ are both decreasing in $p_1$. Let $M$ be large and independent of $n$ and $p \in [c, M]$. Since $D(c, c; n)$ and $D(M, M; n)$ are asymptotic to the same function of $n$, see (37), it follows that $D(p, p; n)$ converges uniformly to the same function of $n$ on the interval $[c, M]$. We can make an identical argument to show that $D_1(p, p; n)$ converges uniformly on the interval $[c, M]$. It then follows that $-D(p, p; n)/D_1(p, p; n)$ converges uniformly to the asymptotic markup expression (which is a function of $n$) on $[c, M]$

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} -D(p, p)/D_1(p, p) \sim \phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \mathbb{E}[\beta]
\]
uniformly on $p \in [c, M]$.

Let $q(p, n) = p - c + D(p, p; n)/D_1(p, p; n)$. Our equilibrium markup over $p(n)$ is characterized by $q(p(n), n) = 0$. Clearly, $q(c, n) < 0$ for all $n$, while for $M$ sufficiently large $q(M, n) > 0$ and sufficiently large $n$. It follows that a solution $p(n)$ exists to $q(p, n) = 0$ in $[c, M]$ for sufficiently large $n$; so a solution $p(n)$ exists. This solution satisfies

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} -\frac{D(p(n), p(n))}{D_1(p(n), p(n))} \sim \phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \mathbb{E}[\beta],
\]
as desired. \[\blacksquare\]
9 Details of Trade / Macro Framework

We start with the first order conditions for the RD specification. Utility (22) is to be maximized subject to the consumer budget constraint

\[ wL + \Pi(Q) = qZ + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i Q_i, \]  

and where \( w \) is the wage rate and \( q, p_i \) are the goods prices, while \( \Pi(Q) \) are the profits received from the differentiated goods sector. The number \( n \) equals the number of goods for which demand is strictly positive, i.e. \( n = \sum_i \chi_{Q_i > 0} \). Suppose that

\[ \frac{e^{X_i}}{p_i} \geq \max \left\{ \frac{e^{X_j}}{p_j} \right\}, \text{ for } j = 1, \ldots, n. \]

Optimality requires

\[ Q_j = 0, \text{ for } j \neq i. \]

\[ (1 - \theta) Z^{-\theta} [e^{X_i} Q_i]^\theta - \lambda q = 0, \]

\[ \theta Z^{1-\theta} [e^{X_i} Q_i]^{\theta-1} e^{X_i} - \lambda p_i = 0, \]

\[ -L^n + \lambda w = 0 \]

and

\[ wL + \Pi(Q) = qZ + p_i Q_i. \]

Manipulating these conditions yields by dividing the first two conditions

\[ p_i Q_i = \frac{\theta}{1 - \theta} qZ. \]

This together with the budget constraint implies

\[ Z = (1 - \theta) \frac{wL + \Pi(Q)}{q} \]

and

\[ Q_i = \theta \frac{wL + \Pi(Q)}{p_i}. \]
Furthermore, from the first three first order conditions

\[ \frac{q}{w} = (1 - \theta) Z^{-\theta} \left[ e^{X_i Q_i} \right]^\theta L^{-\eta} \]

\[ = (1 - \theta) \left( \frac{1 - \theta}{\theta} \frac{p_i}{q} Q_i \right)^{-\theta} \left[ e^{X_i Q_i} \right]^\theta L^{-\eta} \]

so that

\[ L = \left( \frac{w}{q^{1-\theta} p_i^\theta} (1 - \theta)^{1-\theta} \theta^\theta \right)^{1/\eta} e^{(\theta/\eta)X_i}. \]

The well known consumer first order conditions for the DS case imply the same demand functions for \( Z \) and \( Q_i \) as in (42) and (43) and are left to the reader. The only difference is that in the DS case there is demand for all differentiated goods. Use that in the symmetric equilibrium all prices for the differentiated goods will be equal \( p_i = p \). Conditional on \( e^{X_i/p_i} \geq \max_j \left[ e^{X_j/p_j} \right] \), we get for both specifications

\[ Q_i = \theta \frac{wL + \Pi(Q)}{p} \quad (44) \]

and

\[ Z = (1 - \theta) \frac{wL + \Pi(Q)}{q}. \quad (45) \]

