ALAN GELDER

CONTACT

Economic Science Institute
Chapman University
One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866, USA

gelder@chapman.edu
1-319-621-7086 (Cell)
http://agelder.weebly.com

Home Address
1201 Fairhaven Ave. Apt. 6F
Santa Ana, CA 92705, USA

Citizenship: U.S.

MAJOR FIELDS OF CONCENTRATION

Primary: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Experimental/Behavioral Economics, Data Linkage
Other Interests: Industrial Organization, Political Economy, Public Economics, Cliometrics

EDUCATION

Degree	Field	Institution	Year
Ph.D.	Economics	University of Iowa	Aug 2014
M.A.	Economics	University of Iowa	Dec 2011
B.A.	Economics	Brigham Young University	Apr 2009
Minors	Anthropology, Mathematics		

DISSERTATION

Title: Multi-Stage Contests: Theory and Experiments
Dissertation Committee: Dan Kovenock (co-chair), Nicholas Yannelis (co-chair), Rabah Amir, Kyungmin Kim, Frederick Boehmke

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Postdoctoral Fellow

Economic Science Institute, Chapman University: August 2014–Present

Instructor

Principles of Microeconomics (U Iowa, 06E:001): Spring 2012, 2013, Fall 2012
Statistics for Strategy Problems (U Iowa, 06E:071): Fall 2011, Summer 2012
Intermediate Microeconomics (U Iowa, 06E:104): Fall 2013 (Team Teacher)
PhD Math Camp—Week 1: Calculus, Linear Algebra (U Iowa): 2011, 2012

Teaching Assistant

Dr. Blake Whitten, Statistics for Strategy Problems (U Iowa, 06E:071): 2009–2011
Dr. Scott Condie, Intermediate Macroeconomics (BYU, Econ 381): 2007–2008

Research Assistant

Dr. Joseph Price, Department of Economics, BYU: 2008–2009

(Revised: October 29, 2015)

PUBLISHED WORK

Gelder, A. (2014). From Custer to Thermopylae: Last Stand Behavior in Multi-Stage Contests. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 87, 442–466. [Link]

REVISE & RESUBMIT

Gelder, A., Kovenock, D. (2015). Dynamic Behavior and Player Types in Majoritarian Multi-Battle Contests. Chapman University, Economic Science Institute Working Paper No. 15–02. SSRN No. 2558229. *Games and Economic Behavior*, Revise and Resubmit. [Link]

WORKING PAPERS/WORK IN PROGRESS

Gelder, A., Kovenock, D., Roberson, B. (2015). All-Pay Auctions with Ties. Chapman University, Unpublished Manuscript, October 2015.

Gelder, A., Kovenock, D., Sheremeta, R. (2015). Behavior in All-Pay Auctions with Ties. Chapman University, Economic Science Institute Working Paper No. 15–22. SSRN No. 2683568. *Job Market Paper.* [Link]

Gelder, A. (2014). Methodological Advances for Linking Historical Censuses: With an Application to Occupational Following. In: Multi-Stage Contests: Theory and Experiments. Univ. Iowa, Ph.D. Thesis, 88–123. [Link]

Gelder, A., Kovenock, D. Anchoring, Status Quo Bias, and Conflict.
(Data collected, currently writing)

Gelder, A., Kovenock, D. Multi-Battle Contests with Ties.
(Preliminary theoretical results)

Gelder, A., Kovenock, D. Rent Dissipation in Two-Player All-Pay Auctions.
(Data partially collected)

CONFERENCES

Conference and Seminar Presentations (by paper)

All-Pay Auctions with Ties and *Behavior in All-Pay Auctions with Ties*
85th Southern Economic Association Conference; New Orleans; Nov 2015
15th SAET Conference; Cambridge, England; Jul 2015
Contests: Theory and Evidence Conference; Norwich, England; Jul 2015

Dynamic Behavior and Player Types in Majoritarian Multi-Battle Contests
11th Econometric Society World Congress; Montreal, Canada; Aug 2015
1st ESI Theory/Experiments Workshop; Orange, California; Apr 2015
17th Southwest Economic Theory Conference; Tucson, Arizona; Mar 2015
25th Int'l Conference on Game Theory; Stony Brook, New York; Jul 2014

From Custer to Thermopylae: Last Stand Behavior in Multi-Stage Contests

Seminars: Lancaster University; University of Nebraska - Lincoln; Brigham Young University; Monash University; University of Technology, Sydney; Jan–Apr 2014