These demand functions reflect the expenditure shares inherent to the Cobb-Douglas type utility function. The first order conditions imply for the RD case

\[ L = \left( (1 - \theta)^{1-\theta} \theta^\theta \frac{w}{q^{1-\theta} p_i^\theta} \right)^{1/\eta} e^{(\theta/\eta)X_i}, \]

whereas labor supply in the DS case reads

\[ L = \left( (1 - \theta)^{1-\theta} \theta^\theta \frac{w}{q^{1-\theta} p_i^\theta} \right)^{1/\eta}. \quad (47) \]

On the supply side, the Ricardian technologies for the two types of goods are

\[ Z = BN \text{ and } Q_i = AN_i. \]

Here \( A \) and \( B \) are the labor productivity coefficients while \( N \) and \( N_i \) are the respective labor demands. Perfect competition in the composite goods market implies that prices equal the
per unit labor costs \( q = w/B \).

The differentiated goods producer exploits his direct pricing power, but ignores his pricing effect on the price index of the differentiated goods and the consumer income \( wL + \Pi(Q) \). For the RD case, the markup is \( \mu_n \) from (7), so that by (2) \( p_i = (1 + \mu_n) w/A \) and where \( c = w/A \). Substitute this and and \( q = w/B \) into (46) to determine the equilibrium labor supply as a function of the markup factor conditional on the specific demand shock

\[
L = \left( \theta^\theta (1 - \theta)^{1-\theta} A^\theta B^{1-\theta} \right)^{1/\eta} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \mu_n} \right)^{\theta/\eta} e^{(\theta/\eta)X_i} = \varphi(A, B) \left( \frac{1}{1 + \mu_n} \right)^{\theta/\eta} e^{(\theta/\eta)X_i},
\]

say, and where \( \varphi(A, B) \) is a composite of supply shocks \( A \) and \( B \). Combine the differentiated product sector profits \( (p - w/A)Q_i \) with the demand \( Q_i \) from (44) to get

\[
\Pi(Q) = \frac{\theta \mu_n}{1 + (1 - \theta) \mu_n} wL
\]

Finally, combining (49) with (48) yields the unconditional per capita macro demand for the differentiated good

\[
Q_i = \frac{\theta}{1 + (1 - \theta) \mu_n} A \varphi(A, B) \left( \frac{1}{1 + \mu_n} \right)^{\theta/\eta} e^{(\theta/\eta)X_i}
\]

and

\[
Q_j = 0, \ \forall j \neq i
\]

Similarly, the demand for the competitive good is

\[
Z = \frac{(1 - \theta) (1 + \mu_n)}{1 + (1 - \theta) \mu_n} B \varphi(A, B) \left( \frac{1}{1 + \mu_n} \right)^{\theta/\eta} e^{(\theta/\eta)X_i}.
\]

In the DS specification, the pricing power requires setting prices in proportion to unit labor costs and the markup factor \( \tau \), so that \( p_i = (1 + \tau) w/A \). Labor supply then follows from (47)

\[
L = \varphi(A, B) \left( \frac{1}{1 + \tau} \right)^{\theta/\eta}.
\]
Analogous to the RD case, the demand for the differentiated good is

\[ Q_j = \frac{\theta}{1 + (1 - \theta) \tau} A^\varphi (A, B) \left( \frac{1}{1 + \tau} \right)^{\theta/\eta} , \forall j \]  \hspace{1cm} (53)

and for the competitive good

\[ Z = \frac{(1 - \theta)(1 + \tau)}{1 + (1 - \theta) \tau} B^\varphi (A, B) \left( \frac{1}{1 + \tau} \right)^{\theta/\eta} . \]  \hspace{1cm} (54)

To determine the price level, a simple quantity type relation \( M = wL \) suffices. This determines wages \( w \) and prices \( p_i, q \) in terms of the quantity of money \( M \).

### 10 Second-Order Conditions for Profit Maximization

Recall that the profit function \( \pi(p_i, p) \) for firm \( i \) when it sets price \( p_i \) and all other firms set price \( p \) is

\[ \pi(p_i, p) = (p_i - c) D(p_i, p) - K. \]  \hspace{1cm} (55)

So far, we have analyzed the first-order condition for profit maximization, \( \pi_1(p, p; n) = 0, \) which is necessary but not sufficient to ensure equilibrium. Anderson et al. (1992) show (Prop. 6.5, p.171 and Prop. 6.9, p.184) that symmetric price equilibria exist in the Perloff-Salop, Sattinger and Hart models when \( f \) is log-concave. Thus in these cases (55) defines the unique symmetric price equilibrium. However, their results do not cover distributions where \( f \) is not log-concave. We are unable to derive global conditions for existence of equilibrium in these cases. Instead, we verify in this appendix that the markups we study satisfy the second-order conditions for profit-maximization.

#### 10.1 Perloff-Salop, Sattinger and Hart Models

The following three propositions show that the symmetric equilibrium markup expression (2) which we use in our calculations also satisfies the second-order condition for profit maximization, \( \pi_{11}(p, p; n) < 0. \) It is useful to note that, via simple calculations, the second order condition is

\[ \pi_{11}(p, p; n) = 2D_1(p, p; n) - \frac{D(p, p; n)}{D_1(p, p; n)} D_{11}(p, p; n) < 0. \]  \hspace{1cm} (56)
Proposition 8 Assume that $F$ satisfies the conditions for Theorem 2, that $f^3(x)$ is $[w_l, w_u]$-integrable, and that

$$-4\Gamma (\gamma + 2)^2 + \Gamma (2\gamma + 3) < 0,$$

which holds for $-1.45 < \gamma < 0.64$. Then the second-order condition for profit maximization is satisfied in the symmetric equilibrium of the Perloff-Salop model.

Note that this covers all distributions with thin ($-1 \leq \gamma \leq 0$) and medium fat tails ($\gamma = 0$), and all the heavy tailed distributions with a finite variance, i.e. $\gamma \in (0,1/2]$.

Proposition 9 Assume that $F$ satisfies the conditions for Theorem 2, that $f^3(x)$ is $[w_l, w_u]$-integrable, and that either $\gamma > 0$ or

$$-4\Gamma (\gamma + 2)^2 + \Gamma (2\gamma + 3) < 0,$$

which holds for $-1.45 < \gamma \leq 0$. Then the second-order condition for profit maximization is satisfied in the symmetric equilibrium of the Sattinger model.

Proposition 10 Assume that the conditions for Theorem 2 are satisfied, and that $e^{\psi x} f^3(x)$ is $[w_l, w_u]$-integrable. Then the second-order condition for profit maximization is satisfied in the symmetric equilibrium of the Hart model.

Proof of Proposition 8

We use $U_n = F^{-1}(1/n)$ as a shortcut notation in several of the proofs below. Note, from Section 7 in this Appendix, that

$$D(p_i, p) = \int f(x) F^{n-1}(x + p - p_i) \, dx$$

and

$$D_1(p_i, p) = -(n-1) \int f(x) f(x + p - p_i) F^{n-2}(x + p - p_i) \, dx,$$

from which we may calculate

$$D_{11}(p, p) = \frac{(n-1)(n-2)}{2} \int f^3(x) F^{n-3}(x) \, dx + \frac{n-1}{2} f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \bigg|_{-\infty}^{\infty}$$
where the last term on the RHS vanishes. So, applying Proposition 1,

\[ \pi_{11}(p;p;n) = 2D_1(p,p;n) - \frac{D(p,p;n)}{D_1(p,p;n)}D_{11}(p,p;n) \]

\[ = -2(n-1) \int f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx + \frac{(n-1)(n-2)}{n(n-1)} \int f^3(x) F^{n-3}(x) \, dx \]

\[ = -2(n-1) \int f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx + \frac{(n-2)}{2n} \int f^3(x) F^{n-3}(x) \, dx \]

\[ \sim -2f(U_n) \Gamma(\gamma + 2) + \frac{f(U_n) \Gamma(2\gamma + 3)}{2\Gamma(\gamma + 2)} \]

\[ = \frac{f(U_n)}{2\Gamma(\gamma + 2)} (-4\Gamma(\gamma + 2)^2 + \Gamma(2\gamma + 3)) . \]

since we can easily verify numerically that \(-4\Gamma(\gamma + 2)^2 + \Gamma(2\gamma + 3) < 0\) for \(-1.45 < \gamma \leq 0\), it follows that

\[ \pi_{11}(p;p;n) < 0 \text{ for } \gamma \in [-1.45, 0.64] . \]