13th SAET Conference; Paris, France; Jul 2013

Young Researchers Workshop on Contests; Dortmund, Germany; Nov 2012

Faculty Presenter

20th and 21st Visiting Graduate Student Workshop in Experimental Economics: Presentation on Contest Experiments; Orange, California; Jan 2015, 2016

Invited Participant

18th Visiting Graduate Student Workshop in Experimental Economics; Jan 2013

PROGRAMMING

R, Visual Basic.NET (for lab experiments), Mathematica, MATLAB, Stata, LaTeX

REFEREE

Economics of Education Review; *Economic Theory*; *Games and Economic Behavior*; *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*

AWARDS AND HONORS

Ballard and Seashore Dissertation Year Fellowship, 2013–2014

Graduate Student Senate Travel Funds Award, 2013

Glenn E. and Olive W. Nielson Scholarship, 2008

Brigham Young Scholarship: 2003, 2006, 2007

Research Grant: Shallit Memorial Fund, BYU, 2006

Research Grant: Office of Research and Creative Activities, BYU, 2006

REFERENCES

Dan Kovenock
Professor of Economics
Economic Science Institute
Chapman University
1-714-628-7226
kovenock@chapman.edu

David Porter
Professor of Economics and Math
Economic Science Institute
Chapman University
1-714-997-6915
dporter@chapman.edu

Vernon Smith
2002 Nobel Prize Laureate
Professor of Economics and Law
Chapman University
1-714-628-2830
vsmith@chapman.edu

Nicholas Yannelis
Professor of Economics
Dept. of Economics
University of Iowa
1-319-335-2290
nicholas-yannelis@uiowa.edu

John Solow (Teaching)
Professor of Economics
Chair, Dept. of Economics
University of Iowa
1-319-335-0845
john-solow@uiowa.edu

RESEARCH SUMMARY

I study microeconomics using theory, laboratory experiments, and empirical methods. My research largely centers on the study of contests—situations where people essentially pay to play. Examples of contest settings abound and range from lobbying to litigation, sports to warfare, and election campaigns to R&D competitions. In a theoretical article published in *Games and Economic Behavior* **(From Custer to Thermopylae: Last Stand Behavior in Multi-Stage Contests)**, I find that last stand behavior is optimal in a dynamic contest environment where players not only have an incentive to win, but a distinct incentive to avoid losing. In a follow-up study **(Dynamic Behavior and Player Types in Majoritarian Multi-Battle Contests)**, which is currently revise and resubmit at *Games and Economic Behavior*, I use a laboratory experiment to examine the model's theoretical predictions, as well as other behavioral patterns of competition in dynamic contests. Primarily, this study looks at players' propensity to continually escalate a costly competition, to willingly surrender, or to make a last stand on the verge of defeat.

In three additional papers, including my job market paper, I examine contests where winning requires a decisive margin of victory. Otherwise, players tie and each receives a prize that is valued somewhere between winning and losing. This captures, for instance, the idea of political gridlock where neither party is able to implement its preferred policy and the status quo ensues. Other examples include military standoffs with no clear victor, ties and draws in sports, or a business contract divided between top contenders. The first of these three papers **(All-Pay Auctions with Ties)** develops the theoretical underpinnings by extending the canonical all-pay auction to the study of ties. Here, ties are defined along two parameters: the margin required for victory, and the value of tying relative to winning and losing. My job market paper **(Behavior in All-Pay Auctions with Ties)** then studies the all-pay auction with ties in a laboratory experiment by varying both the margin required for victory and the relative value of tying. I identify a non-monotonic relationship between each of these parameters and how aggressively players compete. Importantly, by imposing a moderately sized margin for victory, players compete even more aggressively than in the standard win-loss framework. The third paper **(Anchoring, Status Quo Bias, and Conflict)** is a behavioral twist on the framing of the contest. It uses another laboratory experiment to contrast strategic interaction in two distinct types of contests: one where winning represents a potential Pareto improvement; and another where winning has more of a zero-sum nature with the loser paying the winner, and neither player paying the other if a tie occurs. In the zero-sum case, there is a pronounced tendency for players to overemphasize the value of tying and compete less aggressively.

My research also extends into the field of probabilistic data linkage. An endeavor that I am particularly interested in is linking information about individuals and families across historical censuses. Although censuses are a rich source of micro-level data, they are by nature cross-sectional. Only a few attempts have been made to systematically link each individual from one census with the corresponding individual in another census—much rarer still to attempt this exercise over more than two censuses. I attempt it with six censuses spanning the Victorian era for Cornwall County, England, and achieve a 43% matching rate from one census to the next **(Methodological Advances for Linking Historical Censuses)**. Since writing the current version of this paper, I have made significant strides to improve the algorithm's accuracy and cut its computational time.