**Proof of Proposition 9**

Without loss of generality, let \(\theta y = 1\). Then, from Section 7 in this Appendix,

\[ D(p_i,p) = \frac{1}{p_i} \int f(x) F^{n-1}(x + \ln p - \ln p_i) \, dx \text{ and } \]

\[ D_1(p_i,p) = -\frac{1}{p_i^2} \int f(x) F^{n-1}(x + \ln p - \ln p_i) \, dx \]

\[ - \frac{n-1}{p_i^2} \int f(x) f(x + \ln p - \ln p_i) F^{n-2}(x + \ln p - \ln p_i) \, dx, \]

from which we may calculate

\[ D_{11}(p,p) = \frac{2}{p^3} \int f(x) F^{n-1}(x) \, dx + 3\frac{n-1}{p^3} \int f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \, dx \]

\[ + \frac{(n-1)(n-2)}{2p^3} \int f^3(x) F^{n-3}(x) \, dx + \frac{n-1}{2p^3} \left[ f^2(x) F^{n-2}(x) \right]_{-\infty}^{\infty} \]

where the last term on the RHS vanishes. We may then substitute our expressions for \(D(p,p;n), D_1(p,p;n), D_{11}(p,p;n)\) into (56) and apply Proposition 1. The asymptotic ex-
pression simplifies to

$$\pi_{11} (p, p; n) = 2D_1 (p, p; n) - \frac{D (p, p; n)}{D_1 (p, p; n)} D_1 (p, p; n)$$

$$= -\frac{2}{p^2} \left( \int f (x) F^{n-1} (x) \, dx + (n - 1) \int f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx \right)$$

$$+ \frac{2 \int f (x) F^{n-1} (x) \, dx + 3 (n - 1) \int f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx}{+ \frac{2}{p^2} \left( \int F^n (x) \, dx \right)}$$

$$\frac{2}{p^2} \left( \int f (x) F^{n-1} (x) \, dx + (n - 1) \int f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) \, dx \right)$$

$$= \frac{p^{-2}}{n} \left( -2 \left( 1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2) \right) + o \left( n f (U_n) \right) \right)$$

$$= \frac{p^{-2}}{n} \left( -2 \left( 1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2) \right) + \frac{2 + 3 n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)}{1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)} \right)$$

$$= \frac{p^{-2}}{n} \left( -2 \left( 1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2) \right) + \frac{2 + 3 n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)}{1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)} \right)$$

$$+ o \left( n f (U_n) \right)$$

$$< 0.$$

In the case $nf (U_n) = o (1)$, which implies $\gamma \geq 0$ and $f (w_u) = 0$, we get

$$\pi_{11} (p, p; n) = \frac{p^{-2}}{n} \left( \frac{-2 \left( 1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2) \right) + o \left( n f (U_n) \right)}{1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)} \right)$$

$$= \frac{p^{-2}}{n} \left( -\frac{2 \left( 1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2) \right) + o \left( n f (U_n) \right)}{1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)} \right)$$

$$= \frac{p^{-2}}{n} \left( -\frac{2 \left( 1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2) \right) + o \left( n f (U_n) \right)}{1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)} \right)$$

$$< 0.$$

In the case $\lim_{n \to \infty} n f (U_n) \in (0, \infty)$, which implies $\gamma = 0$, we get

$$\pi_{11} (p, p; n) = \frac{p^{-2}}{n} \left( \frac{-2 \left( 1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2) \right) + o \left( n f (U_n) \right)}{1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)} \right)$$

$$= \frac{p^{-2}}{n} \left( -\frac{2 \left( 1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2) \right) + o \left( n f (U_n) \right)}{1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)} \right)$$

$$= \frac{p^{-2}}{n} \left( -\frac{2 \left( 1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2) \right) + o \left( n f (U_n) \right)}{1 + n f (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2)} \right)$$

$$< 0.$$

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In the case $\lim_{n \to \infty} nf (U_n) = \infty$, which implies $\gamma \leq 0$, we get

$$\pi_{11} (p, p; n) = \frac{p^{-2}}{n} \left( -2 \left( 1 + nf (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2) \right) + o (nf (U_n)) \right)$$

$$= \frac{p^{-2}}{n} \left( -2 \left( nf (U_n) \Gamma (\gamma + 2) \right) + o (nf (U_n)) \right)$$

$$= p^{-2} f (U_n) \left( -2 \Gamma (\gamma + 2) + \frac{1}{2} \Gamma (2 \gamma + 3) \right);$$

since we can easily verify numerically that $-2 \Gamma (\gamma + 2) + \frac{1}{2} \Gamma (2 \gamma + 3) < 0$ for $-1.45 < \gamma \leq 0$, it follows that

$$\pi_{11} (p, p; n) < 0$$

for $\gamma \in [-1.45, 0].$ □

**Proof of Proposition 10**

Note that in the Hart case, we are restricted to $\gamma \in [-1, 0]$. We have, from Section 7 in this Appendix,

$$D (p, p) = \frac{1}{p^1 + \psi} \int e^{\psi x} f (x) F^{n-1} (x + \ln p - \ln p_i) dx$$

and

$$D_1 (p, p) = -\frac{1}{p^2 + \psi} \left\{ (1 + \psi) \int e^{\psi x} f (x) F^{n-1} (x + \ln p - \ln p_i) dx + (n - 1) \int e^{\psi x} f (x) f (x + \ln \rho - \ln p_i) F^{n-2} (x + \ln p - \ln p_i) dx \right\},$$

from which we may calculate

$$D_{11} (p, p) = \frac{1}{p^3 + \psi} \left\{ (1 + \psi) (2 + \psi) \int e^{\psi x} f (x) F^{n-1} (x) dx + 3 \left( 1 + \frac{\psi}{2} \right) (n - 1) \int e^{\psi x} f^2 (x) F^{n-2} (x) dx + \frac{1}{2} (n - 1) (n - 2) \int e^{\psi x} f^3 (x) F^{n-3} (x) dx \right\}.$$

We may then substitute our expressions for $D (p, p; n), D_1 (p, p; n), D_{11} (p, p; n)$ into (56) and apply Proposition 1. This gives us

$$2D_1 (p, p; n) - \frac{D (p, p; n)}{D_1 (p, p; n)} D_{11} (p, p; n) = \frac{e^{\psi U_n}}{p^2 + \psi} (A + B),$$

where $A, B$ are functions of $\gamma$. □
where

\[ A \sim -2(1+\psi)\Gamma(1-a\psi) - 2n f(U_n)\Gamma(\gamma + 2 - a\psi), \]
and

\[ B \sim \Gamma(1-a\psi) \frac{1}{(1+\psi)\Gamma(1-a\psi) + n f(U_n)\Gamma(\gamma + 2 - a\psi)} \]

After some tedious but straightforward calculations: if \( a = 0 \), then \( n f(U_n) \rightarrow_{n \to \infty} \infty \), and the asymptotic expression simplifies to

\[ \pi_{11}(p, p; n) \sim e^{\psi U_n} \frac{nf(U_n)}{p_i^{2+\psi}} \left( -2 \Gamma(\gamma + 2) + \frac{\Gamma(2\gamma + 3)}{2\Gamma(\gamma + 2)} \right) < 0 \text{ for } \gamma \in [-1, 0] \]

Since we can verify that \(-2\Gamma(\gamma + 2) + \frac{\Gamma(2\gamma + 3)}{2\Gamma(\gamma + 2)} < 0 \) for \( \gamma \in [-1, 0] \), our claim holds in the case \( a = 0 \).

If \( 0 < a < \infty \), then \( \gamma = 0 \), \( nU_n \to 1/a \) and the asymptotic expression simplifies to

\[ \pi_{11}(p, p; n) \sim e^{\psi U_n} \frac{\Gamma(1-a\psi)}{p_i^{2+\psi}} \left( -2(1 + 1/a) + \left\{ \frac{(1+\psi)(2+\psi) + 3(1+\psi/2)(1/a - \psi)}{1+1/a} + \frac{1}{2}(2/a - \psi)(1/a - \psi) \right\} \right) \]

\[ = -\frac{e^{\psi U_n} \Gamma(1-a\psi)}{p_i^{2+\psi} a} < 0. \]

### 10.2 ELRU Model

Finally, we check the second order condition for the ELRU model in the case that the density \( f(x) \) is of the Rootzen type (27).

**Proposition 11** Assume that the conditions for Theorem 3 are satisfied. Suppose, moreover, that the distribution for the “taste for money” is such that the variance is smaller than the square of the mean, i.e. \( V[\beta] < E[\beta]^2 \). Then the second-order condition for profit maximization
is satisfied in the symmetric equilibrium of the ELRU model.

**Proof of Proposition 11** First condition on $\beta$, $w$ and hence $q = \beta p + w$ having a fixed value. Differentiation gives

$$
\frac{\partial^2 D(p, p)}{\partial p_i^2} = -\beta^2 \int_q^\infty \frac{\partial f(s)}{\partial s} \left[ (n-1) F^{n-2}(s) f(s) \right] ds
$$

$$
\sim -\beta^2 \int_q^\infty \left[ -\kappa \lambda^2 \phi^2 x^{2\phi + \nu - 2} \exp(-\lambda x^\phi) \right] \left[ (n-1) F^{n-2}(s) f(s) \right] ds.
$$

Moreover, for $s$ close to zero

$$
f'(F^{-1}(s)) \sim -\phi^2 \lambda^{2/\phi} s \left[ \ln \frac{A}{s} \right]^{-\alpha/\phi} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{A}{s} \left[ \ln \frac{A}{s} \right]^{\alpha/\phi} \right) \right]^{2+\nu-2/\phi}.
$$

From this the regular variation at zero of $f'(F^{-1}(y))$ follows:

$$
\lim_{y \to 0} \frac{f'(F^{-1}(xy))}{f'(F^{-1}(y))} = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{f'(F^{-1}(x/t))}{f'(F^{-1}(1/t))}
$$

$$
= x \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\left[ \ln \frac{At}{x} \right]^{\nu/\phi} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{At}{x} \left[ \ln \frac{At}{x} \right]^{\nu/\phi} \right) \right]^{2+\nu-2/\phi}}{\left[ \ln At \right]^{\nu/\phi} \left[ \ln \left( At \left[ \ln At \right]^{\alpha/\phi} \right) \right]^{2+\nu-2/\phi}}
$$

$$
= x.
$$

Hence, $f'(F^{-1}(y)) \in RV_1$. So that by the main theorem at given values of $\beta$ and $w$

$$
\frac{\partial^2 D(p, p)}{\partial p_i^2} \sim -\beta^2 f'(F^{-1}(\frac{1}{n}))
$$

$$
\sim \beta^2 \phi^2 \lambda^{2/\phi} \frac{1}{n} \left[ \ln A + \ln n \right]^{-\nu/\phi} \left\{ \ln A + \ln n + \frac{\nu}{\phi} \ln \left( \ln A + \ln n \right) \right\}^{2+\nu-2/\phi}
$$

$$
\sim \beta^2 \phi^2 \lambda^{2/\phi} \frac{1}{n} \left( \ln n \right)^{2-2/\phi}.
$$
Subsequently apply the same sandwich arguments as were used in the proof to Lemma 7 and integrate out over the random taste for money and outside option. This gives

$$\frac{\partial^2 D(p, p)}{\partial p_i^2} \sim \phi^2 \lambda^{2/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{2-2/\phi} \mathbb{E}[^2]$$

The second order condition becomes

$$2D_1 - \frac{D}{D_1} D_{11} \sim -2\phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \mathbb{E}[\beta]$$

$$+ \frac{1/n}{\phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \mathbb{E}[\beta]} \phi^2 \lambda^{2/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{2-2/\phi} \mathbb{E}[^2]$$

$$= -2\phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \mathbb{E}[\beta] + \phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \mathbb{E}[^2] \mathbb{E}[\beta]$$

$$= -\phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \frac{1}{\mathbb{E}[\beta]} \left\{ 2\mathbb{E}[\beta]^2 - \mathbb{E}[^2] \right\}$$

$$= -\phi \lambda^{1/\phi} \frac{1}{n} (\ln n)^{1-1/\phi} \frac{\mathbb{E}[^2] - \text{var}[\beta]}{\mathbb{E}[\beta]}.$$ 

The SOC is satisfied if the variance of the taste for money is smaller than the square of mean.
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